GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY
Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy
Department of Criminology, Law & Society

Rainier Beach:
A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth

2019 Evaluation Update

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Report prepared for the City of Seattle

April 30, 2020

Contract Number: DC19-1603

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This evaluation update was funded by the City of Seattle Human Services Department, Contract # DC19-1603. Prior support for this research through 2016 was provided by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice (Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation grant # 2012-AJ-BX-0006) and funding from 2016 to 2018 was provided by the City of Seattle Human Services Department (Contract #s DC16-1603, DC17-1603, and DC18-1603). The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, or the City of Seattle.

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What is Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth?

Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth (ABSPY) is an innovative community-led, place-based violence prevention initiative. The goal of the program is to reduce youth victimization and crime in the Rainier Beach neighborhood. The program is named for the vision set out by the Rainier Beach community in its Neighborhood Plan Update, which is to make Rainier Beach a Beautiful Safe Place. ABSPY is happening in five small groups of street blocks in the neighborhood—"hot spots"—where about half of all youth crime incidents in Rainier Beach happened in 2012. The five hot spots are Rose Street, Rainier and Henderson, Rainier Beach Light Rail Station, Lake Washington, and Our Safe Way. This report updates our original 2016 evaluation report and 2017 update.

ABSPY Background

ABSPY is based on a number of research studies, including one from Seattle by David Weisburd and his colleagues, showing that about half of all crime in cities comes from a very small number—typically about 5 percent—of street blocks. Crime involving young people is even more likely to come from a small number of places. Research shows that police efforts to reduce crime at hot spots through crackdowns and arrests are effective at reducing crime, but arrest and prosecution can increase the chance of reoffending among high-risk youth. ABSPY focuses on **non-arrest** strategies to reduce crime, such as building community leadership and capacity to help solve problems and addressing environmental risk factors for crime to promote community safety. ABSPY was originally funded by a $1 million grant from the Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program, an initiative of the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance, awarded in 2012, and has been funded by the City of Seattle since 2016. The Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program supports partnerships between cities, communities, and researchers to develop community-led, place-based, data-driven problem-solving efforts. ABSPY is advised by a Core Team including representatives from the City of Seattle, the Seattle Neighborhood Group, Seattle Police Department, the Boys and Girls Club of King County, Seattle Public Schools, and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition. However, what makes ABSPY unique is that community members in Rainier Beach itself have taken the lead in developing evidence-informed strategies to address the root causes of youth crime in the neighborhood.

Community-Led Problem Solving

From 2013 through 2016, in an effort overseen by the Core Team, community members from the five Rainier Beach hot spots took the lead in developing evidence-informed strategies to address the root causes of youth crime in the neighborhood. These interventions were tailored to the specific conditions in each hot spot, and continue to be regularly updated and adjusted based on new data and changing conditions in the hot spots. ABSPY's signature interventions include:

- **Corner Greeter** events, led by the Rainier Beach Action Coalition, in which young people from the neighborhood set up stations offering refreshments, information, and fun activities in each hot spot to engage community members and "activate" places that were previously considered to be unsafe.
- **Safe Passage**, led by the Boys and Girls Club of King County, which provides guardianship, supervision, and encouragement to young people as they leave school.

- **Business engagement**, coordinated by Seattle Neighborhood Group and supported by the Rainier Beach Merchants Association, Seattle Police Department, and local community and economic development organizations. This intervention focuses on learning about the concerns facing local businesses, building relationships between businesses and with the police, and increasing business owners' ability to prevent and report crime.
- **Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)** interventions and resources, applied to both public and private property, to improve design, layout, and place management.
- **Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS)** in both school and community settings, overseen by Seattle Public Schools and the ABSPY Core Team, to collaboratively set behavioral expectations for young people, reward good behavior, and support youth in need of services.

Updated Evaluation Findings

The Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University is the research partner for ABSPY. We tracked calls for service and reported crime in the five hot spots from September 2011 to August 2019. We paired each Rainier Beach hot spot with a comparison hot spot—a similar location elsewhere in Seattle Police Department's South Precinct—and assessed crime rates in the Rainier Beach hot spots and neighborhood compared to trends in the South Precinct. We have also conducted five waves of community surveys in the hot spots and comparison areas—one in the summer of 2014 before the ABSPY interventions began (Wave 1), and follow-ups in the summers of 2016 (Wave 2), 2017 (Wave 3), 2018 (Wave 4), and 2019 (Wave 5).

Our updated findings for 2019 show that **ABSPY continues to have a number of positive effects, but there has been some slippage** that needs to be addressed in 2020. We find that:

- The hot spots have continued to become less "hot" over time, but there has been a slight uptick in youth crime at Rainier and Henderson, and violent and minor offenses are still much higher at Safeway than they were pre-ABSPY. However, youth crime has almost disappeared at Rose Street and the Light Rail.
- Calls for service and crime incidents were higher in the Rainier Beach hot spots while the ABSPY interventions were active. However, this may be a result of people calling the police more (i.e. getting more engaged in crime prevention efforts) rather than a backfire effect. This is a common finding in evaluations of interventions that aim to increase community involvement in crime prevention.
- Recognition of and satisfaction with ABSPY interventions have decreased in Rainier Beach. Only about half of people we surveyed in Rainier Beach were aware of ABSPY and its signature interventions, and satisfaction levels among those who had noticed the interventions was much lower than in previous years. However, satisfaction with the signature interventions—business improvements, Corner Greeters, and Safe Passage—is still in the 70-80% range.

- Most people in Rainier Beach believe crime has gotten better in the past year, but fewer said so than last year. However, the number of people who said crime had gotten better in the past year was still significantly higher than it was in 2014 before ABSPY began. Feelings of safety also continue to steadily improve in Rainier Beach.
- Social cohesion fell slightly this year after improving steadily since ABSPY began, but we continued to see small improvements in collective efficacy.
- People's impressions of the police in Rainier Beach were less positive than last year, but respondents said they saw police activity more frequently. This finding may have been affected by high-profile crime incidents in the neighborhood in 2019 as well as lower engagement with SPD on the Core Team.

Recommendations for 2020

It is not surprising that interventions intended to create sustainable change at long-term hot spots of crime can take many years to work. However, the advantage of regular data analysis and evaluation is the ability to catch potential problems early and make course corrections. We recommend the following focus areas in 2020 to address some of the less positive trends:

- **The ABSPY Core Team should continue to consider its role and membership.** In particular, it may be important to revitalize the Implementation Team to ensure that interventions are being delivered with appropriate dosage and intensity. We recommend engaging with other community partners in Rainier Beach to share the effort and maximize impact.
- **Focus on re-engaging the community and increasing community representation.** Ensuring authentic community representation on the Core Team will ensure that ABSPY interventions continue to reflect community priorities.
- **Re-engage SPD in ABSPY and the Core Team.** Ensuring Seattle Police Department has continued representation on the Core Team may assist with relationship-building and improve community perceptions of the police.
- **Consider whether changes need to be made to the focus hot spots.** Given that youth crime has dwindled so much at Rose Street and the Light Rail, the Core Team should consider whether to discontinue or reduce ABSPY efforts at these locations to focus on addressing slippage or sustaining successes at the other hot spots.
- **Adapt ABSPY and its evaluation strategy in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.** While this recommendation does not stem from our 2019 analysis, the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in the first quarter of 2020 presents unprecedented challenges for the implementation and evaluation of community-led crime prevention efforts. We will need to focus on how ABSPY operates and responds to community needs amid social distancing and other disease prevention efforts, and how to assess its effect given the pandemic's likely impact on crime rates.

1 Background

This report updates the original *Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth* (ABSPY) Final Evaluation Report (Gill et al., 2016) and subsequent evaluation updates (Gill et al., 2018; Gill & Vitter, 2017) with new findings from our community survey and crime analysis in 2019. ABSPY is a **community-led, place-based, data-driven, non-arrest based collaboration** focused on preventing crime in five juvenile and youth crime hot spots in the Rainier Beach neighborhood of Seattle (see Figure 1). ABSPY builds on several neighborhood and City processes, including the 2011 Rainier Beach Neighborhood Plan Update (RBNPU) and the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative, and is grounded in research evidence showing that crime—especially crime involving juveniles and youth[1]—is highly concentrated at small places (e.g. Weisburd, 2015; Weisburd et al., 2004; Weisburd et al., 2009). This evidence indicates that policing and crime prevention efforts focused at these hot spots are effective (Braga et al., 2014; Lum et al., 2011; Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018). However, proactive policing approaches that focus on law enforcement strategies such as crackdowns and "busts" to clear offenders from high-crime areas may not be suitable at hot spots of youth crime, since young people who are arrested and processed through the juvenile justice system—especially those involved in less serious crimes—are more likely to reoffend than those who are diverted. Research suggests that community-led, non-arrest strategies may be more appropriate at such places.

Figure 1: Rainier Beach hot spots identified for ABSPY intervention



[1] ABSPY defines "youth" as individuals aged 25 and under. While the juvenile justice system focuses on young people under the age of 18, ABSPY builds on increasing recognition by researchers and policy makers that the brain does not fully develop until around age 25, directly impacting decision-making and risky behavior (e.g. Steinberg, 2008).

The RBNPU explicitly called for a community-led hot spots approach to address crime and improve neighborhood safety in Rainier Beach, which led to the development of ABSPY. The planning process began in 2012 with the development of a successful $1 million grant proposal to the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance's Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program (renamed "Innovations in Community Based Crime Reduction" in 2017). Implementation began in October 2013 with a problem-solving process undertaken by Community Task Force (CTF) teams representing each of the five hot spots, and the subsequent development and implementation of a suite of signature interventions (see below). Federal funding continued through September 2016. Beginning in January 2016, the City of Seattle's Human Services Department also began to fund implementation and evaluation on an annual basis. In 2019 ABSPY received funding through 2020 from the city's Department of Neighborhoods. ABSPY planning and implementation is overseen by a cross-sector Core Team and supported by a range of community intervention partners. A detailed description of ABSPY's history, including key partners, hot spot identification process, problem-solving process, and intervention development, can be found in the original evaluation report (Gill et al., 2016).

2 2019 Intervention Update

Our 2017 evaluation update shows the timeline of ABSPY interventions from October 2013, the beginning of the planning phase, to October 2017 (Gill & Vitter, 2017, p. 3). The interventions continued through the last few months of 2017 and were consistently implemented through 2018 and 2019. Over time, interventions and focus areas have developed (as described below) in response to data and experiences. However, funding was not received in 2019 for administration for Safe Passage (the Safe Passage program itself continued) and a new CPTED youth stewardship program.

The ABSPY initiative faced several challenges in 2019, including a continued focus on relations and power dynamics on the Core Team (for example, the role of institutional versus grass-roots community partners; see our 2018 update (Gill et al., 2018) for more details); and gun violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood, including the high-profile Pritchard Beach shooting in May. Both of these challenges led to questions about the role of ABSPY in Rainier Beach, particularly around how the team should respond to crisis situations and how to balance crisis response with year-round community advocacy and support. However, there were also a number of success stories this year, including two positive meetings with Seattle's Mayor, Jenny Durkan, which resulted in sustained funding for ABSPY through 2020.

2.1 Intervention summary

2.1.1 Coordination and planning

The Core Team continues to meet on a monthly basis to oversee ABSPY and related initiatives. Key Core Team activities and decisions in 2019 included:

- A **"messaging exercise"** in February, in which Core Team members discussed what ABSPY is and should be about and how partners should talk about and promote ABSPY for consistency and impact. The Core Team agreed on several core components of ABSPY that should be highlighted for consistent messaging, including: a public safety action team with a non-arrest focus; place- and

individual-based activities and interventions; data-driven; and centered on PBIS values.

- **Meetings with Mayor Durkan** in March and April. These meetings initially focused on the co-design process for a request for proposals (RFP) that took place toward the end of 2018. Through this process, community partners gave input to develop funding priorities for 2020, which would lead to the City of Seattle issuing a RFP to which ABSPY would apply for continued funding. However, Core Team and Rainier Beach community members were concerned about the lack of emphasis on place-based approaches in the co-design process. The subsequent discussions with the City led to the decision to fund ABSPY in 2020 separately from the RFP and move funding responsibility to the Department of Neighborhoods, better reflecting the place-based focus.

- Following up on previous retreats and peacemaking processes focused on Core Team relations and responsibilities, a further **one-day retreat** was held in July. The key needs and action items arising from the retreat were to:

  – clarify and revisit decision-making processes agreed upon in 2018;

  – transition to a policy-level role focused on systems change rather than being "in the weeds" and focused on programmatic decision-making;

  – clarify the purpose of Core Team meetings and how data are used for accountability

  – ensure the initiative is truly community-led: although the voting structure was changed, involvement from different community partners is still limited—especially community members who are most impacted by the issues ABSPY focuses on.

- A renewed focus on **hot spot activation**. Lake Washington has been a specific focus area for several years after our initial evaluation results showed that ABSPY was not having as much of an impact there compared to other hot spots. However, the Core Team recognized that this may have led to insufficient focus on other hot spots, especially Safeway and the Light Rail. Safeway has been a challenge because of decisions by management to have young people arrested rather than working with ABSPY's non-arrest approach. However, there have been a number of positive efforts to activate all the hot spots and reach out to a broader number of partners, including the second "Get Down" in October and November's Rainier Beach United event, which brought together different community partners who may not have engaged with ABSPY before to find out about different work that is being done and build awareness and alignment. About 50 people attended Rainier Beach United, representing an inclusive cross-section of people and organizations doing work in Rainier Beach. Participants expressed a desire to keep the effort going in 2020.

2.1.2 Safe Passage/Campus Safety Initiative

Safe Passage is one of the flagship initiatives of ABSPY. Overseen by the Boys and Girls Club of King County, Safe Passage provides supervision, guardianship, and a friendly face on the streets in the afternoons (between 1 and 6pm) when children are leaving schools on the Rainier and Henderson campus and the risk of youth crime at this hot spot is highest. Safe Passage staff work for the Boys and Girls Club and are community members who have grown up in the neighborhood. They are easily recognizable by their bright blue jackets or t-shirts with the "Be Safe" slogan, which (along with "Be Safe Bro!") has become

a popular greeting between the Safe Passage team and local young people. While Safe Passage staff are authorized to break up fights, they primarily focus on providing a positive presence and engaging young people as they walk home or head to the bus stop.

The Safe Passage initiative continues to engage young people beyond school times by supporting lunch programs and providing participation and support to community events such as the second "Get Down" pre-game celebration at Rainier Beach High School, which was held at Homecoming in October 2019. The Safe Passage team also participated in a SMART Moves program at Lake Washington apartments, which aims to build relationships between the team and young residents through field trips and other activities. The team plans to add Safeway and Lake Washington to its regular routes.

2.1.3 Corner Greeters

The Corner Greeters initiative, overseen by the Rainier Beach Action Coalition (RBAC), consists of positive community messaging, mobilization, and outreach; pop-up events and activities such as music, dancing, crafts, and other fun and culturally-relevant activities at the hot spots; and community data collection. The goal of the Corner Greeters is to "take back" hot spot spaces for the community and build collective efficacy and empowerment among residents. The key feature of the Corner Greeters is that the events are completely youth-led. Young people from the neighborhood collaborate with RBAC to plan different activities and staff the events. They are also trained to communicate and share ABSPY data and information, such as neighborhood crime data reports, with visitors to their events to connect community members to ABSPY, build collective efficacy, and empower them to take action in the neighborhood. RBAC is also responsible for the Mobile Discovery Center, a unique community information booth on wheels that sets up at Corner Greeter and other neighborhood events. The Corner Greeters also conduct their own surveys regularly at the Rainier Beach hot spots to track community perceptions of safety and collective efficacy at the hot spots, and support ABSPY at community events.

In 2019 the Corner Greeters continued to conduct surveys and plan events to respond to the results they were seeing; for example, in November they arranged a "Light Walk" to identify areas that needed additional street lighting. They held Rainier Beach Town Halls in October and December, and engaged in community outreach through over 700 social media posts and almost 30 Corner Greeter events, as well as the Back to School Bash. Youth representatives from RBAC were key participants in the meetings with Mayor Durkan in March and April. Importantly, in 2019 the Corner Greeters also mobilized in response to the Pritchard Beach shooting by setting up "show love stations" where community members could make cards for victims and reconnect with each other.

2.1.4 Business and community engagement

SPD's South Precinct Community Policing Team continues to support ABSPY by building relationships with business and community stakeholders in Rainier Beach. SPD's activities include engaging with local businesses to help them learn more about crime reporting, CPTED, and steps they can take to reduce their risk of victimization; and generating opportunities for positive interactions with community members through ice-cream socials at the Lake Washington Apartments and participation in the Town Halls, "Get Down," and other community events.

Specific ABSPY engagement activities in 2019 included working with the Rainier Beach Merchants' Association and community liaisons to build relationships with local businesses and connect them with resources, including graffiti removal kits. SPD held a "Cops and Cones" ice-cream social at Lake Washington Apartments in November, which also featured a multicultural potluck.

2.1.5 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

ABSPY partners have continued to work on improvements to local infrastructure (such as landscaping around sidewalks) and storefront improvements to local small businesses (such as removing security bars, repainting and improving curb appeal, and improving sight lines). Community and city partners in these efforts include South East Effective Development (SEED); The Mission Continues, a veterans' organization; the Rainier Valley Chamber of Commerce; and the Rainier Beach Merchants Association.

In 2019 ABSPY received specific funding for graffiti removal, safety training for businesses, and CPTED in public spaces. The team worked with Union Resaurant, Qeerroo Restaurant, and Somali Community Services to install lights; remove security bars and replace them with CPTED-friendly film; install signage; remove graffiti; and other CPTED improvements. A number of "work parties" with The Mission Continues were held throughout the year. RBAC was also involved in addressing CPTED needs in public areas. The RBAC Clean Crew, made up of young people from the neighborhood, went out three times per week to conduct clean-ups and litter removal.

2.1.6 Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) and restorative practices

The NIJ Workgroup of the Core Team continued to meet regularly in 2019 to implement community-wide PBIS and restorative practices under a grant from the National Institute of Justice. In 2019 the team finalized community-wide PBIS and restorative practices plans, conducted community outreach and messaging as part of the PBIS social norms campaign, including hundreds of yard signs around the neighborhood highlighting the "Be^3" (*Be Safe, Be Respectful, Be Responsible*) and a college decision-day party, and hiring and training of youth "circle keepers" to conduct peace circles. Members of the PBIS team made a presentation to public library management and worked with the Lake Washington Apartments on bringing PBIS principles to that space. Team members also attended the Northwest PBIS and Restorative Justice Forums to learn more about what other communities and schools are working on in these spaces.

3 2019 Evaluation Update: Summary of Methods

A detailed description of the data and methods used for this evaluation can be found in the original evaluation report and the 2017 update. In this section we summarize the most important aspects of our approach and the updates we made in 2019. Our 2019 evaluation is based on monthly police data on calls for service and recorded offenses and incidents from January 2011 to August 2019, provided by SPD, and five waves of our community survey, which was conducted by trained local researchers in the summers of 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. Our analytic approach matches each Rainier Beach hot spot with a comparison location elsewhere in SPD's South Precinct, which is similar in terms of crime rates and characteristics such as land use, presence of schools, access to public transit etc. Further details

about the selection of the hot spots and comparison sites and information about the police data are available in our original report. We also report the results of crime and survey data analysis for the Rainier Beach hot spots without the comparison spots. This research design is not as rigorous as the matched comparison hot spot approach because it does not account for other, non-ABSPY-related factors that might affect the results. However, we recognize that due to gentrification and population change in Southeast Seattle some of our matched comparison spots now look very different compared to when they were first identified in 2012. This can also affect the conclusions of the research.

To make this report easier to read, all of the tables and most graphs are included in the Statistical Appendix at the end of this report. You can look at any of the tables or graphs in more detail in the electronic version of this report by clicking on the blue number next to each reference to a table or figure (e.g. Table A1—click the blue "A1" link to see the table).

3.1 Changes to police data in 2019

In May 2019 SPD rolled out a new records management system (RMS) for its incident reports. This changed the way incident data are stored and reported. Specifically, the data are now in NIBRS (National Incident-Based Reporting System) format. The NIBRS program is an update to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system, to which police departments across the United States report their data. The FBI is in the process of rolling out this new program nationally. It allows police departments to report crime in more detail. The new reporting system requires some changes to the way that we categorize incidents and offenses and determine the seriousness of offenses, but allows us to report numbers that are more in line with those shared directly by SPD.

As we described in our original evaluation report, in the old data system a single *incident* could involve multiple *offenses*. For example, a carjacking scenario might involve the suspect threatening the victim with a firearm and then stealing the car. This incident involves two offenses: assault with a deadly weapon and motor vehicle theft. However, under the old FBI reporting system, police departments only had to report the "main" offense in the incident. This was determined by a complex offense seriousness hierarchy. We did not have access to the hierarchy that SPD applied, so we created our own, which prioritized violent offenses/offenses against persons, then property, then other crime types. We would have counted the carjacking example above as an assault incident, which is a person/violent crime, and not a motor vehicle theft, which is a property crime. In our previous reports we shared the number of incidents and offenses, but we mainly focused on incidents. Because we used our own hierarchy to define incidents, our numbers did not always match SPD's official numbers.

NIBRS has an offense hierarchy built in, so we no longer need to create our own. The NIBRS system allows us to determine which offenses are violent and how serious they are in the same way that SPD does, so our numbers are now more in line with theirs. NIBRS data splits offense types into two categories: Group A and Group B. Group A offenses are the most serious and violent offenses, and Group B are non-violent and less serious offenses. All offenses are counted individually, even if they occurred as part of the same event. Therefore, under the new system, we would count the carjacking example above as two offenses: the assault and the motor vehicle theft.

The NIBRS system also classifies offense types into four broad categories: person, property, society, and other. This is a similar classification to the one we created for the old data, except that we called crimes against society "disorder." Under the old system, we determined which crimes fell into each of these

categories. Under the new system, the classification is built in. Therefore, while the broad categories of crime remain the same, there may be variations in the specific offense types included in each one.

SPD provided us with data from the new system going back to 2011 so that we could continue to compare trends year on year. However, for the reasons described above, it is important to note that the new incident data cannot be compared to the old incident data, so numbers in this report will differ from previous reports (although overall trends are the same). We also caution that the 2019 numbers are preliminary as SPD continues to work out challenges with the new system. In particular, a small number of offenses in the citywide are missing address data, so we cannot tell whether or not they happened in Rainier Beach or one of the comparison hot spots. The system for reporting calls for service (CAD) data has not changed.

Finally, to better align with the terminology used by SPD and NIBRS, we will begin referring to incident data as "offense data" or "recorded offenses." In the NIBRS system, *offenses* are crime reports and *incidents* are non-criminal events reported by police, such as death by natural causes or impound of a vehicle. For this reason we will no longer refer to "incident data" to avoid confusion. We will clarify whether numbers just include offenses, or both offenses and incidents, as necessary.

3.2 Police crime data definitions

We use the following information from official police data provided to us by SPD in our analyses. Each measure of crime data can tell us different information about how ABSPY is working. Note that we are not allowed to report the numbers of certain offense types, including homicide, rape, and domestic incidents. These offenses are included in our statistical models because specific numbers cannot be identified, but they are not included when we report the numbers of certain offenses.

1. **Calls for police service.** "Calls for service" include both 911 calls from the public to the police, and the logs that police record (usually on their in-car computers) while they are out on patrol. Calls for service tell us what people in the neighborhood are concerned about, what they are willing to call the police about (which may indicate how much they trust the police), and what the police see or hear about while they are in the neighborhood. But calls for service don't tell us the "true" picture of crime. Sometimes the person calling 911 doesn't know exactly what they are seeing or hearing, but when the police arrive they can determine what type of crime has been committed and record this in their report (see below). Multiple people might call 911 about the same problem, like hearing shots being fired. And sometimes, even if a person was worried about an issue and called the police, it might turn out that no crime has been committed or the police can't find whatever was going on. Calls for service also don't tell us who was involved in a crime (e.g. the age, gender, or race of a suspect or victim). This information is verified by police at the scene and included in the report.

2. **Police reports (offenses).** Police write reports when they respond to a call or see something while on patrol and have reason to believe that a crime may have occurred (such as a victim or witness willing to make a report). Although not every call for service turns into a report, the reports give us a better idea of what happened and who was involved. However, police can decide whether or not to take a report, and sometimes victims don't want the police to take a formal report, so not all crimes make it into the data. Data on offenses and incidents reported by police are stored in the new NIBRS-compliant system described above. This overall category of police reports includes the

juvenile/youth, violent, and minor crime incidents described in points 3-5 below.

3. **Juvenile/youth crime reports.** Because ABSPY is focused on creating a "beautiful safe place for youth," we also analyze reports of offenses that involve young people (under 18 and age 18-25).

4. **Violent crime reports.** ABSPY is also focused on violence prevention, so we look at the effects of the interventions on violent offenses. We define "violent offenses" as murder and non-negligent manslaughter; aggravated assault; robbery; rape; and simple assault.[2]

5. **Group A person offenses.** NIBRS Group A offenses are the most serious or violent offenses. They are similar to Part I offenses in the older Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system, but more offense types are included. Group A person offenses include the violent incident types described above and certain other offenses against the person such as intimidation and kidnapping. To create this category, we selected all offenses that were categorized as both Group A and Person Offenses. A full list of NIBRS offense definitions is available here.

6. **Group A property offenses.** Similar to the Group A person offense category, Group A property offenses include the more serious property offenses. These include crimes like arson, burglary, larceny/theft (including motor vehicle theft), property damage, and so on. To create this category, we selected all offenses that were categorized as both Group A and Property Offenses.

7. **Group B offenses.** NIBRS Group B offenses are typically minor crimes, including things like disorderly conduct, drunkenness, non-violent family offenses, and liquor law violations. It is useful to look at these less serious crimes because if they increase it may suggest that community members are more likely to call the police and feel more empowered to take action against minor quality of life issues.

3.3 Community survey

We conducted a fifth wave of our in-person community survey in the five Rainier Beach hot spots and five comparison hot spots. The survey was conducted in the summer and fall of 2019, five years after the first (baseline) survey ("Wave 1"), which was conducted in summer 2014, three years after "Wave 2" (summer 2016), two years after "Wave 3" (summer 2017), and one year after "Wave 4" (summer 2018). We present results from all five waves in this report for comparison. We asked the same questions in each wave of the survey in order to measure and compare community members' views of crime, safety, collective efficacy and social cohesion, the police, and ABSPY itself. We made a few changes to the questions in 2019 to eliminate questions that were redundant and had not shown any change over time (some questions about perceived disorder in the neighborhood) and added some questions about community engagement and ABSPY interventions. We followed the same approach as we described in our previous reports: the surveys were conducted on the street, in people's homes, and in businesses by a team of five researchers, most of whom came from the local area . As in previous waves, the majority of surveys were conducted on the street so we did not talk to the same people each year.

In total, we have obtained 1,495 valid surveys over our five years of research: 297 in Wave 1, 300 in Wave 2, 290 in Wave 3, 305 in Wave 4, and 303 in Wave 5 (Table A1). Table A2 in the Statistical Appendix shows a full description of the characteristics of survey participants in each wave, as well as the similarities and

[2]We are not permitted to report homicide and rape offenses separately.

differences between respondents in the treatment and comparison hot spots at baseline (Wave 1). Overall, across both the Rainier Beach and comparison hot spots each year, survey participants each year are slightly more likely to be male, aged between 18 and 35, and identify as Black or African American, followed by White. Around two-thirds were born in the United States and just over half had children of any age. Most participants have completed high school or equivalent, or some college classes. Most of the respondents live in the hot spots where they were interviewed; those who did not typically worked there, shopped there, or used public transit. At Wave 1 there were significant differences in age and race between participants in Rainier Beach and the comparison spots, which we control for in our analyses of the survey data. Within the Rainier Beach hot spot participants there were significant differences in the location where the survey was conducted, race, employment and education status, school attendance, and main activity at the hot spot across each of the five waves (not shown in a table), so we also control for these factors in our analyses of Rainier Beach-only effects.

3.4 Analytic strategy

We follow the same analytic strategy from our previous reports in this evaluation update. Specifically, we used difference-in-differences analysis with Poisson regression and robust standard errors to assess the effects of ABSPY on calls for service and offenses while the interventions were active and inactive, accounting for clustering within the hot spots and controlling for seasonal and overall crime trends (Berk & MacDonald, 2008; Kondo et al., 2015; see also Gill et al., 2016). We also statistically examine pre-post change in the Rainier Beach hot spots, removing the comparison sites, to address concerns about the differences between the Rainier Beach and comparison locations. The updated timeframe for the police data analysis is January 2011 to August 2019 (104 months).[3] We also present descriptive graphs showing offense in each hot spot and across all five Rainier Beach hot spots from September 2011 to August 2019, and the percentage change in each crime outcome pre- and post-May 2014 (when the first interventions were rolled out) in each hot spot relative to its comparison site, the overall Rainier Beach neighborhood, and the South Precinct overall.

As in our 2018 report, we also calculated the crime inflation factor, which is the ratio of calls to offenses in the pre-intervention and during-intervention periods (Weisburd et al., 2020). The crime inflation factor assesses whether higher numbers of offenses can be attributed to increased calls to the police (reflecting improved collective efficacy and trust in police among residents) rather than ABSPY failing to work or even "backfiring." This is an important potential source of bias in analyzing the effects of interventions that aim to decrease crime but increase citizen engagement with crime prevention (which can result in more calls to the police). We calculated the inflation factor for both the treatment and comparison hot spots and adjusted the number of incidents in the treatment spots by the difference between the treatment and comparison group inflation factors. This process and its results are described in section 4.3.

As in our previous reports, we used multilevel mixed effects regression models (e.g. Kochel & Weisburd, 2017) to analyze the effects of ABSPY on community member perceptions measured by the surveys, accounting for the clustering of individual within hot spots. These models include a series of interaction terms that allow us to compare the short- and longer-term effects of ABSPY with the original, pre-ABSPY survey findings (Wave 1). As noted above, we controlled for age and race in the models that include both the Rainier Beach and comparison hot spots, and age, employment, education, and main activity at the

[3] Refer to the 2017 Evaluation Update for a table showing pre-intervention monthly average numbers for each crime outcome.

hot spot in the Rainier Beach-only models. We used linear, logistic, and ordered logistic regression depending on the outcome measure, and regular one-level models when the random effects were unstable (see notes on individual tables in the Statistical Appendix). All Rainier Beach-only analyses use one-level models. As before, we combined individual survey questions into scales to measure concepts such as social cohesion, collective efficacy, feelings of safety, and perceptions of police. Table A3 describes each survey outcome included in our analysis; Cronbach's α[4] and the number of questions in the scale, where relevant; and descriptive statistics and number of responses at each wave.

4 Updated Evaluation Findings

4.1 The hot spots continue to get less "hot" over time, but we should not lose focus on small changes

Figure 2 shows a small but steady downward trend in the number of offenses and incidents involving youth between September 2011 and August 2019. Youth offenses and incidents have decreased every year since 2015-16, around the time that all ABSPY interventions were fully under way. There does not seem to have been any effect on offenses and incidents involving adults age 26 and over.

Figure 2: Offenses and incidents in all Rainier Beach hot spots, September 2011-August 2019



A descriptive analysis of the period pre- and post-May 2014, when ABSPY interventions first began, shows no change in calls for service or overall offenses in the Rainier Beach hot spots relative to the comparison spots, the Rainier Beach neighborhood (excluding the hot spots) or the South Precinct (Figures A1-A2). However, offenses involving youth are 19% lower than the pre-ABSPY period (Figure A3). While the decrease in youth offenses was greater in the comparison spots, the decrease in the Rainier Beach hot spots is on par with the rest of the neighborhood and the South Precinct overall. Violent offenses were also

[4]Cronbach's α is a statistic that tells us whether the questions in the scale do a good job of measuring the same concept, e.g. collective efficacy. $\alpha > .75$ indicates that they do.

9% lower in the hot spots, compared to 8% lower in Rainier Beach overall and 7% in the South Precinct (Figure A4). There was little change in NIBRS Group A person or property offenses (Figures A5-A6), but NIBRS Group B offenses were 10% higher in the hot spots post-ABSPY, while they decreased substantially elsewhere in the neighborhood and South Precinct (Figure A7). We have seen similar trends in previous reports, and it may may be due to residents becoming more involved in crime prevention in the neighborhood and therefore noticing more minor issues, or feeling more confident to call the police.

As noted in prior reports, crime problems at Rose Street have largely been driven by adults in recent years. All offenses/incidents fell sharply between 2017-18 and 2018-19, and youth offenses/incidents have been decreasing steadily since 2016-17 (Figure 3). In 2018-19 only 5 offenses/incidents involving youth that can be reported publicly occurred at Rose Street. This location no longer appears to be a hot spot for youth crime. Calls for service were 25% lower than the pre-ABSPY period (Figure A8), although they were 50% lower in Rose Street's comparison spot, and offenses were 28% lower compared to 26% in the comparison spot (Figure A9). Offenses involving youth were 44% lower compared to 20% in the comparison spot (Figure A10). Violent, Group A, and Group B offenses were also lower, although the decrease in Part A property offenses was only 3%. This is likely because most of the crime opportunities at Rose Street are property-related, i.e. business and retail (Figures A11-A14).

Figure 3: Offenses and incidents at Rose Street, September 2011-August 2019



For the first time we see a slight uptick in crime at Rainier and Henderson, ABSPY's largest and longest-term hot spot where many of the flagship interventions were first launched (Figure 4). Offenses and incidents involving both adults and youth were higher in 2018-19 after years of steady decline since the beginning of ABSPY. The number of offenses post-ABSPY is around 3% higher than pre-ABSPY (Figure A16). Despite this uptick, calls for service were 18% lower in the post-ABSPY period compared to pre-ABSPY (Figure A15), and 14% lower in the comparison spot. In further good news, violent offenses at Rainier and Henderson were 16% lower post-ABSPY, compared with 5% lower in the comparison spot (Figure A18). However, youth offenses were 4% higher at Rainier and Henderson (Figure A17) and Part B offenses were 19% higher, although these are minor crimes and the increase was not as large as the comparison spot, where they were 71% higher (Figure A21).

Figure 4: Offenses and incidents at Rainier & Henderson, September 2011-August 2019



The Light Rail is another success story for offenses involving youth. While crime involving adults increased from 2017-18 to 2018-19, youth crime has steadily declined and only 1 offense/incident was reported in the past year. We caution that the overall small numbers at the Light Rail can affect long-term trends, but with only four youth offenses in the past three years it appears the Light Rail is no longer a youth crime hot spot. Overall, calls for service are 30% lower at this spot since ABSPY began, compared to 13% at the comparison site (Figure A22); offenses are 33% lower relative to 35% in the comparison site (Figure A23); and youth offenses are 35% lower, compared to 24% in the comparison site (Figure A24). All offense types have reduced substantially and much more than in the comparison spot: violent offenses are 61% lower, Group A person offenses 41% lower, Group A property offenses 32% lower, and Group B offenses 15% lower (Figures A25-A28).

Lake Washington continues to show promising trends as well (Figure 6). After both youth and adult crime increased considerably in 2015-16, the ABSPY team increased its focus on the area and upped the dosage of interventions, and the trend is now back in the right direction. Youth crime has remained fairly consistent for the past two years. While the changes in calls for service and incidents since ABSPY began are not as strong at Lake Washington as they are in the comparison site (Figures A29-A35), trends are generally going in the right direction. In particular, youth offenses are 21% lower at Lake Washington than in the pre-ABSPY period (Figure A31). However, as in previous years, violent incidents are 19% higher post-ABSPY (Figure A32).

Safeway was a cause for concern in our previous report due to a focus on enforcement of minor crimes by store management, which pushed the number of reported offenses up considerably. However, it appears that in 2018-19 this trend began to reverse to some extent—both youth and adult crime reduced at this hot spot (Figure 7). A promising finding is that youth-involved offenses are 26% lower at Safeway in the post-ABSPY period (although they were 41% lower in the comparison site: Figure A38). However, on all other measures this site is showing much higher levels of calls for service and offenses post-ABSPY, which may reflect the culture of increased enforcement. Calls for service are 72% higher (Figure A36),

Figure 5: Offenses and incidents at Light Rail, September 2011-August 2019



Figure 6: Offenses and incidents at Lake Washington, September 2011-August 2019



offenses are 36% higher (Figure A37), violent offenses are 62% higher (Figure A39, Part A person offenses are 135% higher (Figure A40), Part A property offenses are 9% higher (Figure A41), and Part B offenses are 86% higher (Figure A42). The fact that property offenses are not the key issue at this hot spot is a cause for concern given that the primary crime opportunity at this retail location is property crime.

Figure 7: Offenses and incidents at Safeway, September 2011-August 2019



4.2 Calls for service and youth incidents were higher in the Rainier Beach hot spots while the interventions were active, but violent and property crimes were lower

The difference-in-differences analysis described above allows us to examine whether changes in crime in the Rainier Beach hot spots were *statistically* different from changes in the comparison sites. Statistical significance is a scientific standard used to determine whether changes can be attributed to the interventions or if they just happened by chance. However, it does have several limitations. As we have noted before, it was extremely difficult to find comparison hot spots that were similar to Rainier Beach, especially because many other areas in the South Precinct are experiencing gentrification and economic development that can affect crime rates and people's perceptions of safety. Our statistical results also do not take into account the possibility that a program like ABSPY, which is intended to increase community members' involvement with crime prevention and encourage them to look out for each other and interact more with the police, could increase calls for service, which in turn may lead to higher rates of recorded offenses as the police respond to and take reports for more calls.

Figures A43 and A44 show that while calls for service in the Rainier Beach hot spots appear to be on a downward trend, they are also decreasing in the comparison spots. Calls for service in Rainier Beach were higher than the comparison sites even when the ABSPY interventions were inactive, but the gap increases slightly when the interventions were active. Active ABSPY interventions are associated with a statistically significant 34% higher rate of calls for service in the Rainier Beach hot spots relative to the comparison sites (Table A4). The rate of offenses was 12% higher in Rainier Beach when the interventions were active (Figures A45 and A46); youth offenses were 7% higher (Figures A47 and A48); and violent offenses were 17% higher (Figures A49 and A50). However, none of these models was statistically significant (Table A5). Similarly, rates of NIBRS Group A offenses were also higher in the hot spots while ABSPY was active, while there was no difference between groups in Part B offenses, but none of these findings was statistically significant (Table A6; Figures A51-A56). Figures A50 and A54 show that although the rates of violent and property crimes were higher in the Rainier Beach hot spots, the predicted number of offenses in the hot

spots decreased slightly while the interventions were active.

4.3 Higher rates of calls and offenses in the Rainier Beach hot spots may be a result of people calling the police more

As described above, we also ran a model adjusted for the crime inflation factor to see whether the higher rates of crime associated with ABSPY could be a result of increased community engagement and reporting to the police. We calculated a crime inflation factor of 1.66 for the Rainier Beach hot spots (indicating that the ratio of calls to incidents was higher after ABSPY was implemented) and 1.18 in the comparison hot spots (indicating that the ratio was also higher, but by a smaller amount, during the same period). Because there are more months in the intervention active period (40 pre-intervention months and 64 post-intervention months), the inflation factor in the Rainier Beach hot spots is about what would be expected, since the ratio of 64/40 is 1.6. The difference between the inflation factors in the treatment and comparison areas was not statistically significant (t=-1.123; p=.294). We then divided the comparison group inflation factor by the treatment group inflation factor and multiplied the total number of post-ABSPY crime incidents in the treatment hot spots by this value to adjust for call inflation. We ran a univariate ANOVA (adjusting for treatment assignment, each "block" or treatment-comparison site pair, and the pre-ABSPY crime rate) with the unadjusted and adjusted incident counts.[5] The unadjusted model showed that crime incidents were slightly higher in the treatment hot spots relative to the comparison spots, but not significantly so (F=0.57; p=.507), while the adjusted model predicted a slightly lower and non-significant incident rate in Rainier Beach (F=.4.62; p=.120). While this analysis is very exploratory and has substantial limitations (for example, it doesn't account for the rolling start and pauses in interventions), this does suggest that while ABSPY did not lead to any changes in crime, the increased rates we see in the statistical models are likely due to increased reporting rather than a "backfire effect." This conclusion is also supported by our survey results, which indicate that people in Rainier Beach generally believe that crime is improving rather than getting worse.

4.4 Recognition of and satisfaction with ABSPY interventions have decreased in Rainier Beach

After a strong improvement in 2018 in the number of people in the five Rainier Beach hot spots saying they had noticed business improvements, Corner Greeters, and Safe Passage, recognition of all three interventions fell sharply this year—most notably for Safe Passage (Figures A57-A59). The decrease in recognition was statistically significant compared to Wave 2 (the 2016 survey) for both business improvements and Safe Passage (Table A7).

There was a corresponding decrease in the number of people who had noticed the interventions and said they were satisfied with them (Figures A60-A62), although this was not statistically significant for any of the interventions (Table A8).[6] However, satisfaction levels are still well over 70% for business improvements, almost 80% for Corner Greeters, and over 80% for Safe Passage, and satisfaction with Corner Greeters remains higher than it was in Wave 2 when the question was first asked.

[5] We used logged values for the pre- and post-ABSPY crime incident rates in this analysis.

[6] In previous surveys, this question was asked as a scale, from "very satisfied" to "very unsatisfied." In 2019, we changed it to a yes/no question. Data from previous years was recoded from "satisfied" or "very satisfied" to "yes," and from "unsatisfied" or "very unsatisfied" to "no."

In 2019, for the first time, we also asked people in the Rainier Beach hot spots whether they had noticed and were satisfied with the Be^3 principles and the ABSPY initiative in general. Figures A63 and A64 show that about half of the people we asked had noticed them. This is similar to the proportion of people who had noticed the business improvements, Corner Greeters, and Safe Passage. However, satisfaction with these initiatives was high. Among those who had noticed the Be^3, 73% said they were satisfied (Figure A65). Eighty-four percent of people who had noticed the overall ABSPY initiative were satisfied with it (Figure A66).

4.5 Most people in Rainier Beach believe crime has gotten better in the past year, but fewer said so than last year

Within the Rainier Beach hot spots, a majority of people (55%) said they thought crime had gotten better in the past year. This is a lower percentage of people than in our 2018 survey, where 72% of people thought crime had gotten better, but still significantly higher than the 34% of people in 2014 before ABSPY started (Figure A67; Table A9). It is possible that some of the shootings in the neighborhood this year, which occurred shortly before and during our data collection, may have affected people's feelings about crime in the neighborhood. People in Rainier Beach are still slightly more likely than those in the comparison hot spots to believe crime had gotten better, but the difference was not statistically significant this year as it was in 2017 and 2018 (Figure A10; Table A68).

People's feelings of safety continue to gradually improve over time in Rainier Beach (Figure A73). The improvement between Waves 1 and 5 is statistically significant. However, people in Rainier Beach were more likely this year than in previous years to say they saw disorder issues such as graffiti and trash more often (Figure A71), and their perceptions of the likelihood that a serious crime will occur on their block increased slightly in 2019, after decreasing every year since Wave 1 (Figure A69). Again, it is possible that the shootings this summer may have affected these results. Perceptions of disorder in Rainier Beach had been significantly lower than 2014 every year since 2016, and this year, while still slightly lower, were not significantly different from baseline. However, the number of people believing a serious crime on their block was likely was still significantly lower this year than it was in 2014 (Table A11).

There were no statistically significant differences in perceptions of safety, disorder, or the likelihood of crime between Rainier Beach hot spots and the comparison hot spots (Table A12). Feelings of safety in the comparison hot spots continued to slightly decrease, although people in those areas still generally feel safer than people in Rainier Beach (Figure A74). The pattern is similar for perceptions of disorder in the comparison sites: there was an uptick in perceived disorder in these locations as well, but no significant difference compared to Rainier Beach (Figure A72). In 2018 we found that people's perceptions of improvements in crime in Rainier Beach could be attributed to ABSPY, as significantly fewer people in Rainier Beach thought a crime was likely to occur on their block compared to people in the comparison hot spots. Unfortunately we did not see this result again this year—there was very little difference between Rainier Beach and comparison site respondents (Figure A70).

4.6 Social cohesion fell slightly, but there was a small improvement in collective efficacy

Social cohesion (whether people trust each other and believe that they have adequate community resources to take care of problems) fell very slightly in Rainier Beach this year, after steadily increasing

since 2014. However, the decrease was very small (only about 0.02 on a 4-point scale: Figure A75) and not statistically significant compared to 2014. However, we found a slight uptick in collective efficacy (the willingness of residents to intervene and deal with community problems) in Rainier Beach, although it is still lower than it was in Wave 1 (Figure A77). The difference is not statistically significant (Table A13). Social cohesion in Rainier Beach is still higher than in the comparison sites, and there was also a slight decrease in the comparison sites in 2019 (Figure A76). Collective efficacy also decreased slightly in the comparison sites (Figure A78). Neither social cohesion nor collective efficacy were significantly different between the Rainier Beach and comparison hot spots (Table A14). Our findings here are consistent with the Corner Greeters' Rainier Beach Report Card update this year, which found that "trust" and "teamwork" were down in Rainier Beach.

For the first time in 2019 we also asked survey respondents whether they or members of their family had participated in various community events or problem-solving in the past year. Interestingly given that social cohesion and collective efficacy tend to be higher in Rainier Beach, participation in all types of activity was slightly lower than in the comparison sites. Around 40 to 50 percent of Rainier Beach respondents had participated in activities, which is similar to the proportion who were aware of ABSPY and its signature interventions (Figure A79).

4.7 People's impressions of the police in Rainier Beach are less positive than last year

Interestingly, Rainier Beach respondents perceived higher levels of police activity in the neighborhood than in previous years (Figure A86), while comparison site respondents perceived lower activity (Figure A87). However, neither the pre/post nor comparison analyses were statistically significant (Table A15-A16).

In 2018, Rainier Beach respondents' satisfaction with the police[7] and perception of the police as legitimate significantly improved, even relative to the comparison spots (suggesting that the change was due to ABSPY). However, in 2019 both satisfaction and legitimacy fell back to 2014 (pre-ABSPY) levels (Figures A80 and A82): the differences between Waves 1 and 5 was not statistically significant (Table A15). Satisfaction with the police has generally been higher in Rainier Beach than in the comparison sites since ABSPY began, but for the first time since 2014 it was lower this year (Figure A81). Legitimacy has steadily increased in the comparison sites since 2016 (Figure A83). However, there were no significant differences between the treatment and comparison sites in either satisfaction or legitimacy this year (Table A16). This is unfortunate given the significant improvements last year.

Given our more positive results in previous years, it seems that satisfaction and legitimacy are inversely correlated with police activity. It is possible that the high profile crimes that occurred in Rainier Beach this year have contributed to perceptions of both greater police activity and lower levels of satisfaction.

This year for the first time we also asked a question assessing people's overall satisfaction with the police (Figure A84), and whether or not they had any direct contact with the police in the past year; for example, stopped or arrested, asked for assistance, spoke with police at a community event, etc. (Figure A85). Respondents in Rainier Beach and the comparison sites were fairly evenly matched on both questions: in

[7] In 2019 we used a slightly different scale to measure satisfaction with police, using only two questions ("the police do a good job preventing crime" and "the police do a good job preventing drug activity") instead of three. We had previously also asked whether people thought the police did a good job enforcing traffic laws, but this was less closely related to people's overall impressions of the police so we dropped the question this year.

both sets of hot spots 22% of respondents were very satisfied with the police, although slightly more were satisfied in the comparison sites. Just under one-third of people in both sites had any contact with the police. Given the similarities between the treatment and comparison site respondents in terms of contact with the police, it is unlikely that actual contact drove any differences in perceptions of satisfaction or legitimacy.

5 Conclusions and Recommendations

ABSPY is a community-led, place-based, data-driven approach to reducing crime and public safety in five hot spots of juvenile and youth crime in the Rainier Beach neighborhood of Seattle. This updated evaluation report finds that while the ABSPY hot spots continue to get less "hot" over time, the promising trends we have observed over the past few years in terms of community engagement and satisfaction with the process have not been sustained. Fewer people we surveyed in Rainier Beach were aware of the initiative this year and satisfaction was slightly lower. There was also a drop in social cohesion and a substantial decrease in positive impressions of the police. It is important to note that events external to ABSPY, such as the Pritchard Beach shooting—which happened at the beginning of the summer shortly before survey data collection began—may have influenced people's perceptions of crime and safety in the neighborhood. Nonetheless, our results suggest that it will be important to refocus and reprioritize ABSPY efforts in 2020 to attempt to reverse these less positive trends.

- **The hot spots have continued to become less "hot" over time, but we should not lose focus on small changes.** Overall, there is a downward trend in the number of youth offenses at the Rainier Beach hot spots, and on many measures crime in Rainier Beach has been lower since ABSPY started than it was before. Rose Street and the Light Rail are notable success stories. While crime was typically lower at these two hot spots than the other three sites, youth crime in particular has dwindled to the point that these locations would likely no longer be considered hot spots of crime. Lake Washington also continues to show positive trends, following our recommendation in the 2017 evaluation update to increase intervention dosage at that location. However, there are some trends in the other direction that will require attention in the coming year. After consistent decreases in crime since ABSPY began, there has been an uptick in both youth and adult offenses at Rainier and Henderson in the past year. While offenses at Safeway are lower than they were last year, this location has still seen substantial increases in violence and enforcement of minor crime issues since ABSPY began. It is important not to lose focus on these minor changes—this year could be an anomaly, but it is worth putting more effort into monitoring and assessing these two locations in 2020 to ensure they do not turn into longer-term trends.

- **Calls for service and crime incidents were higher in the Rainier Beach hot spots while the ABSPY interventions were active, but violent and property crimes were lower.** As we have previously reported, it is difficult to statistically assess the impact of ABSPY relative to the comparison sites because the Rainier Beach hot spots are unique, and over the past seven years the comparison areas have experienced considerable gentrification and economic development—both factors that can impact crime and social outcomes—that has not been present in Rainier Beach. However, while the rates of violent and property crimes were still higher in Rainier Beach relative to the comparison hot spots, there were slightly fewer of these offense types while the interventions were active. It is important to note that these reductions were not statistically significant.

- **Higher rates of calls and offenses in the Rainier Beach hot spots may be a result of people calling the police more.** We previously speculated that the higher rates of crime associated with ABSPY that we observed could actually be a positive effect of ABSPY—when people are more engaged with community crime prevention they might be more willing to intervene by calling the police or noticing problems. We applied a technique called the Crime Inflation Factor (Weisburd et al., 2020) to assess this question. While our findings were not statistically significant, we did find that crime was slightly lower in the ABSPY sites when we adjust for the possibility that people are calling the police more. While this analysis does not *prove* that people are more willing to get involved in crime prevention and calling the police, it does suggest that the higher rates of crime are not a backfire effect. While our survey findings are not as promising this year, we still see fairly positive levels of social cohesion and collective efficacy, which lend further support to this finding.

- **Recognition of and satisfaction with ABSPY interventions have decreased in Rainier Beach.** In the 2018 community survey we saw substantial improvements in the number of people who noticed and were satisfied with ABSPY's signature interventions—business improvements, Corner Greeters, and Safe Passage. People were 60% less likely to say they had noticed business improvements and Safe Passage this year compared to 2016, two years after interventions began, which was statistically significant (people were 20% less likely to say they noticed the Corner Greeters, but this was not significantly different from 2016). Levels of satisfaction with business improvements and Safe Passage among people who had noticed the interventions were also lower than they were in 2016, although not significantly different. Satisfaction with Corner Greeters also fell, but was still higher than it was in 2016. Nonetheless, satisfaction with the interventions is still high, in the 70-80% range. However, these results show it will be crucial to reengage the community in 2020, focusing specifically on ABSPY branding, partnerships, and ensuring that the interventions reflect community priorities.

- **Most people in Rainier Beach believe crime has gotten better in the past year, but fewer said so than last year.** In line with our crime analysis findings, which show that higher crime rates in Rainier Beach may be due to increased community engagement rather than a backfire effect of ABSPY, people in Rainier Beach in 2019 continued to feel that crime problems in the neighborhood were improving, and there has been a steady increase in feelings of safety. At the same time, people in the hot spots were more likely to say they had seen disorder issues. Again, this could be a positive indicator of increased engagement in community crime prevention—people may be more likely to notice lower-level problems, especially if they feel safer and that major crime issues are improving. However, there was also a large decrease in the percentage of people who felt crime had gotten better in the past year compared to 2018 (55% thought so this year, compared to 72% of people last year), and there was an increase in the number of people who thought it was likely that a serious crime could happen on their block. This could reflect some of the major crime incidents, like the Pritchard Beach shooting, that happened shortly before our 2019 survey was conducted.

- **Social cohesion fell slightly, but there was a small improvement in collective effcacy.** Trust, shared values, and recognition of community resources (*social cohesion*), as well as a perceived willingness to intervene if there is a problem (*collective efficacy*), have steadily improved in Rainier Beach since ABSPY began. Social cohesion decreased slightly this year, but there was a small increase in collective efficacy. It is important to note that these changes were not statistically significant compared to previous years or the comparison hot spots. We also found that fewer than half of survey respondents in Rainier Beach had participated in community activities. While we do not know if these were ABSPY activities specifically, this was similar to the percentage of respondents

who were aware of ABSPY and its signature interventions.

- **People's impressions of the police in Rainier Beach are less positive than last year.** In 2018 we found statistically significant long-term improvements in satisfaction with the police and perceptions of legitimacy associated with ABSPY. However, this year these trends reversed completely—both satisfaction and legitimacy returned to pre-ABSPY (2014) levels. At the same time, Rainier Beach respondents perceived more police activity than in any other survey year. Again, these results may have been affected by the high-profile crime incidents in the community in 2019. However, ABSPY's engagement with SPD has been more limited in 2019 (particularly in terms of Core Team representation). These findings, taken in the context of previous improvements in police satisfaction, suggest that the police need to be actively involved in community-led interventions to help improve community members' impressions of them.

5.1 Recommendations for 2020

Our 2019 report indicates that, while ABSPY continues to have many positive effects on crime and community perceptions, there has been some slippage that needs to be urgently addressed to avoid undoing the strong positive effects of previous years. While it is not surprising that interventions intended to create sustainable change at entrenched hot spots of crime can take many years to work (e.g. Weisburd et al., 2020), the benefit of regular data analysis and evaluation is the opportunity to catch potential problems early on and make course corrections as needed. We recommend the following areas of focus in 2020 to attempt to reverse the slippage:

- **The ABSPY Core Team should continue to consider its role and membership.** Discussions this year have focused on transitioning the team to a policy role; however, the survey results indicate that community awareness of and satisfaction with ABSPY and its core interventions have declined. At the same time, ABSPY's implementation team's role has decreased in recent years and the team does not meet regularly. The Core Team should consider whether it is best placed to oversee interventions or whether the Implementation Team should be revitalized to increase the visibility of interventions. This may in turn lead to more positive community perceptions again in the future. It is also important for the Core Team to identify ways to bring in more authentic community engagement and potentially partner with other organizations, building on the success of Rainier Beach United in late 2019. There was a desire to continue this work, which is a positive step forward as it could also connect with efforts to revitalize the Implementation Team by identifying community partners who are already working in ABSPY's key spaces.

- **Focus on re-engaging the community and increasing community representation.** Trust and teamwork were down in Rainier Beach this year according to RBAC's neighborhood score card, and our survey showed lower levels of social cohesion and relatively low community participation in events, activities, and problem-solving. As suggested above, the Core Team should continue to focus on reengaging the community and increasing community representation on the team itself in order to strengthen recognition, participation, and engagement.

- **Re-engage SPD in ABSPY and the Core Team.** While SPD have continued to participate in ABSPY activities this year, turnover in the South Precinct and lack of a clear role for SPD on the Core Team may be indirectly related to lower levels of police satisfaction and legitimacy. While there have been concerns about the roles and relationships between community and institutional part-

ners on the Core Team, the police's expertise in crime prevention and their potential role in engaging and building trust with the community to form effective problem-solving partnerships is well-documented in research literature and it is important to explore efforts to work in partnership rather than at odds with the police.

- **Consider whether changes need to be made to the focus hot spots.** Youth crime at both Rose Street and the Light Rail has dwindled to almost nothing since ABSPY began. At the same time, violent incidents (involving both youth and adults) have been higher at Safeway post-ABSPY, and engagement of store management with ABSPY has been low. There was also an uptick in overall crime at Rainier and Henderson this year after sustained decreases since 2014. We continue to see sustained suppression of youth crime at Lake Washington, but only after increased focus and dosage of interventions at that hot spot. Given the low levels of crime at Rose Street and the Light Rail, the Core Team may consider whether to discontinue or reduce ABSPY efforts at these locations to focus efforts and resources on addressing the issues at Safeway, reversing the uptick at Rainier and Henderson, and sustaining the successes at Lake Washington. Crime involving adults continues to be an issue at Rose Street and the Light Rail, and prevention efforts could be redirected to other agencies (including SPD) that focus specifically on efforts to reduce adult-involved crime problems.

- **Adapt ABSPY and its evaluation strategy in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.** Due to delays in receiving the new data from SPD, we are completing this report later than usual. In the first few months of 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic hit, affecting Seattle and its surrounding area particularly badly. This is an unprecedented challenge for community-led interventions and engagement efforts that rely on face-to-face contact and relationship building, and for the evaluation of crime prevention programs. The lack of people using the streets and public spaces will almost certainly change opportunities for crime and the detection and reporting of crime, making it even more difficult to assess the impacts of ABSPY. The Core Team has already dedicated its meetings in the first quarter of 2020 to brainstorming how to pivot ABSPY activities to adapt to social distancing and lockdown requirements, as well as responding to immediate community needs created by the pandemic. The Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy will research and stay abreast of developments in the field to identify the best available methods to evaluate ABSPY in the light of these changes.

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Rainier Beach:
A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth

2019 Evaluation Update

Statistical Appendix

Table A1: Number of surveys completed, by site and wave

	Wave				
	1	2	3	4	5
Treatment Sites					
Rose St	27	32	29	29	30
Rainier & Henderson	36	30	28	33	30
Light Rail	25	31	30	25	30
Lake Washington	26	26	27	30	31
Safeway	31	35	32	30	25
Total	145	154	146	147	146
Comparison Sites					
Rose St Comparison	27	21	27	31	32
Rainier & Henderson Comparison	42	26	28	34	31
Light Rail Comparison	31	33	30	28	31
Lake Washington Comparison	28	32	29	33	33
Safeway Comparison	24	34	30	32	30
Total	152	146	144	158	157

Table A2: Sample characteristics by wave and by group at baseline (wave 1)

	Wave					Comparison at wave 1	Treatment at wave 1
	1	2	3	4	5		
Gender (%)							
Female	43.5	49.7	43.2	46.6	51.5	43.8	43.2
Male	56.1	50.3	56.4	52.4	47.1	55.6	56.8
Other	0.4	0.0	0.4	1.0	1.4	0.7	0.0
Age* (%)							
18-25	22.1	23.5	24.3	15.6	18.9	17.2	27.9
26-35	24.3	22.8	26.8	26.9	27.5	23.4	25.4
36-45	15.4	17.0	17.5	20.4	19.6	13.1	18.0
46-55	15.4	15.9	12.5	18.4	14.8	18.6	11.5
56-65	15.4	14.5	13.9	12.2	12.4	16.6	13.9
Over 65	7.5	6.2	5.0	6.5	6.9	11.0	3.3
Race*** (%)							
Black/African-American	36.6	41.7	33.0	30.4	36.8	31.2	42.7
African immigrant/refugee	7.5	11.9	8.1	17.1	6.6	5.0	10.5
White	24.9	23.0	26.7	22.5	19.4	34.0	14.5
Asian	12.5	6.5	11.0	16.0	12.8	17.7	6.5
Other/more than one race	18.5	16.9	21.2	14.0	24.3	12.1	25.8
Born in United States (%)	63.1	70.8	68.3	64.3	69.6	65.3	60.5
Has children (%)	56.3	61.4	51.7	55.1	60.9	57.6	54.8
Education (%)							
Primary/elementary school	3.0	1.7	0.7	0.4	2.8	0.7	5.6
Some middle/high school	7.5	5.5	6.0	6.0	3.8	7.1	8.0
High school diploma/GED	26.4	21.1	29.1	24.2	25.3	22.1	31.2
Some college	23.0	33.6	27.6	27.0	32.6	24.3	21.6
Associate's degree	15.5	12.8	9.0	10.7	10.1	17.1	13.6
Bachelor's degree	16.2	15.2	16.0	20.6	17.7	18.6	13.6
Masters/graduate/professional degree	8.3	10.0	11.6	11.0	7.6	10.0	6.4
Employment (%)							
Full-time	42.5	43.3	54.4	60.8	47.4	44.5	40.0
Part-time	18.7	23.9	21.0	13.4	19.8	17.5	20.0
Not working	29.0	19.0	14.0	13.1	17.7	27.0	31.3
Retired	9.9	10.0	7.0	8.1	10.6	10.9	8.7
Main activity at hot spot (%)							
Live	47.8	35.7	36.3	40.7	32.7	46.1	49.7
Work	13.1	10.0	11.4	23.6	15.5	9.9	16.6
School	0.3	0.3	1.0	0.7	1.3	0.0	0.7
Own business	1.7	1.3	2.1	1.0	1.0	2.6	0.7
Own property/land	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.7	0.0
Shop	12.8	22.3	17.0	13.4	14.2	11.2	14.5

Sample characteristics by wave and by group at baseline (continued)

	Wave					Comparison at wave 1	Treatment at wave 1
	1	2	3	4	5		
Use public transit	15.5	15.7	17.6	10.8	14.5	18.4	12.4
Use local resources	1.7	6.0	6.6	1.6	8.3	1.3	2.1
Walk/drive through	4.0	6.3	4.8	3.9	8.3	5.9	2.1
Other	2.7	1.7	2.8	3.9	4.3	3.9	1.4
Duration of main activity (%)							
Less than 1 year	20.6	22.0	21.5	23.0	19.3	21.1	20.1
1 year or more, but less than 5 years	36.8	37.3	39.2	35.3	34.3	35.4	38.2
5 years or more, but less than 10 years	18.6	13.9	16.0	19.3	21.0	22.4	14.6
10 years or more	24.1	26.8	23.3	22.3	25.3	21.1	27.1

Significant differences between treatment and comparison group at baseline:
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A3: Descriptive statistics for survey outcomes

		Wave 1			Wave 2			Wave 3			Wave 4			Wave 5		
	α (Items)	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Noticed business improvements[a,b]	-	-	-	-	138	.69	.46	124	.58	.50	124	.63	.49	130	.51	.50
Noticed Corner Greeters[a,b]	-	-	-	-	119	.51	.50	125	.34	.48	122	.52	.50	127	.43	.50
Noticed Safe Passage[a,b]	-	-	-	-	120	.68	.47	125	.69	.47	123	.73	.44	131	.53	.50
Noticed Be3[a,c]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	133	.50	.50
Noticed ABSPY[a,c]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	132	.53	.50
Satisfied with business improvements[d,e]	-	-	-	-	97	2.94	.67	73	3.12	.58	74	3.04	.65	78	2.83	.75
Satisfied with Corner Greeters[d,e]	-	-	-	-	64	2.89	.69	46	3.20	.69	65	3.15	.69	63	3.03	.82
Satisfied with Safe Passage[d,e]	-	-	-	-	76	3.18	.63	74	3.32	.60	80	3.38	.62	73	3.08	.83
Satisfied with Be3[d,f]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	67	2.91	.79
Satisfied with ABSPY[d,f]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	76	3.07	.70
Has crime here gotten better in past year[g]	-	241	3.22	1.11	239	3.70	.99	235	3.56	1.05	225	3.86	.99	256	3.62	1.07
Likelihood of crime[h]	0.942 (11)	265	3.00	.64	266	2.83	.67	272	2.73	.66	275	2.66	.75	285	2.71	.66
Frequency of disorder[d]	0.932 (9)	266	2.52	.98	264	2.22	.91	274	2.03	.88	275	2.21	.97	293	2.31	.90
Feelings of safety[d]	0.879 (8)	290	2.85	.58	284	2.93	.48	284	2.99	.59	297	2.97	.63	303	2.99	.56
Social cohesion/community resources[d]	0.847 (11)	295	2.72	.52	288	2.73	.43	289	2.76	.50	301	2.81	.45	303	2.79	.45
Collective efficacy[i]	0.782 (4)	280	2.45	.71	278	2.53	.64	280	2.54	.72	277	2.64	.70	294	2.57	.63
Satisfaction with police[d]	0.831 (2)	251	2.67	.80	252	2.78	.65	248	2.73	.75	243	2.86	.70	252	2.62	.86
Police legitimacy[d]	0.888 (3)	244	2.64	.85	247	2.72	.70	251	2.64	.72	244	2.81	.71	266	2.63	.72
Frequency of police activity[h]	0.811 (6)	269	2.34	.75	268	2.34	.73	267	2.27	.78	263	2.35	.76	287	2.33	.78

The "mean" is the average score across all respondents in each wave. SD is the standard deviation, which is a statistical measure of how spread out all the response values are from the mean.

[a] Outcomes based on a 2-point scale (0 = no, 1 = yes). Until Wave 4, outcomes were based on a 4-point agreement scale. These responses were recoded (agree/strongly agree = yes). The mean for this variable represents the proportion of respondents who said yes.

[b] These questions asked only to respondents in treatment sites in Waves 2-5

[c] These questions asked only to respondents in treatment sites in Wave 5

[d] Outcomes based on a 4-point agreement scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree)

[e] These questions asked only to respondents in treatment sites in Waves 2-5 who said they had noticed these interventions

[f] These questions asked only to respondents in treatment sites in Wave 5 who said they had noticed these interventions

[g] Outcomes based on a 5-point scale (1 = much worse, 5 = much better)

[h] Outcomes based on a 4-point frequency scale (1 = less than once a month, 4 = every day)

[i] Outcomes based on a 4-point likelihood scale (1 = very unlikely, 4 = very likely)

Table A4: Difference-in-differences Poisson regression on calls for service

	Calls for service
	IRR (Robust SE)
Active	.777*** (.047)
Treatment	1.395*** (.068)
Active × Treatment	1.337*** (.081)
Month (ref:Jan)	
Feb	.979 (.083)
Mar	1.152 (.093)
Apr	1.114 (.076)
May	1.286** (.099)
Jun	1.194* (.084)
Jul	1.271** (.101)
Aug	1.140 (.087)
Sep	1.062 (.080)
Oct	1.054 (.077)
Nov	.990 (.074)
Dec	.867* (.054)
Trend	.998 (.001)
Constant	78.038*** (5.345)
Log pseudolikelihood	-1039.586
Pseudo R^2	.412
Wald χ^2	470.883***
N	208

Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)

$^{*}\ p < 0.05, ^{**}\ p < 0.01, ^{***}\ p < 0.001$

Table A5: Difference-in-differences Poisson regression on selected offenses

	All offenses	Youth offenses	Violent offenses
	IRR (robust SE)	IRR (robust SE)	IRR (robust SE)
Active	.894 (.064)	1.071 (.145)	.761* (.085)
Treatment	1.474*** (.074)	1.681*** (.135)	1.444*** (.110)
Active × Treatment	1.118 (.073)	1.065 (.117)	1.170 (.129)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	.948 (.067)	1.088 (.140)	.991 (.140)
Mar	1.084 (.093)	1.154 (.160)	1.183 (.173)
Apr	1.055 (.082)	1.148 (.163)	1.132 (.166)
May	1.217** (.087)	1.517*** (.184)	1.245 (.168)
Jun	1.093 (.087)	1.304* (.163)	1.184 (.180)
Jul	1.168 (.109)	1.261 (.214)	1.148 (.158)
Aug	1.106 (.093)	1.255 (.178)	1.317* (.175)
Sep	1.017 (.081)	1.024 (.146)	1.089 (.157)
Oct	1.069 (.080)	1.285* (.156)	1.005 (.141)
Nov	.951 (.083)	.938 (.133)	1.013 (.177)
Dec	.963 (.075)	.921 (.110)	1.031 (.163)
Trend	.999 (.001)	.992*** (.002)	1.001 (.002)
Constant	26.252*** (1.920)	10.316*** (1.278)	4.988*** (.690)
Log pseudolikelihood	-820.609	-671.660	-556.830
Pseudo R^2	.202	.213	.076
Wald χ^2	265.122***	225.146***	101.323***
N	232	232	232

Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
$^{*}\ p < 0.05, ^{**}\ p < 0.01, ^{***}\ p < 0.001$

Table A6: Difference-in-differences Poisson regression on NIBRS offense categories

	Part A person offenses	Part A property offenses	Part B offenses
	IRR (robust SE)	IRR (robust SE)	IRR (robust SE)
Active	.927 (.102)	.708*** (.072)	1.460** (.199)
Treatment	1.482*** (.111)	1.424*** (.101)	1.668*** (.144)
Active × Treatment	1.219 (.127)	1.126 (.108)	.980 (.114)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.055 (.131)	.901 (.074)	.919 (.136)
Mar	1.098 (.151)	1.126 (.120)	1.029 (.190)
Apr	1.076 (.136)	1.045 (.110)	1.064 (.147)
May	1.350* (.166)	1.212* (.112)	1.125 (.165)
Jun	1.251 (.156)	1.045 (.105)	1.023 (.140)
Jul	1.113 (.141)	1.207 (.172)	1.105 (.156)
Aug	1.277 (.161)	1.113 (.118)	1.000 (.146)
Sep	1.154 (.146)	.969 (.091)	.995 (.201)
Oct	1.095 (.123)	1.177 (.130)	.889 (.120)
Nov	.976 (.159)	1.006 (.105)	.811 (.134)
Dec	.951 (.119)	.929 (.103)	.982 (.140)
Trend	.999 (.001)	1.002 (.001)	.992*** (.002)
Constant	5.421*** (.691)	12.076*** (1.145)	7.460*** (.950)
Log pseudolikelihood	-553.841	-743.366	-596.980
Pseudo R^2	.099	.118	.121
Wald χ^2	125.799***	142.649***	118.766***
N	232	232	232

Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
$^{*}\ p < 0.05$, $^{**}\ p < 0.01$, $^{***}\ p < 0.001$

Table A7: Survey participants who noticed ABSPY interventions in Rainier Beach

	Noticed business improvements	Noticed Corner Greeters	Noticed Safe Passage
	OR (Robust SE)	OR (Robust SE)	OR (Robust SE)
Wave 3	.475* (.142)	.518* (.156)	.892 (.296)
Wave 4	.602 (.183)	1.104 (.332)	1.182 (.405)
Wave 5	.391** (.113)	.801 (.233)	.403** (.127)
Hot spot (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	1.498 (.518)	.576 (.196)	.433* (.168)
Light Rail	.501* (.173)	.652 (.230)	.571 (.230)
Lake Washington	.930 (.319)	.516 (.180)	.348** (.137)
Safeway	1.055 (.368)	.545 (.193)	.477 (.187)
Age (ref:18-25)			
26-35	.666 (.214)	.533* (.171)	1.062 (.385)
36-45	.668 (.231)	.780 (.267)	.634 (.244)
46-55	1.049 (.367)	.698 (.240)	.646 (.244)
56-65	1.091 (.404)	.822 (.300)	.944 (.389)
Over 65	.729 (.394)	.146** (.103)	.192** (.122)
Race (ref:Black/African-American)			
African immigrant/refugee	1.162 (.403)	1.015 (.338)	.788 (.306)
White	.814 (.232)	.824 (.245)	.391** (.125)
Asian	.734 (.287)	.567 (.227)	.304** (.130)
Other/more than one race	1.263 (.372)	1.134 (.327)	.841 (.277)
Education (ref:Less than high school)			
High school diploma/GED	.940 (.474)	.820 (.404)	1.158 (.726)
Some college	.760 (.381)	1.160 (.573)	.685 (.423)
Associate's degree	.711 (.417)	.849 (.497)	.351 (.243)
Bachelor's degree	.778 (.421)	.760 (.412)	.604 (.402)
Masters/graduate/professional degree	.727 (.433)	.585 (.359)	.798 (.577)
Employment (ref:Full-time)			
Part-time	.777 (.232)	1.291 (.366)	.714 (.226)
Not working/retired/other	.432** (.115)	.823 (.224)	.546* (.155)
Main activity at hot spot (ref:Live)			
Work	1.052 (.351)	.721 (.228)	.730 (.271)
Shop	.653 (.222)	.505 (.177)	.456* (.171)
Use public transit	.713 (.270)	.672 (.255)	.329** (.136)
Other	.837 (.263)	.539 (.172)	.504* (.174)
Constant	6.665** (4.114)	3.849* (2.406)	23.852*** (18.814)
Log pseudolikelihood	-292.154	-285.688	-248.288
Pseudo R^2	.081	.083	.154
Wald χ^2	51.670**	52.031**	90.184***
N	475	452	454

Logistic regression. Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios).
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8: Satisfaction with ABSPY interventions in Rainier Beach

	Satisfied with business improvements	Satisfied with Corner Greeters	Satisfied with Safe Passage
	OR (Robust SE)	OR (Robust SE)	OR (Robust SE)
Wave 3	1.502 (.796)	3.179 (2.055)	2.555 (1.868)
Wave 4	1.011 (.494)	1.671 (.887)	2.010 (1.370)
Wave 5	.679 (.287)	1.235 (.625)	.457 (.251)
Hot spot (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	1.043 (.533)	.615 (.390)	.395 (.250)
Light Rail	1.769 (1.141)	1.142 (.791)	1.278 (1.026)
Lake Washington	.808 (.437)	1.110 (.743)	.832 (.569)
Safeway	.939 (.521)	1.880 (1.372)	1.328 (1.031)
Age (ref:18-25)[a]			
26-35	.775 (.404)	.529 (.338)	-
36-45	.554 (.294)	.298 (.197)	-
46-55	.889 (.525)	.369 (.240)	-
56-65	.682 (.403)	.126** (.089)	-
Over 65	.769 (.807)	1.000 (.)	-
Race (ref:Black/African-American)[a]			
African immigrant/refugee	1.049 (.567)	1.746 (1.024)	-
White	3.589* (2.256)	4.620* (3.463)	-
Asian	.969 (.683)	.392 (.283)	-
Other/more than one race	.761 (.318)	1.075 (.526)	-
Education (ref:Less than high school)[b]			
High school diploma/GED	1.277 (1.166)	-	-
Some college	.277 (.236)	-	-
Associate's degree	.380 (.375)	-	-
Bachelor's degree	.332 (.306)	-	-
Masters/graduate/professional degree	.301 (.309)	-	-
Employment (ref:Full-time)			
Part-time	.629 (.281)	.740 (.383)	2.281 (1.556)
Not working/retired/other	.640 (.299)	.974 (.538)	1.233 (.650)
Main activity at hot spot (ref:Live)			
Work	.740 (.367)	.925 (.522)	1.302 (.895)
Shop	1.333 (.754)	1.024 (.660)	.708 (.523)
Use public transit	.456 (.274)	1.018 (.739)	1.549 (1.351)
Other	.776 (.386)	1.503 (.924)	.873 (.537)
Youth (18-25)[a]	-	-	.831 (.443)
Race (African-American)[a]	-	-	.838 (.373)
Constant	17.703** (18.354)	6.169* (5.039)	10.631** (7.878)
Log pseudolikelihood	-124.697	-93.490	-79.822
Pseudo R^2	.114	.121	.091
Wald χ^2	32.246	25.848	15.925
N	297	223	293

[a] Binary race and age variables (Black/African-American vs. other; 18-25 vs. over 25) were used in the Safe Passage model due to collinearity.

[b] Education was omitted from the Corner Greeter and Safe Passage models due to collinearity.

Logistic regression. Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios)

$^{*}\ p < 0.05, ^{**}\ p < 0.01, ^{***}\ p < 0.001$

Table A9: Has crime gotten better, worse, or stayed the same in the past year? (Rainier Beach only)

	Change in crime in past year (Rainier Beach)
	b (Robust SE)
Wave 2	1.197*** (.293)
Wave 3	1.101*** (.286)
Wave 4	1.875*** (.315)
Wave 5	1.057*** (.286)
Hot spot (ref:Rainier & Henderson)	
Rose St	-.038 (.286)
Light Rail	-.251 (.309)
Lake Washington	-.012 (.295)
Safeway	-.340 (.293)
Age (ref:18-25)	
26-35	-.322 (.272)
36-45	-.336 (.304)
46-55	-.265 (.303)
56-65	-.375 (.321)
Over 65	-1.061* (.452)
Race (ref:Black/African-American)	
African immigrant/refugee	.699* (.335)
White	-.651** (.250)
Asian	-.523 (.343)
Other/more than one race	.352 (.256)
Education (ref:Less than high school)	
High school diploma/GED	-.699 (.438)
Some college	-.625 (.439)
Associate's degree	-1.089* (.489)
Bachelor's degree	-.183 (.477)
Masters/graduate/professional degree	-.124 (.533)
Employment (ref:Full-time)	
Part-time	-.505* (.248)
Not working/retired/other	-.374 (.231)
Main activity at hot spot (ref:Live)	
Work	-.148 (.282)
Shop	-.568 (.300)
Use public transit	.174 (.351)
Other	-.011 (.287)
Cut 1	*-2.302*** (.534)*
Cut 2	*-.472 (.525)*
Log pseudolikelihood	-477.152
Pseudo R^2	.092
Wald χ^2	97.136***
N	543

Note: Outcome was recoded to a three-level variable for analysis (got worse, stayed the same, got better)
Ordered logistic regression
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A10: Has crime gotten better, worse, or stayed the same in the past year? (Rainier Beach vs. comparison spots)

	Change in crime in past year
Fixed effects	b (SE)
Wave 2	.561* (.268)
Wave 3	.221 (.263)
Wave 4	.475 (.264)
Wave 5	.408 (.249)
Treatment	-.867** (.299)
Wave 2 $\times$ Treatment	.531 (.375)
Wave 3 $\times$ Treatment	.774* (.371)
Wave 4 $\times$ Treatment	1.294*** (.388)
Wave 5 $\times$ Treatment	.583 (.361)
Race (ref:Black/African-American)	
African immigrant/refugee	.470* (.233)
White	-.415** (.154)
Asian	-.090 (.204)
Other/more than one race	.216 (.175)
Age (ref:18-25)	
26-35	-.137 (.183)
36-45	-.202 (.199)
46-55	-.395* (.200)
56-65	-.386 (.210)
Over 65	-.670* (.263)
Cut 1	*-2.086*** (.266)*
Cut 2	*-.302 (.256)*
Random effects	σ (SE)
Hot spot	.054 (.040)
Log pseudolikelihood	-1045.613
Wald χ^2	77.501***
N	1150.000

Note: Outcome was recoded to a three-level variable for analysis (got worse, stayed the same, got better)
Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression
$^{*}\ p < 0.05$, $^{**}\ p < 0.01$, $^{***}\ p < 0.001$

Table A11: Perceptions of safety, crime, and disorder (Rainier Beach only)

	Feelings of safety	Frequency of disorder	Likelihood of crime
	b (Robust SE)	b (Robust SE)	b (Robust SE)
Wave 2	.079 (.074)	-.334** (.126)	-.193* (.093)
Wave 3	.092 (.074)	-.348** (.124)	-.210* (.092)
Wave 4	.141 (.074)	-.343** (.126)	-.490*** (.093)
Wave 5	.149* (.074)	-.097 (.124)	-.290** (.093)
Hot spot (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	-.190** (.072)	-.320** (.121)	-.204* (.090)
Light Rail	.066 (.077)	-.222 (.131)	-.157 (.097)
Lake Washington	-.038 (.074)	-.350** (.125)	-.233* (.093)
Safeway	-.113 (.075)	-.002 (.127)	-.017 (.094)
Age (ref:18-25)			
26-35	.005 (.067)	-.348** (.114)	-.098 (.085)
36-45	-.105 (.073)	-.154 (.124)	-.036 (.092)
46-55	-.022 (.076)	-.171 (.129)	.017 (.096)
56-65	.001 (.080)	-.203 (.137)	-.047 (.102)
Over 65	-.122 (.121)	-.428* (.205)	-.108 (.152)
Race (ref:Black/African-American)			
African immigrant/refugee	-.054 (.075)	-.000 (.128)	-.174 (.095)
White	-.228*** (.064)	-.036 (.109)	.091 (.080)
Asian	-.294*** (.086)	-.252 (.148)	-.142 (.111)
Other/more than one race	-.061 (.062)	-.048 (.105)	.007 (.078)
Education (ref:Less than high school)			
High school diploma/GED	-.111 (.097)	-.129 (.169)	-.181 (.125)
Some college	-.089 (.098)	.084 (.169)	.128 (.125)
Associate's degree	-.279* (.115)	.048 (.197)	.026 (.146)
Bachelor's degree	-.052 (.107)	-.179 (.184)	.011 (.136)
Masters/graduate/professional degree	.077 (.121)	-.225 (.207)	-.030 (.153)
Employment (ref:Full-time)			
Part-time	.013 (.062)	-.211* (.105)	-.098 (.079)
Not working/retired/other	-.131* (.057)	-.046 (.098)	.054 (.073)
Main activity at hot spot (ref:Live)			
Work	-.106 (.069)	-.053 (.116)	-.039 (.086)
Shop	-.047 (.076)	-.252 (.130)	-.137 (.096)
Use public transit	-.085 (.081)	-.220 (.138)	-.136 (.104)
Other	-.030 (.071)	-.087 (.121)	-.050 (.090)
Constant	3.169*** (.122)	3.153*** (.213)	3.300*** (.157)
F	2.51***	2.19***	2.85***
R^2	.104	.095	.121
RMSE	.550	.918	.678
N	636	615	608

Linear regression.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A12: Perceptions of safety, crime, and disorder (Rainier Beach vs. comparison spots)

	Feelings of safety	Frequency of disorder	Likelihood of crime
Fixed effects	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)
Wave 2	.107 (.069)	-.261* (.117)	-.168* (.085)
Wave 3	.176** (.068)	-.521*** (.112)	-.278*** (.082)
Wave 4	.176** (.066)	-.249* (.111)	-.197* (.081)
Wave 5	.156* (.066)	-.192 (.109)	-.281*** (.080)
Treatment	-.043 (.091)	.115 (.158)	.141 (.097)
Wave 2 $\times$ Treatment	-.040 (.099)	-.070 (.164)	-.002 (.120)
Wave 3 $\times$ Treatment	-.052 (.098)	.119 (.161)	.013 (.118)
Wave 4 $\times$ Treatment	-.054 (.096)	-.046 (.160)	-.274* (.117)
Wave 5 $\times$ Treatment	-.005 (.096)	.054 (.158)	-.002 (.117)
Race (ref:Black/African-American)			
African immigrant/refugee	-.054 (.055)	-.067 (.092)	-.167* (.067)
White	-.057 (.041)	-.065 (.067)	.120* (.050)
Asian	-.285*** (.052)	-.163 (.086)	-.078 (.063)
Other/more than one race	-.084 (.043)	.048 (.071)	.110* (.053)
Age (ref:18-25)			
26-35	.012 (.045)	-.159* (.075)	-.007 (.055)
36-45	-.039 (.050)	-.082 (.082)	.004 (.060)
46-55	-.061 (.051)	-.082 (.085)	.035 (.062)
56-65	-.021 (.053)	-.162 (.088)	.015 (.065)
Over 65	-.025 (.070)	-.506*** (.118)	-.174* (.086)
Constant	2.950*** (.073)	2.585*** (.126)	2.902*** (.080)
Random effects	σ (SE)	σ (SE)	σ (SE)
Hot spot	.008 (.005)	.029 (.016)	.005 (.004)
Residual	.307 (.012)	.803 (.032)	.434 (.017)
Log pseudolikelihood	-1139.722	-1718.863	-1304.153
Wald chi2	49.227***	67.822***	85.486***
N	1366	1306	1298

Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A13: Social cohesion and collective efficacy (Rainier Beach only)

	Social cohesion	Collective efficacy
	b (Robust SE)	b (Robust SE)
Wave 2	.079 (.061)	.121 (.092)
Wave 3	.082 (.061)	.132 (.091)
Wave 4	.117 (.061)	.161 (.092)
Wave 5	.116 (.060)	.170 (.091)
Hot spot (ref:Rainier & Henderson)		
Rose St	-.152** (.059)	-.034 (.089)
Light Rail	-.116 (.063)	-.018 (.096)
Lake Washington	-.072 (.060)	-.056 (.091)
Safeway	-.230*** (.061)	-.170 (.093)
Age (ref:18-25)		
26-35	-.002 (.055)	-.081 (.083)
36-45	-.077 (.060)	-.277** (.090)
46-55	.044 (.062)	-.044 (.094)
56-65	.046 (.065)	-.052 (.099)
Over 65	.035 (.099)	-.175 (.151)
Race (ref:Black/African-American)		
African immigrant/refugee	-.037 (.061)	-.030 (.094)
White	-.061 (.053)	-.145 (.080)
Asian	-.085 (.070)	-.303** (.106)
Other/more than one race	.003 (.051)	-.050 (.077)
Education (ref:Less than high school)		
High school diploma/GED	-.055 (.078)	-.070 (.117)
Some college	-.057 (.078)	-.081 (.117)
Associate's degree	-.171 (.093)	-.179 (.139)
Bachelor's degree	-.044 (.086)	-.075 (.129)
Masters/graduate/professional degree	.041 (.097)	-.020 (.146)
Employment (ref:Full-time)		
Part-time	-.007 (.051)	-.101 (.077)
Not working/retired/other	-.030 (.047)	-.065 (.071)
Main activity at hot spot (ref:Live)		
Work	.063 (.056)	-.037 (.085)
Shop	-.016 (.063)	-.205* (.096)
Use public transit	-.141* (.067)	-.187 (.101)
Other	-.038 (.058)	-.084 (.088)
Constant	2.925*** (.099)	2.862*** (.148)
F	1.65*	1.71*
R^2	.071	.075
RMSE	.450	.675
N	637	624

Linear regression.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A14: Social cohesion and collective efficacy (Rainier Beach vs. comparison spots)

	Social cohesion	Collective efficacy
Fixed effects	b (SE)	b (SE)
Wave 2	.058 (.057)	.088 (.086)
Wave 3	.051 (.056)	.066 (.084)
Wave 4	.130* (.054)	.247** (.082)
Wave 5	.108* (.054)	.155 (.082)
Treatment	.058 (.069)	.048 (.093)
Wave 2 $\times$ Treatment	-.025 (.081)	-.004 (.121)
Wave 3 $\times$ Treatment	.008 (.080)	.075 (.120)
Wave 4 $\times$ Treatment	-.028 (.079)	-.091 (.119)
Wave 5 $\times$ Treatment	-.026 (.079)	-.005 (.118)
Race (ref:Black/African-American)		
African immigrant/refugee	.022 (.045)	.072 (.068)
White	-.008 (.033)	-.085 (.050)
Asian	.004 (.042)	-.072 (.064)
Other/more than one race	-.041 (.036)	-.127* (.053)
Age (ref:18-25)		
26-35	-.043 (.037)	-.065 (.056)
36-45	-.073 (.040)	-.160** (.061)
46-55	-.011 (.042)	-.108 (.063)
56-65	.017 (.044)	-.008 (.065)
Over 65	.035 (.058)	-.122 (.087)
Constant	2.701*** (.056)	2.527*** (.079)
Random effects	σ (SE)	σ (SE)
Hot spot	.003 (.002)	.003 (.003)
Residual	.208 (.008)	.452 (.018)
Log pseudolikelihood	-875.002	-1352.487
Wald chi2	20.712	35.470**
N	1371	1320

Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A15: Perceptions of police (Rainier Beach only)

	Police activity	Satisfaction with police	Police legitimacy
	b (Robust SE)	b (Robust SE)	b (Robust SE)
Wave 2	.088 (.102)	.362*** (.102)	.207 (.105)
Wave 3	.095 (.102)	.299** (.103)	.089 (.105)
Wave 4	.015 (.103)	.392*** (.104)	.296** (.107)
Wave 5	.168 (.101)	.081 (.102)	.027 (.104)
Hot spot (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	-.256** (.098)	.192 (.100)	.112 (.102)
Light Rail	-.044 (.107)	.086 (.107)	.045 (.111)
Lake Washington	-.079 (.101)	-.007 (.103)	-.001 (.106)
Safeway	.049 (.102)	-.034 (.104)	-.063 (.106)
Age (ref:18-25)			
26-35	-.317*** (.092)	-.016 (.094)	.018 (.095)
36-45	-.142 (.101)	-.171 (.103)	.005 (.105)
46-55	-.154 (.106)	.060 (.106)	.207 (.109)
56-65	-.222* (.111)	.095 (.112)	.225 (.115)
Over 65	-.319 (.167)	.048 (.168)	-.055 (.171)
Race (ref:Black/African-American)			
African immigrant/refugee	.013 (.104)	.247* (.104)	.127 (.106)
White	-.368*** (.088)	-.066 (.089)	.091 (.091)
Asian	-.440*** (.121)	.078 (.126)	.028 (.124)
Other/more than one race	-.184* (.086)	.100 (.088)	.044 (.090)
Education (ref:Less than high school)			
High school diploma/GED	-.035 (.134)	-.102 (.140)	-.098 (.142)
Some college	-.060 (.135)	-.193 (.140)	-.136 (.143)
Associate's degree	-.354* (.158)	-.166 (.163)	-.232 (.167)
Bachelor's degree	-.241 (.148)	-.323* (.153)	-.339* (.155)
Masters/graduate/professional degree	-.053 (.168)	.050 (.176)	-.036 (.177)
Employment (ref:Full-time)			
Part-time	-.126 (.087)	-.021 (.089)	-.052 (.089)
Not working/retired/other	.004 (.079)	.140 (.079)	.103 (.082)
Main activity at hot spot (ref:Live)			
Work	-.126 (.095)	-.018 (.096)	.095 (.098)
Shop	-.148 (.104)	-.027 (.106)	-.042 (.107)
Use public transit	-.343** (.115)	-.008 (.118)	-.106 (.122)
Other	-.190 (.098)	-.025 (.099)	-.069 (.101)
Constant	2.954*** (.168)	2.577*** (.175)	2.560*** (.178)
F	3.36***	2.58***	1.74*
R^2	.140	.117	.083
RMSE	.742	.730	.744
N	607	573	572

Linear regression.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A16: Perceptions of police (Rainier Beach vs. comparison spots)

	Police activity	Satisfaction with police	Police legitimacy
Fixed effects	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)
Wave 2	-.054 (.094)	-.114 (.098)	-.068 (.098)
Wave 3	-.080 (.092)	-.084 (.095)	-.033 (.094)
Wave 4	.070 (.091)	.022 (.094)	.010 (.093)
Wave 5	-.035 (.089)	-.073 (.095)	.034 (.092)
Treatment	.053 (.099)	-.158 (.105)	-.099 (.103)
Wave 2 × Treatment	.092 (.134)	.417** (.138)	.238 (.137)
Wave 3 × Treatment	.085 (.133)	.327* (.137)	.097 (.135)
Wave 4 × Treatment	-.065 (.132)	.309* (.136)	.269* (.135)
Wave 5 × Treatment	.098 (.130)	.075 (.135)	-.064 (.132)
Race (ref:Black/African-American)			
African immigrant/refugee	-.107 (.076)	.226** (.078)	.164* (.076)
White	-.251*** (.055)	-.123* (.058)	.039 (.057)
Asian	-.283*** (.071)	.058 (.074)	.112 (.072)
Other/more than one race	-.098 (.059)	-.039 (.061)	-.058 (.060)
Age (ref:18-25)			
26-35	-.222*** (.062)	-.093 (.064)	-.065 (.063)
36-45	-.078 (.067)	-.017 (.070)	.051 (.069)
46-55	-.119 (.070)	.098 (.073)	.168* (.071)
56-65	-.128 (.072)	.112 (.076)	.157* (.074)
Over 65	-.361*** (.095)	.167 (.099)	.110 (.098)
Constant	2.544*** (.084)	2.736*** (.089)	2.608*** (.088)
Random effects	σ (SE)	σ (SE)	σ (SE)
Hot spot	.002 (.003)	.004 (.004)	.003 (.003)
Residual	.545 (.021)	.542 (.022)	.524 (.021)
Log pseudolikelihood	-1447.405	-1334.557	-1321.260
Wald chi2	64.242***	66.538***	51.113***
N	1296	1197	1204

Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure A1: Percent change in calls for service in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014



Figure A2: Percent change in offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014



Figure A3: Percent change in youth offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014



Figure A4: Percent change in violent offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014



Figure A5: Percent change in NIBRS Group A Person offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014



Figure A6: Percent change in NIBRS Group A Property offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014



Figure A7: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014



Figure A8: Percent change in calls for service at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A9: Percent change in all offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A10: Percent change in youth offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A11: Percent change in violent offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A12: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A13: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A14: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A15: Percent change in calls for service at Rainier & Henderosn and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A16: Percent change in all offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A17: Percent change in youth offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A18: Percent change in violent offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A19: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A20: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A21: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A22: Percent change in calls for service at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A23: Percent change in all offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A24: Percent change in youth offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A25: Percent change in violent offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A26: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A27: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A28: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A29: Percent change in calls for service at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A30: Percent change in all offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A31: Percent change in youth offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A32: Percent change in violent offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A33: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A34: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A35: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A36: Percent change in calls for service at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A37: Percent change in all offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A38: Percent change in youth offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A39: Percent change in violent offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A40: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A41: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A42: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014



Figure A43: Calls for service in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2019



Figure A44: Predicted number of calls by treatment assignment and intervention status



Figure A45: Offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2019



Figure A46: Predicted number of offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status



Figure A47: Youth offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2019



Figure A48: Predicted number of youth offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status



Figure A49: Violent offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2019



Figure A50: Predicted number of violent offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status



Figure A51: NIBRS Group A person offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2019



Figure A52: Predicted number of NIBRS Group A person offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status



Figure A53: NIBRS Group A property offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2019



Figure A54: Predicted number of NIBRS Group A property offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status



Figure A55: NIBRS Group B offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2019



Figure A56: Predicted number of NIBRS Group B offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status



Figure A57: Noticed improvements to businesses, 2016 vs. 2019



Figure A58: Noticed Corner Greeters, 2016 vs. 2019



Figure A59: Noticed Safe Passage, 2016 vs. 2019



Figure A60: Satisfied with improvements to businesses, 2016 vs. 2019



Figure A61: Satisfied with Corner Greeters, 2016 vs. 2019



Figure A62: Satisfied with Safe Passage, 2016 vs. 2019



Figure A63: Noticed the Be^3, 2019



Figure A64: Noticed ABSPY, 2019



Figure A65: Satisfied with the Be^3, 2019



Figure A66: Satisfied with ABSPY, 2019



Figure A67: In the past year, has crime gotten worse, stayed the same, or gotten better? (Rainier Beach hot spots)



Figure A68: In the past year, has crime gotten worse, stayed the same, or gotten better?



Figure A69: Change in perceived likelihood of crime in the Rainier Beach hot spots, 2014-2019



Figure A70: Change in perceived likelihood of crime in the hot spots and comparison spots, 2014-2019



Figure A71: Change in perceived frequency of disorder in the Rainier Beach hot spots, 2014-2019



Figure A72: Change in perceived frequency of disorder in the hot spots and comparison spots, 2014-2019



Figure A73: Change in feelings of safety in the Rainier Beach hot spots, 2014-2019



Figure A74: Change in feelings of safety in the hot spots and comparison spots, 2014-2019



Figure A75: Change in social cohesion in the Rainier Beach hot spots, 2014-2019



Figure A76: Change in social cohesion in the hot spots and comparison spots, 2014-2019



Figure A77: Change in collective efficacy in the Rainier Beach hot spots, 2014-2019



Figure A78: Change in collective efficacy in the hot spots and comparison spots, 2014-2019



Figure A79: Participation in community activities in past year in hot spots and comparison spots, 2019



Figure A80: Change in satisfaction with police in the Rainier Beach hot spots, 2014-2019



Figure A81: Change in satisfaction with police in the hot spots and comparison spots, 2014-2019



Figure A82: Change in perceived police legitimacy in the Rainier Beach hot spots, 2014-2019



Figure A83: Change in perceived police legitimacy in the hot spots and comparison spots, 2014-2019



Figure A84: Overall satisfaction with police in the hot spots and comparison spots, 2019



Figure A85: Direct contact with police in the hot spots and comparison spots, 2019



Figure A86: Change in perceived frequency of police activity in the Rainier Beach hot spots, 2014-2019



Figure A87: Change in perceived frequency of police activity in the hot spots and comparison spots, 2014-2019