Rainier Beach:
A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth

2020 Evaluation Update

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What is Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth?

Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth (ABSPY) is an innovative community-led, place-based violence prevention initiative. The goal of the program is to reduce youth victimization and crime in the Rainier Beach neighborhood. The program is named for the vision set out by the Rainier Beach community in its Neighborhood Plan Update, which is to make Rainier Beach a Beautiful Safe Place. ABSPY is happening in five small groups of street blocks in the neighborhood—"hot spots"—where about half of all youth crime incidents in Rainier Beach happened in 2012. The five hot spots are Rose Street, Rainier and Henderson, Rainier Beach Light Rail Station, Lake Washington, and Our Safe Way. This report updates our original 2016 evaluation report and updates in 2017, 2018, and 2019.

ABSPY Background

ABSPY is based on a number of research studies, including one from Seattle by David Weisburd and his colleagues, showing that about half of all crime in cities comes from a very small number—typically about 5 percent—of street blocks. Crime involving young people is even more likely to come from a small number of places. Research shows that police efforts to reduce crime at hot spots through crackdowns and arrests are effective at reducing crime, but arrest and prosecution can increase the chance of reoffending among high-risk youth. ABSPY focuses on **non-arrest** strategies to reduce crime, such as building community leadership and capacity to help solve problems and addressing environmental risk factors for crime to promote community safety. ABSPY was originally funded by a $1 million grant from the Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program, an initiative of the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance, awarded in 2012, and has been funded by the City of Seattle since 2016. The Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program supports partnerships between cities, communities, and researchers to develop community-led, place-based, data-driven problem-solving efforts. ABSPY is advised by a Core Team including representatives from the City of Seattle, the Seattle Neighborhood Group, Seattle Police Department, the Boys and Girls Club of King County, Seattle Public Schools, and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition. However, what makes ABSPY unique is that community members in Rainier Beach itself took the lead in developing evidence-informed strategies to address the root causes of youth crime in the neighborhood.

Community-Led Problem Solving

From 2013 through 2016, in an effort overseen by the Core Team, community members from the five Rainier Beach hot spots took the lead in developing evidence-informed strategies to address the root causes of youth crime in the neighborhood. These interventions were tailored to the specific conditions in each hot spot, and continue to be regularly updated and adjusted based on new data and changing conditions in the hot spots. ABSPY's signature interventions include:

- **Corner Greeter** events, led by the Rainier Beach Action Coalition, in which young people from the neighborhood set up stations offering refreshments, information, and fun activities in each hot spot to engage community members and "activate" places that were previously considered to be unsafe.

- **Safe Passage**, led by the Boys and Girls Club of King County, which provides guardianship, supervision, and encouragement to young people as they leave school.

- **Business engagement**, coordinated by Seattle Neighborhood Group and supported by the Rainier Beach Merchants Association, Seattle Police Department, and local community and economic development organizations. This intervention focuses on learning about the concerns facing local businesses, building relationships between businesses and with the police, and increasing business owners' ability to prevent and report crime.

- **Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)** interventions and resources, applied to both public and private property, to improve design, layout, and place management.

- **Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS)** in both school and community settings, overseen by Seattle Public Schools and the ABSPY Core Team, to collaboratively set behavioral expectations for young people, reward good behavior, and support youth in need of services.

Updated Evaluation Findings

The Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University is the research partner for ABSPY. We tracked calls for service and reported crime in the five hot spots from September 2011 to August 2020. We paired each Rainier Beach hot spot with a comparison hot spot—a similar location elsewhere in Seattle Police Department's South Precinct—and assessed crime rates in the Rainier Beach hot spots and neighborhood compared to trends in the South Precinct. We were not able to conduct our usual in-person community survey in the hot spots and comparison sites in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but we were able to conduct a small online survey with some community members who subscribe to the Rainier Beach Action Coalition's mailing list. Although the survey respondents and sample size are not comparable to previous years, we asked the same questions.

Our updated findings for 2020 show that **crime in the ABSPY hot spots continues to trend downwards**, but the events of 2020 and some of the challenges ABSPY has experienced over the past few years have highlighted some areas where renewed focus is needed.

- Crime is still trending down in most of the hot spots, but some positive trends from last year have reversed. Last year youth crime almost disappeared at Rose Street and the Light Rail, but we saw small upticks this year. However, the Rainier and Henderson and Lake Washington hot spots have seen long-term downward trends in youth crime.

- Calls for service remain significantly higher in the hot spots, but individual ABSPY interventions seem to affect crime outcomes differently according to new statistical models we implemented this year.

- Satisfaction with ABSPY interventions is high, but business improvements need attention. Because our survey sample this year was connected to RBAC, they were all well aware of ABSPY's work in the Rainier Beach community. However, those who responded to the survey were somewhat dissatisfied with the business improvements in the community. This also aligns with a conversation that occurred early in 2020 within the Core Team about the low visibility of CPTED interventions.

- Fewer people in this year's survey believe crime has gotten better in Rainier Beach in the past year. While these results are not really comparable to previous years, a majority of respondents this year believed crime had stayed the same or gotten worse. While they felt fairly safe in most situations in the hot spots, they reported noticing various types of disorder quite frequently and believed it was highly likely that a serious crime could occur in the hot spots. This may have been influenced by high profile crime events in the neighborhood in 2020.

- Social cohesion is fairly high among survey respondents this year, but most do not think that people are willing to intervene in neighborhood problems.

- Satisfaction with police is low, and survey respondents report low levels of police visibility in the neighborhood. As noted above, this may reflect the events of 2020 both locally and nationally, as police brutality and the relationship between police and communities of color returned to the national spotlight.

Recommendations for 2020

It is not surprising that interventions intended to create sustainable change at long-term hot spots of crime can take many years to work. However, the advantage of regular data analysis and evaluation is the ability to catch potential problems early and make course corrections. It is important to note that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic also affects both the implementation of ABSPY interventions and our ability to evaluate their impact. However, our analysis this year suggests the following focus areas for 2021:

- Continue to **mobilize the Core Team and ABSPY resources to support the Rainier Beach community** through continued public health and violence emergencies, including discussion and planning for what the role of the Core Team should be in the long-term.

- Explore how to **re-engage the community and increase representation, particularly among youth**, in the continued development and evolution of ABSPY interventions and data collection and evaluation efforts.

- **Explore the differential impacts of interventions at the hot spots** to understand small changes in trends over time and possible reporting effects.

1 Background

This report updates the original *Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth* (ABSPY) Final Evaluation Report (Gill et al., 2016) and subsequent evaluation updates (Gill et al., 2018; Gill & Prince, 2020; Gill & Vitter, 2017) with new findings from our crime analysis and community survey (modified due to COVID-19) in 2020. ABSPY is a **community-led, place-based, data-driven, non-arrest based collaboration** focused on preventing crime in five juvenile and youth crime hot spots in the Rainier Beach neighborhood of Seattle (see Figure 1). ABSPY builds on several neighborhood and City processes, including the 2011 Rainier Beach Neighborhood Plan Update (RBNPU) and the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative, and is grounded in research evidence showing that crime—especially crime involving juveniles and youth[1]—is highly concentrated at small places (e.g. Weisburd, 2015; Weisburd et al., 2004; Weisburd et al., 2009). This evidence indicates that policing and crime prevention efforts focused at these hot spots are effective (Braga et al., 2014; Lum et al., 2011; Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018). However, proactive policing approaches that focus on law enforcement strategies such as crackdowns and "busts" to clear offenders from high-crime areas may not be suitable at hot spots of youth crime, since young people who are arrested and processed through the juvenile justice system—especially those involved in less serious crimes—are more likely to reoffend than those who are diverted. Research suggests that community-led, non-arrest strategies may be more appropriate at such places.

Figure 1: Rainier Beach hot spots identified for ABSPY intervention

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
[1] ABSPY defines "youth" as individuals aged 25 and under. While the juvenile justice system focuses on young people under the age of 18, ABSPY builds on increasing recognition by researchers and policy makers that the brain does not fully develop until around age 25, directly impacting decision-making and risky behavior (e.g. Steinberg, 2008).

The RBNPU explicitly called for a community-led hot spots approach to address crime and improve neighborhood safety in Rainier Beach, which led to the development of ABSPY. The planning process began in 2012 with the development of a successful $1 million grant proposal to the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance's Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program (renamed "Innovations in Community Based Crime Reduction" in 2017). Implementation began in October 2013 with a problem-solving process undertaken by Community Task Force (CTF) teams representing each of the five hot spots, and the subsequent development and implementation of a suite of signature interventions (see below). Federal funding continued through September 2016. Beginning in January 2016, the City of Seattle's Human Services Department also began to fund implementation and evaluation on an annual basis. In 2019 ABSPY received funding through 2020 from the city's Department of Neighborhoods. ABSPY planning and implementation is overseen by a cross-sector Core Team and supported by a range of community intervention partners. A detailed description of ABSPY's history, including key partners, hot spot identification process, problem-solving process, and intervention development, can be found in the original evaluation report (Gill et al., 2016).

2 2020 Intervention Update

Our 2017 evaluation update shows the timeline of ABSPY interventions from October 2013, the beginning of the planning phase, to October 2017 (Gill & Vitter, 2017, p. 3). The interventions continued through the last few months of 2017 and were consistently implemented through 2018 and 2019. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in early 2020, some ABSPY interventions have been temporarily paused, while others have continued in a modified capacity (for example, virtual Peace Circles). However, the ABSPY Core Team has continued to meet virtually and spent considerable time in 2020 working to support the Rainier Beach community through the pandemic, policing protests that occurred in the summer, and high-profile shootings that occurred in the neighborhood. For example, Core Team members have coordinated community healing spaces to respond to local and national events and helped provide information to residents about access to COVID testing, food support, and so on. Overall, the pandemic led to continued conversations among the Core Team about its role in crisis response and long-term community support in Rainier Beach.

2.1 Intervention summary

2.1.1 Coordination and planning

Although the COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted ABSPY's primary role, which is to bring people together within and around physical space, the Core Team continued to meet virtually throughout the year and think creatively about how to adapt to the "new normal" of the pandemic in both the short- and longer-term. Specific highlights, activities, and challenges throughout the year included:

- **Transitions within the team.** There were a number of transitions in and out of the Core Team in 2020, including people in key roles. Hana Mohamed, the NIJ grant project manager at the Office of City Auditor (OCA) left the team at the beginning of the year and was replaced by IB Osuntoki. Danielle Jackson, Rashad Barber and Gabbie Price from RBAC joined the team, with Danielle taking on the role of CW-PBIS coordinator from Mahogany Villars, who also left. ABSPY coordinator Jenny

Frankl left at the end of May, and hiring for her replacement continued throughout the summer, with Cathie Wilmore joining the team in the fall. Finally, ABSPY funding and formal administration is transitioning from the Human Services Division to the Department of Neighborhoods (DON) beginning with 2021 contracts. Waing Waing and Jenn Brandon from DON regularly attend Core Team meetings to support the team through this process.

- **Team-building.** Core Team meetings have been virtual since March, but the team has adapted well to the change. In June the team participated in a retreat with Dr. Jabali Stewart and his organization Huayruro. The retreat was successful and focused on discussions about what comes next for ABSPY, particularly given the climate of the pandemic (and the injustices it highlighted) and concerns about policing both locally and nationally. A key theme from the retreat was ABSPY's own accountability, and participants discussed the voting policy, addressing power imbalances between institutions and individuals, improving clarity around the structure and decision-making processes within the group, and the importance of developing and maintaining effective communication practices within a decentralized system. The lack of youth participation was also highlighted once again, and ideas for addressing this issue included developing a youth action team to serve in an advisory capacity. During 2020 another key conversation within the Core Team was how to continue ABSPY's efforts without inadvertently contributing to gentrification and displacement of existing residents. OCA led a literature review and report on gentrification to increase the team's understanding of these issues for continued awareness and advocacy.

- **Community advocacy and outreach.** The COVID-19 pandemic and gun violence in the neighborhood over the summer presented a number of opportunities for the ABSPY interventions to pivot to helping community members facing unprecedented levels of need throughout the year. Specific examples of ABSPY's community outreach and advocacy in 2020 include:

  - Supporting construction and improvement efforts at Be'er Sheva Park that were planned prior to the pandemic, including successfully lobbying for the grass to be cut after maintenance slowed during lockdown.

  - ABSPY funds were used in March and April to cover lunches, cleaning, and sanitation supplies at the Boys and Girls Clubs of Rainier Vista and Skyway. The BGC was one of the few organizations that stayed open to provide childcare, activities, and support for young people and their families in the community during lockdown. Two hundred and fifty families were served by the Rainier Vista network.

  - RBAC set up a COVID-19 hotline for the community to coordinate information sharing and outreach. Key needs identified by the community included groceries, deliveries and pickup, hand sanitizer, and information. RBAC staff also made hand sanitizer to distribute to health centers and families in the community.

  - Several Core Team meetings were dedicated to discussing how ABPSY interventions could be adapted to the virtual space or modified to better address emerging community needs.

  - Core Team members conducted and facilitated community outreach and consultation, in collaboration with the Department of Neighborhoods and Lake Washington Apartments, after a public COVID-19 testing site was proposed at the Atlantic Street boat ramp without community consultation. As a result of this outreach, the site was moved to the Rainier Beach High School parking lot and Core Team members worked to provide information to the community

about the site.

- – ABSPY members engaged in outreach and convened regular community healing spaces after several high-profile crimes in the neighborhood in the summer, including the murder of a local teenager on Mother's Day.

2.1.2 Safe Passage/Campus Safety Initiative

Safe Passage is one of the flagship initiatives of ABSPY. Overseen by the Boys and Girls Club of King County, Safe Passage provides supervision, guardianship, and a friendly face on the streets in the afternoons (between 1 and 6pm) when children are leaving schools on the Rainier and Henderson campus and the risk of youth crime at this hot spot is highest. Safe Passage staff work for the Boys and Girls Club and are community members who have grown up in the neighborhood. They are easily recognizable by their bright blue jackets or t-shirts with the "Be Safe" slogan, which (along with "Be Safe Bro!") has become a popular greeting between the Safe Passage team and local young people. While Safe Passage staff are authorized to break up fights, they primarily focus on providing a positive presence and engaging young people as they walk home or head to the bus stop.

As Seattle Public Schools were closed for much of 2020, Safe Passage could not continue in its normal format this year. However, the team still conducted regular monitoring of the safety zones, created signage and surveys, increased focus on case management and supporting vulnerable families, delivering food and supplies, and supporting activities at the Boys and Girls Club.

2.1.3 Corner Greeters

The Corner Greeters initiative, overseen by the Rainier Beach Action Coalition (RBAC), consists of positive community messaging, mobilization, and outreach; pop-up events and activities such as music, dancing, crafts, and other fun and culturally-relevant activities at the hot spots; and community data collection. The goal of the Corner Greeters is to "take back" hot spot spaces for the community and build collective efficacy and empowerment among residents. The key feature of the Corner Greeters is that the events are completely youth-led. Young people from the neighborhood collaborate with RBAC to plan different activities and staff the events. They are also trained to communicate and share ABSPY data and information, such as neighborhood crime data reports, with visitors to their events to connect community members to ABSPY, build collective efficacy, and empower them to take action in the neighborhood. RBAC is also responsible for the Mobile Discovery Center, a unique community information booth on wheels that sets up at Corner Greeter and other neighborhood events. The Corner Greeters also conduct their own surveys regularly at the Rainier Beach hot spots to track community perceptions of safety and collective efficacy at the hot spots, and support ABSPY at community events.

In 2020 RBAC announced an expansion to the Corner Greeters program, supported by $100,000 from the Youth Consortium of the City Council, to develop YATTA (Young Adults Transitioning to Adulthood) Rising, a program for young people aged 15-24 who may be at risk of negative contact with the police. YATTAs coordinate Corner Greeter activities, such as clean-ups, surveys, documenting positive activities on social media, planting bulbs, and using the city's Find it, Fix it app. YATTA Rising also incorporates a systems change effort in which young people become advocates for police reform. As documented

above, RBAC and the Corner Greeters team was able to continue with a number of community support and outreach activities, as well as virtual meetings and social media campaigns, during the pandemic.

2.1.4 Business and community engagement

2020 has been a challenging year for Seattle Police Department, given the pandemic, large numbers of resignations from the department (including Chief Best in August), and the summer protests. In addition, since many businesses were closed or operating with limited capacity during the pandemic, business and community engagement activities have been difficult. However, SPD continued to plan Cops and Cones events at Lake Washington, and worked with Dr. Jabali Stewart to design and implement police-community healing circles. The department also worked to identify new officers to regularly participate in ABSPY meetings and activities. During the summer months, outdoor hot spot activation activities that could still be carried out with safety measures such as social distancing in place continued in Rainier Beach.

2.1.5 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

Early in 2020 it became clear that while ABSPY has done a lot of CPTED activities over the years, many of the efforts were not well-known or publicized, even within the Core Team. At the February Core Team meeting Jenny Frankl gave a presentation highlighting these efforts. It was proposed that signs should be created saying "this project was done in partnership with ABSPY," although due to the pandemic this idea has not yet moved forward. As part of its overall environmental efforts the ABSPY Core Team approved additional funding for the Clean Crew in 2020, subject to improvements to its supervision and referral procedures. Challenges to continued CPTED implementation during the pandemic included the need for social distancing and limited access to supplies, volunteers, and businesses. However, the team helped to purchase and distribute cleaning supplies and continued checking for and reporting graffiti.

2.1.6 Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) and restorative practices

The NIJ Workgroup of the Core Team continued to meet regularly in 2020 to implement community-wide PBIS and restorative practices under a grant from the National Institute of Justice. While schools were closed most of the year due to COVID, Seattle Public Schools worked with teachers and parents to bring PBIS principles to the online space. SPS also worked to revise the Tiered Fidelity Inventory, the key implementation data collection tool for PBIS, to align it with racial and social justice principles. Virtual peace circles, and some in-person circles, were held at the Boys and Girls Club and provided important opportunities for young people to process the trauma and challenges of the year's events.

3 2020 Evaluation Update: Summary of Methods

A detailed description of the data and methods used for this evaluation can be found in the original evaluation report and the 2017 update. In this section we summarize the most important aspects of our

approach and the updates we made in 2020. Our 2020 evaluation is based on monthly police data on calls for service and recorded offenses and incidents from January 2011 to August 2020, provided by SPD, and a modified community survey conducted online in December 2020. Our analytic approach matches each Rainier Beach hot spot with a comparison location elsewhere in SPD's South Precinct, which is similar in terms of crime rates and characteristics such as land use, presence of schools, access to public transit etc. Further details about the selection of the hot spots and comparison sites and information about the police data are available in our original report. It is important to note that while we include the originally selected comparison sites because analytic models need to match the research design, significant gentrification and population change in Southeast Seattle have changed some of our matched comparison spots considerably and they now look very different compared to when they were first identified in 2012. This may affect the conclusions of the research. It is also very important to note that crime rates are likely to have been significantly impacted by the pandemic, protests, and disruption to police services in 2020. We do not yet know exactly what the impact of these events have been on crime rates nationwide or in Seattle.

To make this report easier to read, all of the tables and most graphs are included in the Statistical Appendix at the end of this report. You can look at any of the tables or graphs in more detail in the electronic version of this report by clicking on the blue number next to each reference to a table or figure (e.g. Table A1—click the blue "A1" link to see the table).

3.1 Police crime data definitions

We use the following information from official police data provided to us by SPD in our analyses. Each measure of crime data can tell us different information about how ABSPY is working. Note that we are not allowed to report the numbers of certain offense types, including homicide, rape, and domestic incidents. These offenses are included in our statistical models because specific numbers cannot be identified, but they are not included when we report the numbers of certain offenses.

1. **Calls for police service.** "Calls for service" include both 911 calls from the public to the police, and the logs that police record (usually on their in-car computers) while they are out on patrol. Calls for service tell us what people in the neighborhood are concerned about, what they are willing to call the police about (which may indicate how much they trust the police), and what the police see or hear about while they are in the neighborhood. But calls for service don't tell us the "true" picture of crime. Sometimes the person calling 911 doesn't know exactly what they are seeing or hearing, but when the police arrive they can determine what type of crime has been committed and record this in their report (see below). Multiple people might call 911 about the same problem, like hearing shots being fired. And sometimes, even if a person was worried about an issue and called the police, it might turn out that no crime has been committed or the police can't find whatever was going on. Calls for service also don't tell us who was involved in a crime (e.g. the age, gender, or race of a suspect or victim). This information is verified by police at the scene and included in the report.

2. **Police reports (offenses).** Police write reports when they respond to a call or see something while on patrol and have reason to believe that a crime may have occurred (such as a victim or witness willing to make a report). Although not every call for service turns into a report, the reports give us a better idea of what happened and who was involved. However, police can decide whether or not to take a report, and sometimes victims don't want the police to take a formal report, so not all

crimes make it into the data. Data on offenses and incidents reported by police are stored in the new NIBRS-compliant system described above. This overall category of police reports includes the juvenile/youth, violent, and minor crime incidents described in points 3-5 below.

3. **Juvenile/youth crime reports.** Because ABSPY is focused on creating a "beautiful safe place for youth," we also analyze reports of offenses that involve young people (under 18 and age 18-25).

4. **Violent crime reports.** ABSPY is also focused on violence prevention, so we look at the effects of the interventions on violent offenses. We define "violent offenses" as murder and non-negligent manslaughter; aggravated assault; robbery; rape; and simple assault.[2]

5. **Group A person offenses.** NIBRS Group A offenses are the most serious or violent offenses. They are similar to Part I offenses in the older Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system, but more offense types are included. Group A person offenses include the violent incident types described above and certain other offenses against the person such as intimidation and kidnapping. To create this category, we selected all offenses that were categorized as both Group A and Person Offenses. A full list of NIBRS offense definitions is available here.

6. **Group A property offenses.** Similar to the Group A person offense category, Group A property offenses include the more serious property offenses. These include crimes like arson, burglary, larceny/theft (including motor vehicle theft), property damage, and so on. To create this category, we selected all offenses that were categorized as both Group A and Property Offenses.

7. **Group B offenses.** NIBRS Group B offenses are typically minor crimes, including things like disorderly conduct, drunkenness, non-violent family offenses, and liquor law violations. It is useful to look at these less serious crimes because if they increase it may suggest that community members are more likely to call the police and feel more empowered to take action against minor quality of life issues.

3.2 Community survey

Due to COVID-19 we were unable to safely conduct our usual in-person community survey in the five Rainier Beach and five comparison hot spots this year. Ultimately, in December 2020 we collaborated with RBAC to conduct an online community survey of the approximately 800 members of RBAC's mailing list. The survey was anonymous so we do not know exactly how members of the mailing list are connected to the five hot spots, but given RBAC's location and mission it is reasonable to assume that most members have a strong connection to the neighborhood (almost everyone who responded to the survey said that they lived or worked in Rainier Beach). The online survey was very similar to the in-person survey instrument we used in 2019, but we included a question at the beginning asking participants to identify which of the five hot spots they spend the most time in when they are in Rainier Beach because we could not be physically present in the hot spots. Participants were asked to choose one of the five locations from a map similar to the one on page 1.

Unfortunately we received very few survey responses, given the size of the mailing list. Only 19 people fully completed the survey. This is likely due to the time of year (mid-December), the possibility that many people may not fully read mailing list emails, and the length of the survey—although only four people

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[2]We are not permitted to report homicide and rape offenses separately.

started the survey and then failed to complete it. As a result, while the survey questions were the same we do not have sufficient data to conduct a full statistical analysis incorporating all six survey waves as we have done in prior years. It is also likely that the people who did respond are different to those we usually encounter on the street, because they have chosen to actively engage with RBAC (for example, this suggests they will be more likely to be aware of ABSPY interventions—especially those led by RBAC, like the Corner Greeters). Finally, because the comparison hot spots are outside Rainier Beach and not all in the same neighborhood, we did not have any means of online access to residents of those areas to collect comparison data. Therefore, the results we present below are simply descriptive, although we do note similarities and differences between findings from previous years.

The characteristics of the 2020 survey respondents also differed substantially from respondents in Rainier Beach and the comparison sites in previous years. They were much more likely to be female (76.4%, compared to about half of the sample in previous years) and older (about three-quarters were aged between 26 and 55, while in previous years about half of respondents were under 35). Respondents were also much more likely to be White (42.1%, compared to less than one-quarter in previous years). All participants were born in the United States compared to less than two-thirds in previous years, and about three-quarters had children of any age, compared to about half in previous years. The 2020 respondents were highly educated, with 63% holding a Masters, graduate, or professional degree compared to around 10% in previous years. About 90% of the sample were employed full- or part-time, compared to about 60-75% in previous years, and only two respondents were attending school. Finally, respondents in 2020 were somewhat more likely to report "I live here" as the main activity they did in Rainier Beach (68.4% compared to fewer than half in previous years who said they lived at the hot spot in question). When asked which of the five Rainier Beach hot spots they spent the most time in, the majority of 2020 respondents (43.8%) said Safeway, followed by Rainier and Henderson (25%), Light Rail and Lake Washington (12.5% each), and Rose Street (6.3%). Due to the small number of respondents we present combined survey results across all five hot spots in this report.

3.3 Analytic strategy

We updated our analytic strategy for the crime data in 2020 to account for advances in statistical methods and to better align with our original research design. Specifically, we now analyze the effects of ABSPY on police incidents and calls for service using random effects negative binomial regression, which allows us to better account for the structure of the underlying data and the clustering of crime within each individual hot spot. Our new models also control for autocorrelation—the relationship that naturally occurs between one month's crime rate and the next month's regardless of the intervention. Finally, instead of combining all the interventions in the model, we include a series of interaction terms between each individual intervention—Corner Greeters, Safe Passage, business engagement, CPTED, and PBIS/restorative practices—to better account for the variation in the use of each intervention by hot spot and the specific months when each of the initiatives were active or inactive at each location. As before, we also control for seasonal and overall crime rates in the models. The updated timeframe for the police data analysis is January 2011 to August 2020 (116 months).[3] We also present descriptive graphs showing offense in each hot spot and across all five Rainier Beach hot spots from September 2011 to August 2019, and the percentage change in each crime outcome pre- and post-May 2014 (when the first interventions were rolled out) in each hot spot relative to its comparison site, the overall Rainier Beach neighborhood, and the South Precinct overall. These descriptive graphs complement the statistical analysis and are easy to

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[3] Refer to the 2017 Evaluation Update for a table showing pre-intervention monthly average numbers for each crime outcome.

read and interpret.

As in previous reports, we also calculated the crime inflation factor, which is the ratio of calls to offenses in the pre-intervention and during-intervention periods (Weisburd et al., 2020). The crime inflation factor assesses whether higher numbers of offenses can be attributed to increased calls to the police (reflecting improved collective efficacy and trust in police among residents) rather than ABSPY failing to work or even "backfiring." This is an important potential source of bias in analyzing the effects of interventions that aim to decrease crime but increase citizen engagement with crime prevention (which can result in more calls to the police). We calculated the inflation factor for both the treatment and comparison hot spots and adjusted the number of incidents in the treatment spots by the difference between the treatment and comparison group inflation factors.

As noted above, we did not conduct any statistical analysis on the 2020 crime data, because the numbers are so low and the respondents are very different from those in previous waves so we cannot compare the results to previous years. We provide a narrative report on the survey results, and tables or graphs where appropriate.

4 Updated Evaluation Findings

4.1 Crime is still trending down in most of the hot spots, but some positive trends from last year have reversed

Figure 3 shows a small but steady downward trend in the number of offenses and incidents involving youth between September 2011 and August 2020. Youth offenses and incidents have decreased every year since 2015-16, around the time that all ABSPY interventions were fully under way, and offenses involving adults age 26 and over also decreased between 2019 and 2020, although it is important to note that the COVID-19 pandemic may affect these results. Figure 2 shows that there was a substantial spike in offenses involving adults in the South Precinct in May 2020. This spike, which is seen across the entire city, is entirely driven by identity theft incidents and is related to a major statewide unemployment scam that was discovered that month.[4] SPD informed us that there was a substantial increase in citywide reporting of fraudulent unemployment benefit filings that month. However, there was no corresponding spike in offenses involving youth and the steady decrease in youth offenses in the Rainier Beach hot spots seems to track with previous years.[5]

A descriptive analysis of the period pre- and post-May 2014, when ABSPY interventions first began, shows only a minimal decrease in calls for service or overall offenses in the Rainier Beach hot spots relative to the comparison spots, the Rainier Beach neighborhood (excluding the hot spots) or the South Precinct (Figures A1-A2). However, offenses involving youth are 26% lower than the pre-ABSPY period (Figure A3), compared to 19% lower last year. While the decrease in youth offenses was slightly greater in the comparison spots, the decrease in the Rainier Beach hot spots is on par with the rest of the neighborhood and

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[4]'Washington state raises its estimate for number of fraudulent unemployment claims by 41%,' Seattle Times, December 17, 2020. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/economy/estimated-number-of-fraudulent-jobless-claims-jumps-41-in-washington-state/.

[5]We reran all of the models and analyses in this report that may have been affected by the spike—all offenses, youth offenses, and Part A property offenses—with the identity theft cases excluded to check whether it affected the results, but there were no substantial changes. The analyses reported here include the identity theft cases. Calls for service, violent offenses, Part A person offenses, and Part B offenses are not affected by the spike.

Figure 2: Monthly youth and adult offense counts in the South Precinct, September 2011-August 2020

the South Precinct overall. Violent offenses were also 14% lower in the hot spots, compared to 7% in the South Precinct overall (Figure A4). There was little change in NIBRS Group A person or property offenses (Figures A5-A6); however, NIBRS Group B offenses were 10% higher in the hot spots post-ABSPY last year but have not changed from pre-2014 levels when this year's data is added. Part B offenses continue to decrease substantially elsewhere in Rainier Beach and the South Precinct (Figure A7).

Figure 3: Offenses and incidents in all Rainier Beach hot spots, September 2011-August 2020

As we have seen in prior years, crime problems at Rose Street have largely been driven by adults in recent years, and there was an uptick in offenses in 2019-20 compared with the previous period. There was a small uptick in youth offenses as well this year after several years of steady decreases, but the numbers are very small (Figure 4). Last year we suggested that Rose Street may no longer be a hot spot of youth crime because only five publicly-reportable youth offenses occurred there, but the uptick this year, while small, should be monitored. Calls for service were 25% lower than the pre-ABSPY period (Figure A8), the same as last year, although they were 52% lower in Rose Street's comparison spot, and offenses were 28% lower (also the same as last year) compared to 30% in the comparison spot (Figure A9). Offenses involving youth were 47% lower compared to 23% in the comparison spot (Figure A10). Violent, Group A, and Group B offenses were also substantially lower, but Part A property offenses were 2% higher than pre-ABSPY. This is likely because most of the crime opportunities at Rose Street are property-related, i.e. business and retail. However, the changes are very small (Figures A11-A14).

Figure 4: Offenses and incidents at Rose Street, September 2011-August 2020

After seeing a slight uptick in both youth and adult crime at Rainier and Henderson last year, crime fell sharply again in 2019-20 (Figure 5). It is important to consider that this hot spot has a number of schools and other locations that attract young people, such as the community center. These venues were closed for most of 2020, so the routine activities of people at this location are likely to be very different. Nonetheless, Rainier and Henderson continues to show promising trends. Calls for service are 22% lower than pre-ABSPY, compared to just 8% lower in the comparison site (Figure A15), and while all incidents are only 3% lower, they were 9% higher in the comparison site (Figure A16). Last year youth offenses were higher than pre-ABPSY levels, but this has balanced out again—they are 5% lower at Rainier and Henderson with the most recent data included (Figure A17). Encouragingly, violent offenses remain much lower than pre-ABSPY levels at Rainier and Henderson and relative to the change at the comparison site: 22% lower at the hot spot, compared to 5% higher in the comparison area (Figure A18). Part A person offenses, which include violent offenses, were also 7% lower at Rainier and Henderson, but 23% higher in the comparison spot ((Figure A19). Part A property offenses were 6% lower than pre-ABSPY levels, although they were 21% lower in the comparison area (Figure A20). While Group B offenses were 8% higher at Rainier and Henderson, they were 66% higher in the comparison site (Figure A21). It is worth

noting that the comparison site for Rainier and Henderson also features a school, so the school closures do not appear to have affected these two locations in the same way.

Figure 5: Offenses and incidents at Rainier & Henderson, September 2011-August 2020

Crimes involving adults at the Light Rail decreased substantially this year after an uptick last year. However, there were five youth crimes at the Light Rail this year, which is one more than the past three years combined. While these are still very small numbers, this trend is worth monitoring as it appeared last year that the Light Rail was no longer a hot spot of youth crime (Figure 6). However, there is good news overall. Calls for service are 34% lower at this spot since ABSPY began, compared to 9% at the comparison site (Figure A22); offenses are 35% lower relative to 25% in the comparison site (Figure A23); and youth offenses are 34% lower, compared to 27% in the comparison site (Figure A24). All offense types have reduced substantially and much more than in the comparison spot: violent offenses are 61% lower, Group A person offenses 36% lower, Group A property offenses 39% lower, and Group B offenses 14% lower (Figures A25-A28). While routine activities likely changed at this spot as a result of the pandemic as well (for example, fewer people using the Light Rail to commute to work, school, or the airport), the comparison site for this location also includes a Light Rail station so we might expect to see similar changes there as well.

Lake Washington continues its steady decline in both adult and youth crimes (Figure 7). This is particularly promising because this is a residential hot spot, and with more people staying at home during the pandemic we might have expected to see more crime here. While the changes in calls for service and incidents since ABSPY began are not as strong at Lake Washington as they are in the comparison site (Figures A29-A35), trends are generally going in the right direction. In particular, youth offenses are 29% lower at Lake Washington than in the pre-ABSPY period (Figure A31). However, as in previous years, violent incidents are higher post-ABSPY (Figure A32), but only by 8% compared to pre-ABSPY levels. This has decreased from last year when violent offenses were 19% higher.

Adult and youth crime also continues to trend down at Safeway. While this may be related to the pandemic, the decreases are steady and in line with previous years, and the Safeway hot spot may have been

Figure 6: Offenses and incidents at Light Rail, September 2011-August 2020

Figure 7: Offenses and incidents at Lake Washington, September 2011-August 2020

less affected by the pandemic than other locations because of the essential nature of the main businesses there (Figure 8). Youth-involved offenses continue to be much lower than pre-ABPSY: 32% lower at Safeway compared to 35% at the comparison site (Figure A38). However, on all other measures this site is still showing higher levels of calls for service and offenses post-ABSPY, which may reflect the culture of increased enforcement we have noted in prior reports. Calls for service are 67% higher (Figure A36), offenses are 29% higher (Figure A37), violent offenses are 58% higher (Figure A39, Part A person offenses are 129% higher (Figure A40), Part A property offenses are 5% higher (Figure A41), and Part B offenses

are 69% higher (Figure A42). The fact that property offenses are not the key issue at this hot spot is a cause for concern given that the primary crime opportunity at this retail location is property crime. However, we note that all of these differences are a little smaller than last year, potentially suggesting a slow movement in the right direction here.

Figure 8: Offenses and incidents at Safeway, September 2011-August 2020

4.2 Calls for service remain significantly higher in the hot spots, but individual ABSPY interventions affect crime outcomes differently

The statistical models described above allow us to examine whether these changes in crime we have observed are *statistically* different from the changes in the comparison sites. Statistical significance is a scientific standard used to determine whether changes can be attributed to the interventions or if they just happened by chance. However, it does have several limitations. As we have noted before, it was extremely difficult to find comparison hot spots that were similar to Rainier Beach, especially because many other areas in the South Precinct are experiencing gentrification and economic development that can affect crime rates and people's perceptions of safety. Our statistical results also do not take into account the possibility that a program like ABSPY, which is intended to increase community members' involvement with crime prevention and encourage them to look out for each other and interact more with the police, could increase calls for service, which in turn may lead to higher rates of recorded offenses as the police respond to and take reports for more calls. Finally, we do not know exactly how the pandemic, protests, and policing challenges in 2020 affected crime rates, or if they affected our hot spots and comparison areas differently.

Figures A43 and A44 show that calls for service in both the treatment and comparison spots are trending slightly upward and that the gap between the Rainier Beach and comparison hot spots may be closing. Calls for service in the Rainier Beach hot spots remained significantly higher in the post-ABSPY period, although the difference in the rate of calls was not as high as we saw last year (24% higher compared

to 34% last year (Table A1). The new analysis also controls for the impact of individual interventions, such as the Corner Greeters, Safe Passage, business improvements, CPTED, and PBIS, at their relevant locations. Table A1 shows that none of the individual interventions had a significant impact on calls for service, looking at the interactions between the active intervention and treatment vs. comparison sites. However, all interventions except business improvements are associated with reduced calls for service in Rainier Beach, though not significantly so. However, business improvements are associated with a 10% higher rate of calls. This may be because of the nature of these interventions, which involved more police outreach to the business community and crime prevention education. It is possible that business owners are calling the police more.

Similarly, the rate of offenses was 21% higher in Rainier Beach in the post-ABSPY period (Figures A45 and A46); youth offenses were 25% higher (Figures A47 and A48); and violent offenses were also 21% higher overall (Figures A49 and A50). However, none of these models was statistically significant (Tables A2-A4). None of the individual ABSPY interventions had a significant effect on total offenses, but we see some interesting results for the impact of individual interventions on youth and violent offenses. During the months when Corner Greeters were active, Rainier Beach hot spots had a statistically significant 90% higher rate of crime than the comparison sites (though it is important to keep in mind that the actual number of youth crimes is very small, which can lead to percentage differences that appear large). Conversely, business improvements were associated with a significant 66% *lower* rate of crime in the hot spots. Safe Passage, CPTED improvements, and PBIS are also associated with lower rates of crime, but none of these effects was statistically significant. We see very similar results for violent offenses: Corner Greeters are associated with a statistically significant 86% higher violent offense rate, while business improvements were again associated with a significant 66% lower rate. The other interventions followed the same promising but non-significant pattern as youth offenses.

The post-ABSPY period is associated with a 3% lower rate of Part A person offenses, a 29% higher rate of Part A property offenses, and a 19% higher rate of Part B offenses. None of these differences is statistically significant (Tables A5-A7; Figures A51-A56). None of the individual interventions significantly impacted Part A person or property crimes, although Corner Greeters and CPTED were associated with non-significant higher rates of these offense types in the Rainier Beach hot spots. However, PBIS interventions at Rainier and Henderson were associated with a statistically significant 52% lower rate of Part B offenses.

As described above, we also ran a model adjusted for the crime inflation factor to see whether the higher rates of crime associated with ABSPY could be a result of increased community engagement and reporting to the police. We calculated a crime inflation factor of 1.94 for the Rainier Beach hot spots (indicating that the ratio of calls to incidents was higher after ABSPY was implemented) and 1.47 in the comparison hot spots (indicating that the ratio was also higher, but by a smaller amount, during the same period). Because there are more months in the intervention active period (40 pre-intervention months and 76 post-intervention months), we would expect to see a higher ratio in the post-ABPSY period in both locations. The inflation factor in the Rainier Beach hot spots is about what would be expected, since the ratio of 76/40 is 1.9. The difference between the inflation factors in the treatment and comparison areas was not statistically significant ($t=-.929$; $p=.380$). We then divided the comparison group inflation factor by the treatment group inflation factor and multiplied the total number of post-ABSPY crime incidents in the treatment hot spots by this value to adjust for call inflation. We ran a univariate ANOVA (adjusting for treatment assignment, each "block" or treatment-comparison site pair, and the pre-ABSPY crime rate) with the unadjusted and adjusted incident counts.[6] The unadjusted model showed that crime incidents

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[6]We used logged values for the pre- and post-ABSPY crime incident rates in this analysis.

were slightly higher in the treatment hot spots relative to the comparison spots, but not significantly so (F=.22; p=.669), while the adjusted model predicted a slightly lower and non-significant incident rate in Rainier Beach (F=4.41; p=.127). This analysis does not offer any conclusive findings about crime inflation, but it does suggest that accounting for inflation changes the results slightly and that ABSPY is not likely to be having a backfire effect. The previous analysis showing differential effects between the individual ABSPY interventions further supports the argument that ABSPY may be changing people's behavior in different ways.

4.3 Satisfaction with interventions is high, but business improvements need attention

As we expected given the sampling of 2020 survey respondents from RBAC's mailing list, everyone who responded to the survey said they had noticed ABSPY and the specific interventions—the Be[3], Safe Passage, Corner Greeters, and business improvements. A number of respondents did not answer the questions about satisfaction with these interventions, but among those who did there were varying levels of satisfaction (Figure 9). Respondents were least satisfied with the business improvements, which aligns with results from previous years, although last year the proportion of people who were satisfied with these improvements was over 70%. It is possible that these negative findings for business improvements is related to the fact that most of the respondents spent most time in the Safeway hot spot. In response to an open-ended question, "If you could change one thing [at the hot spot you chose as the place where you spend the most time] to make it a better place for young people, what would it be?" several respondents noted problems in and around the Safeway parking lot, and specifically the liquor store:

> *"It's not the young people I notice causing issues. There's a lot of people who hang out in [Be'er Sheva Park] drinking, urinating in public, harassing women, and peeking into cars at Be'er Sheva and the Mapes Creek Walkway, as well as the Safeway parking lot…I don't view the youth as the primary perpetrators of violence and theft in the neighborhood."*

> *"Need more places to go rather than the Safeway parking lot. It is obviously harder due to Covid restrictions, but the large groups that hang out there in front of the liquor store is a recipe for issues."*

> *The design is a problem. It has a lot to do with the social design. A large parking lot with areas easy to be inconspicuous and a not great grocery store next to a liquor store is not the best service for the community…"*

> *"I know it is difficult, but really wish Safeway would take better care of the surrounding area; regular trash pick up in the parking lot, better lighting on all sides of building—maybe find ways to positively engage the people who are always hanging outside (i.e. offer stipends to clean up around property, strengthen relationships)."*

> *"Get rid of the liquor store."*

Figure 9: Survey respondents' satisfaction with ABSPY and specific interventions

4.4 Fewer people think crime has gotten better in Rainier Beach in the past year

The proportion of people in the 2020 survey who thought crime had gotten better in the past year in the Rainier Beach hot spots was far lower than in previous years (Figure 10). Seven of the 15 respondents who answered the question (just under half) felt it had stayed about the same, but only two people felt it had gotten somewhat or much better. Six respondents felt crime had gotten somewhat or much worse. It is likely that the shootings in the neighborhood this year, as well as the broader context of the pandemic and social justice concerns, affected these results.

Despite the less favorable perceptions of the change in crime in Rainier Beach, survey respondents in 2020 generally felt safe in most contexts (Figure 11). A majority of respondents felt safe on the street during the day, on public transit, and at work; all respondents felt safe in their homes. However, a majority of respondents who answered the question disagreed or strongly disagreed that they felt safe at night. There was some variation in the frequency with which respondents reported seeing different indicators of disorder (Figure 12). At least half of respondents who answered these questions reported seeing people arguing or fighting, drinking in public, and/or acting drunk or high a few times a week or more, and almost half of those who responded saw people selling drugs in public that often. However, they reported seeing groups of young people hanging out and causing problems, people making too much noise at night, public drug use, prostitution, and vandalism less frequently.

Finally, the number of respondents who believed a serious crime was likely in the hot spot they spent most time in was much higher than we have seen with larger and more random survey samples in the past (Figure 13). At least half of respondents who answered the question believed that violent crimes such as someone being killed or injured with a gun or knife; sexually assaulted; being injured in a fight, robbed, or having property stolen from them were likely or very likely. Most respondents also believed that break-ins and property crimes were likely or very likely, and all but one person said it was likely or very likely that shots would be fired. These results are troubling given that respondents have not perceived

Figure 10: Survey respondents' assessment of change in crime in the hot spots in the past year

Much worse
Somewhat worse
About the same
Somewhat better
Much better

No response

Figure 11: Survey respondents' perceptions of safety in the hot spots

such a high risk of serious crime in the past, and may reflect the violence that has occurred in some of the hot spots in the past two years.

Figure 12: Survey respondents' perceptions of frequency of disorder in the hot spots

Figure 13: Survey respondents' perceptions of likelihood of serious crime in the hot spots

4.5 Social cohesion is fairly high among 2020 respondents, although most do not think that people are willing to intervene

Social cohesion refers to the extent to which residents of a community trust each other and feel they have the resources to take care of problems. We asked a number of questions on the survey that were designed to assess these issues. Overall, the 2020 respondents believed social cohesion was fairly high, which is not surprising considering they are connected to RBAC, a key grassroots community organization in Rainier Beach, and are therefore more likely than a random sample of individuals to be involved in

or knowledgeable of community organizing efforts.[7] A substantial majority agreed that Rainier Beach residents, business owners, and property owners care about the community; that there are opportunities to get involved in community activities, and that people watch out for each other, are willing to help each other out, and can be trusted—although fewer than half agreed that residents know each other by name (Figure 14). Just over half of respondents also agreed (though not strongly) that people tend to call the police when they see a crime in progress. However, fewer than half of respondents who answered the question believed that there were sufficient activities for youth or good stores and services.

Figure 14: Survey respondents' perceptions of social cohesion in the hot spots

Perceptions of collective efficacy—the willingness of residents to intervene directly to address community problems, were less strong than perceived social cohesion. While most respondents thought that residents would be willing to intervene if a fight happened, the majority thought it was unlikely or very unlikely that someone would do something if young people were skipping school and hanging out on the street, showing disrespect to an adult, or if people were spraying graffiti or vandalizing property (Figure 15).

4.6 Satisfaction with the police is low, and people report low levels of police visibility

Perceptions of the police were much less favorable among 2020 survey respondents than in previous years. While last year about 22% of survey respondents in Rainier Beach were "very satisfied" with the police, nobody in the current sample reported being very satisfied. Of the 16 respondents who answered the question, only one-quarter said they were somewhat satisfied. Of the remaining respondents, 44% were somewhat unsatisfied and 31% were very unsatisfied. This may be explained by the local and national protests against police brutality (and the incidents that precipitated them) that took place in 2020. Furthermore, the survey respondents this year were much more likely than those last year to have had

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[7]In a separate set of questions we found that at least two-thirds to three-quarters of respondents reported attending a community meeting or social event; volunteering in the community; or talking to an elected official about a community issue. These numbers are much higher than those observed last year—only 40-50% of Rainier Beach residents we surveyed had participated in similar activities.

Figure 15: Survey respondents' perceptions of collective efficacy in the hot spots

some contact with the police. Ten of 18 respondents reported having contact at their chosen hot spot in the past year, all of whom had talked to an officer at a community meeting or event. In addition, a handful had reported or witnessed a crime.

While last year Rainier Beach respondents reported higher levels of police activity than they had in previous years, respondents in 2020 said they saw police activity infrequently—a few times a month or less (with the exception of officers driving in patrol cars; Figure 16). It is interesting that the respondents said they saw police officers at community events so infrequently given that so many of them reported having spoken to an officer at an event—this speaks to the likelihood that this year's survey sample is more directly involved in community activism.

Figure 17 shows survey respondents' perceptions of police. In previous years we have used the first two measures—"the police do a good job preventing crime" and "the police do a good job enforcing drug laws"—to assess satisfaction with the police and the remaining three measures—the police treat people fairly, treat people with respect, and care about solving problems—to assess perceived legitimacy. Figure 17 shows that satisfaction with police is low, similar to the overall measure of satisfaction reported above. Only two respondents agreed that the police did a good job preventing crime and just one agreed that they did a good job enforcing drug laws (although almost half of respondents did not answer the second question). However, perceptions of legitimacy were slightly more favorable, though a number of respondents did not answer these questions either. Five of the 11 respondents who answered the question agreed or strongly agreed that the police did treat people fairly at the hot spot they chose, while half of the respondents who answered the question said they treated people with respect. Five respondents agreed (but not strongly) that the police care about solving problems at the hot spot, while six disagreed and two strongly disagreed. While this year's survey is not comparable to previous years, it is important to note that just two years ago we saw significant positive improvements to residents' satisfaction with the police in Rainier Beach.

Figure 16: Survey respondents' perceptions of frequency of police activity in the hot spots

Figure 17: Survey respondents' perceptions of police in the hot spots

5 Conclusions and Recommendations

ABSPY is a community-led, place-based, data-driven approach to reducing crime and public safety in five hot spots of juvenile and youth crime in the Rainier Beach neighborhood of Seattle. This updated evaluation report for 2020 should be interpreted with caution due to the substantial impacts that the events of 2020—the COVID-19 pandemic, local and national protests against police brutality and subsequent resignations and instability in the Seattle Police Department, and several high-profile homicides in the Rainier Beach neighborhood—have had on both crime rates and the operation of ABSPY interventions.

However, despite these challenges we find that crime is still trending downward in Rainier Beach since ABSPY was implemented, although new methods implemented in this report indicate that there may be differential effects of the various interventions. Our findings regarding community engagement and satisfaction with ABSPY are difficult to compare to prior years because we had to conduct an online survey this year instead of in-person interviews in the hot spots, and fewer than 20 people responded (compared to approximately 300-350 people each year across the Rainier Beach and comparison hot spots). However, the online respondents, who were members of the Rainier Beach Action Coalition's mailing list and therefore well-connected to community organizing efforts in the neighborhood, had less favorable perceptions of crime and safety, policing, and collective efficacy than our random samples have shown in prior years. While this year's results are based on a very small number of people, and the events of 2020 may have affected perceptions unfavorably, these trends are worthy of further attention in 2021.

- **Crime is still trending down in most of the hot spots, but some positive trends from last year have reversed.** Overall, the downward trend in the number of youth offenses at the Rainier Beach hot spots we have reported in recent years continues, and crime in Rainier Beach continues to be lower since ABSPY began than it was before on several measures. Rainier and Henderson, which is a historical high-crime location and represents a 'flagship' ABSPY intervention site, continues to see lower rates of crime despite a small uptick last year. Lake Washington has also seen a continuing decline in crime since an uptick several years ago led to an increased focus on implementing crime prevention and collective efficacy-building interventions in and around the apartment complex. Crime has also continued to decrease at the Safeway hot spot, although it remains much higher at this location than the pre-ABSPY period. However, last year we suggested that Rose Street and the Light Rail might no longer be considered hot spots of youth crime, but this year we saw slight increases in both adult and youth crime at Rose Street, and an increase in youth crime at the Light Rail. While the actual numbers are very small and could represent a handful of isolated incidents, it will be important to continue monitoring these locations to ensure this is not the beginning of an ongoing trend.

- **Calls for service remain significantly higher in the hot spots, but individual ABSPY interventions affect crime outcomes differently.** In this report we developed a new statistical model to better account for potential differences in the various interventions implemented at each hot spot and the various timeframes during which these interventions were active. In general, the models show similar findings to our statistical analysis in previous years—calls for service remain significantly higher in Rainier Beach relative to the comparison sites, although the size of the difference has reduced. Crime offenses of all types except Group A person offenses are also higher in Rainier Beach, although not significantly so. It is possible that the higher rates of calls and incidents in Rainier Beach can be attributed to people calling the police more due to ABSPY, but we do not have conclusive evidence of this. Among the specific interventions, business improvements are associated with a higher rate of calls but a lower rate of youth and violent crimes. Rainier Beach hot spots had a significantly higher rate of offenses, including youth and violent offenses, during the period when the Corner Greeters were active.

- **Satisfaction with ABSPY interventions is high, but business improvements need attention.** Our survey results are difficult to interpret in comparison to prior years because of the different sample and method of delivery. Respondents this year were very familiar with ABSPY and its interventions, and overall were fairly satisfied with them; however, given that the survey was sent via RBAC's mailing list it is not surprising that people were more familiar with the work. One notable finding is the lower level of satisfaction with business improvements in the neighborhood. Survey

respondents specifically pointed out crime and disorder issues around the Safeway hot spot

- **Fewer people think crime has gotten better in Rainier Beach in the past year.** In contrast to prior years, where survey respondents believed that crime problems were improving in the neighborhood, this year's survey sample were much less likely to think that crime had gotten better in the past year. A majority of respondents felt it had stayed the same or got worse. However, respondents still reported fairly favorable perceptions of safety in the hot spots, except at night. They reported noticing certain elements of disorder, including people arguing, fighting, drinking, and acting drunk or high in public, fairly frequency. Perhaps due to several tragic shooting incidents in the neighborhood, this year's sample of survey respondents was much more likely to believe that a serious crime was likely in the hot spots.

- **Social cohesion is fairly high among 2020 respondents, although most do not think that people are willing to intervene.** Survey respondents reported fairly high levels of social cohesion, which is not surprising considering their connection to RBAC and higher likelihood of being involved in community organizing and problem solving efforts. However, perceptions of collective efficacy were somewhat lower than we have seen across the neighborhood as a whole. With the exception of intervening in a fight, respondents did not think it likely that residents of the hot spots would do anything if disorder-related issues occurred.

- **Satisfaction with police is low, and people report low levels of police visibility.** Two years ago we saw statistically significant improvements in satisfaction with the police and perceptions of legitimacy associated with ABSPY, but last year they returned to pre-ABSPY levels and this year, despite the different and smaller sample, we still see less favorable results. This may be due to longer-term concerns about the police both locally and nationally that have been ongoing for years, but came to the forefront in 2020. It is important to remember that the baseline ABSPY survey was conducted in the summer of 2014 around the same time that Michael Brown was killed by police in Ferguson, MO, an incident that brought broad recognition to the Black Lives Matter movement that began the previous year and galvanized national conversations about police brutality and racism that continue to this day. Although these issues never 'went away' (and certainly did not start in 2014), the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, and others and the disparately severe effects of the pandemic on communities of color undoubtedly affected perceptions of police in 2020, so it is not surprising that our surveys have shown a return to pre-ABSPY levels. Nonetheless, about half of our survey respondents still rated the police somewhat positively on measures of police legitimacy.

5.1 Recommendations for 2021

It is difficult to come up with specific recommendations for 2021, given the continued uncertainty and disruption to ABSPY, which is heavily focused around in-person activities and collaborations, and the data challenges we faced this year, particularly with the survey, which is not comparable to prior years. However, our analysis and experiences from 2020 suggest the following focus areas for 2021:

- **Continue to mobilize the Core Team and ABSPY resources to support the Rainier Beach community through the continued public health and violence emergencies.** Last year we recommended that the ABSPY Core Team focus on reviewing and adapting its role and optimizing ABSPY interventions. This year, it has become clear that the Core Team represents a substantial asset to

the community that can be mobilized to support community members in need (and the community as a whole) through significant hardships. The role of ABSPY in responding to these events (particularly crime incidents, including homicides) in the neighborhood has been a continuing focus of conversation this year and this should continue in 2021 as the pandemic continues to impact life in Rainier Beach and disproportionately impact certain communities, including communities of color.

- **Explore how to re-engage the community and increase representation, particularly among youth.** This recommendation is continued from last year. It is understandable that this has been a challenge in 2020 as ABSPY has had to pivot to a virtual space and traditional methods of community engagement and collaboration have been limited. However, there is a clear desire and need among the Core Team to increase the representation of community members, especially young people, in this work. As we note below, there are several opportunities to review ABSPY interventions, as well as related data collection, and these efforts should be community-led.

- **Explore the differential impact of interventions at the hot spots.** Our statistical analysis this year showed differential impacts for certain interventions in the hot spots. For example, business improvements were associated with higher rates of calls for service and were not viewed favorably by survey respondents, while reported offenses were higher during the months when Corner Greeters were active. It is important to clarify that the analysis does not indicate that, for example, Corner Greeters events themselves are associated with crime—it is not specific enough to track crime rates at the exact times and days when Corner Greeter events were occurring. However, it is possible that events and activities in the community bring more people out onto the street, which in turn could increase the risk of crime through sheer numbers, or that there are higher levels of police scrutiny during times when events are going on. As we recommended last year, it is vital that the Core Team reengages with SPD to ensure that ABSPY events have support from law enforcement as and when needed but without any risk of over-policing. We have also seen that certain interventions can increase reporting of crime. Finally, it is important to examine why youth crime increased at Rose Street and the Light Rail, even though the increases were small, and the survey results suggest that a renewed focus on business improvements and CPTED efforts at the Safeway hot spot are needed as ABSPY moves forward.

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Statistical Appendix

Table A1: Random effects negative binomial regression on calls for service

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	.930 (.045)		.862* (.059)
ABSPY	1.226 (.172)	1.338* (.195)	1.280 (.188)
Post × ABSPY	1.102* (.052)		1.236** (.101)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	1.186 (.268)	1.118 (.263)	1.114 (.265)
Light Rail	1.044 (.269)	.939 (.245)	.916 (.240)
Lake Washington	.963 (.220)	.868 (.207)	.849 (.202)
Safeway	.766 (.151)	.668* (.137)	.670 (.139)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	.924 (.053)	.929 (.053)	.928 (.053)
Mar	1.103 (.061)	1.103 (.061)	1.103 (.060)
Apr	1.039 (.058)	1.023 (.055)	1.022 (.055)
May	1.136* (.060)	1.137* (.060)	1.139* (.060)
Jun	.994 (.054)	.998 (.055)	1.000 (.055)
Jul	1.062 (.056)	1.067 (.057)	1.068 (.057)
Aug	.939 (.051)	.943 (.052)	.945 (.052)
Sep	.891* (.051)	.905 (.052)	.906 (.052)
Oct	.956 (.053)	.967 (.054)	.968 (.054)
Nov	.931 (.052)	.941 (.053)	.943 (.053)
Dec	.838** (.048)	.845** (.049)	.845** (.048)
Trend	.999 (.001)	.999 (.001)	.999 (.001)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.464*** (.048)	1.445*** (.048)	1.436*** (.047)
2 months	1.163*** (.039)	1.162*** (.039)	1.156*** (.039)
3 months	1.052 (.036)	1.055 (.034)	1.051 (.033)
4 months	1.064 (.034)		
Corner Greeters active		.950 (.066)	1.051 (.087)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.077 (.084)	.928 (.090)
Safe Passage active		.958 (.102)	1.023 (.112)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.991 (.127)	.903 (.120)
Business improvements active		.981 (.080)	.986 (.080)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		1.097 (.109)	1.090 (.109)
CPTED active		.886 (.069)	.883 (.069)
CPTED active × ABSPY		.988 (.105)	.982 (.104)
PBIS active		1.158 (.122)	1.108 (.119)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.765* (.100)	.808 (.106)
Constant	2.208*** (.440)	2.874*** (.603)	3.133*** (.666)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	12.502 (7.229)	10.594 (5.720)	10.650 (5.735)
ln_s	13.844 (8.265)	11.230 (6.248)	11.150 (6.183)
Log likelihood	-3412.084	-3434.158	-3430.672
Wald chi2	561.802***	579.872***	591.597***
N	1120	1130	1130

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A2: Random effects negative binomial regression on all offenses

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	.961 (.068)		.927 (.091)
ABSPY	1.221 (.212)	1.221 (.221)	1.174 (.214)
Post × ABSPY	1.073 (.074)		1.218 (.143)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.682 (.179)	.670 (.190)	.656 (.187)
Light Rail	.639 (.208)	.636 (.219)	.623 (.214)
Lake Washington	.698 (.196)	.705 (.214)	.693 (.209)
Safeway	.571* (.153)	.505* (.145)	.512* (.148)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.035 (.087)	1.033 (.086)	1.032 (.086)
Mar	1.144 (.094)	1.122 (.092)	1.123 (.092)
Apr	1.111 (.092)	1.082 (.088)	1.085 (.088)
May	1.258** (.099)	1.265** (.100)	1.265** (.099)
Jun	1.080 (.088)	1.099 (.090)	1.100 (.090)
Jul	1.175* (.093)	1.191* (.096)	1.193* (.096)
Aug	1.063 (.086)	1.075 (.088)	1.078 (.088)
Sep	1.025 (.085)	1.033 (.086)	1.033 (.086)
Oct	1.100 (.090)	1.101 (.090)	1.100 (.090)
Nov	1.029 (.086)	1.029 (.086)	1.028 (.086)
Dec	1.024 (.086)	1.029 (.086)	1.028 (.086)
Trend	.998 (.001)	.999 (.001)	.999 (.001)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.169*** (.041)	1.149*** (.040)	1.147*** (.040)
2 months	1.226*** (.043)	1.211*** (.042)	1.208*** (.042)
3 months	1.083* (.038)	1.068 (.037)	1.068 (.037)
4 months	1.028 (.036)		
Corner Greeters active		.776* (.081)	.825 (.099)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.232 (.145)	1.080 (.154)
Safe Passage active		1.080 (.165)	1.131 (.181)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.999 (.189)	.911 (.179)
Business improvements active		1.348* (.163)	1.365** (.165)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.784 (.117)	.774 (.115)
CPTED active		.789* (.087)	.796* (.088)
CPTED active × ABSPY		1.164 (.179)	1.156 (.178)
PBIS active		1.389* (.213)	1.365* (.215)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.652* (.124)	.690 (.133)
Constant	4.282*** (1.094)	5.291*** (1.444)	5.552*** (1.527)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	15.412 (9.972)	12.949 (7.961)	13.338 (8.254)
ln_s	10.440 (6.976)	8.312 (5.284)	8.507 (5.438)
Log likelihood	-2696.924	-2711.381	-2709.752
Wald chi2	156.072***	168.949***	173.526***
N	1120	1130	1130

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A3: Random effects negative binomial regression on offenses involving youth

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	1.065 (.135)		1.041 (.188)
ABSPY	1.223 (.232)	1.390* (.198)	1.331 (.200)
Post × ABSPY	1.051 (.126)		1.245 (.260)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.517* (.137)	.632* (.142)	.614* (.143)
Light Rail	.247*** (.071)	.257*** (.060)	.249*** (.059)
Lake Washington	.618 (.162)	.706 (.143)	.700 (.143)
Safeway	.616 (.164)	.773 (.193)	.759 (.195)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.230 (.189)	1.234 (.189)	1.234 (.189)
Mar	1.286 (.194)	1.262 (.191)	1.261 (.191)
Apr	1.240 (.189)	1.234 (.188)	1.251 (.191)
May	1.714*** (.238)	1.745*** (.245)	1.748*** (.245)
Jun	1.334* (.195)	1.379* (.205)	1.392* (.207)
Jul	1.269 (.187)	1.331 (.200)	1.339 (.201)
Aug	1.193 (.177)	1.243 (.187)	1.255 (.189)
Sep	1.066 (.164)	1.076 (.167)	1.078 (.167)
Oct	1.379* (.204)	1.385* (.206)	1.387* (.206)
Nov	1.036 (.162)	1.047 (.165)	1.047 (.164)
Dec	1.028 (.161)	1.046 (.165)	1.050 (.166)
Trend	.995*** (.002)	.995** (.002)	.993** (.002)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.108* (.055)	1.088 (.055)	1.082 (.054)
2 months	1.160** (.056)	1.145** (.057)	1.143** (.057)
3 months	1.136** (.054)	1.122* (.054)	1.119* (.054)
4 months	1.037 (.050)	1.028 (.050)	1.029 (.050)
Corner Greeters active		.471*** (.100)	.481** (.113)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		2.207*** (.512)	1.899* (.509)
Safe Passage active		1.459 (.377)	1.467 (.407)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.859 (.268)	.785 (.260)
Business improvements active		2.575*** (.619)	2.641*** (.633)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.349*** (.102)	.344*** (.100)
CPTED active		1.060 (.213)	1.089 (.219)
CPTED active × ABSPY		.691 (.196)	.687 (.194)
PBIS active		1.834* (.519)	1.902* (.561)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.498* (.169)	.529 (.184)
Constant	2.314** (.666)	2.034* (.570)	2.166** (.620)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	19.864 (13.474)	55.116 (56.934)	53.304 (54.863)
ln_s	15.740 (11.081)	45.317 (48.546)	43.441 (46.366)
Log likelihood	-1869.718	-1855.137	-1853.453
Wald chi2	157.878***	216.668***	219.327***
N	1120	1120	1120

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A4: Random effects negative binomial regression on violent offenses

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	.810 (.105)		1.115 (.199)
ABSPY	1.380 (.309)	1.442 (.299)	1.398 (.275)
Post × ABSPY	.989 (.121)		1.211 (.250)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.810 (.253)	.842 (.258)	.485** (.135)
Light Rail	.414** (.137)	.411** (.133)	.209*** (.065)
Lake Washington	.472* (.151)	.439** (.139)	.751 (.228)
Safeway	.642 (.202)	.561 (.173)	.537* (.152)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.006 (.163)	.995 (.159)	1.231 (.182)
Mar	1.307 (.194)	1.287 (.190)	1.214 (.178)
Apr	1.236 (.185)	1.244 (.186)	1.236 (.181)
May	1.406* (.206)	1.421* (.208)	1.725*** (.241)
Jun	1.315 (.195)	1.399* (.209)	1.379* (.204)
Jul	1.297 (.192)	1.371* (.205)	1.348* (.202)
Aug	1.338* (.197)	1.399* (.208)	1.267 (.192)
Sep	1.248 (.191)	1.275 (.195)	1.077 (.166)
Oct	1.133 (.177)	1.150 (.179)	1.382* (.204)
Nov	1.193 (.185)	1.208 (.186)	1.048 (.164)
Dec	1.203 (.186)	1.225 (.189)	1.045 (.164)
Trend	1.002 (.002)	1.003 (.002)	.990*** (.002)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.196*** (.065)	1.145* (.062)	1.088 (.057)
2 months	1.094 (.059)	1.066 (.057)	
Corner Greeters active		.533** (.110)	.493** (.113)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.629* (.374)	1.859* (.488)
Safe Passage active		1.332 (.362)	1.528 (.417)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.764 (.248)	.842 (.278)
Business improvements active		1.844** (.434)	2.905*** (.686)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.523* (.151)	.345*** (.098)
CPTED active		.612** (.116)	1.048 (.213)
CPTED active × ABSPY		1.099 (.291)	.720 (.207)
PBIS active		1.382 (.379)	1.934* (.549)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.423* (.142)	.534 (.180)
Constant	4.712*** (1.685)	5.051*** (1.886)	3.593*** (.974)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	47.553 (26.785)	61.245 (36.642)	15.259 (10.137)
ln_s	11.092 (5.867)	12.879 (7.308)	11.856 (8.252)
Log likelihood	-1628.899	-1613.928	-1920.664
Wald chi2	48.190***	81.654***	156.397***
N	1140	1140	1150

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A5: Random effects negative binomial regression on part A person offenses

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	1.092 (.137)		1.113 (.186)
ABSPY	1.465 (.368)	1.431 (.347)	1.438 (.355)
Post × ABSPY	.983 (.118)		.985 (.200)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.795 (.279)	.977 (.340)	.964 (.337)
Light Rail	.232*** (.085)	.245*** (.090)	.243*** (.089)
Lake Washington	.540 (.195)	.650 (.231)	.647 (.231)
Safeway	.552 (.193)	.509 (.178)	.510 (.179)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.001 (.153)	1.046 (.153)	1.048 (.153)
Mar	1.183 (.169)	1.145 (.163)	1.148 (.163)
Apr	1.157 (.166)	1.119 (.160)	1.128 (.162)
May	1.377* (.190)	1.375* (.190)	1.379* (.191)
Jun	1.333* (.186)	1.360* (.193)	1.368* (.194)
Jul	1.205 (.171)	1.233 (.177)	1.242 (.178)
Aug	1.280 (.179)	1.297 (.184)	1.308 (.186)
Sep	1.243 (.179)	1.237 (.179)	1.240 (.179)
Oct	1.117 (.165)	1.114 (.165)	1.116 (.165)
Nov	1.063 (.159)	1.059 (.158)	1.061 (.159)
Dec	1.042 (.157)	1.038 (.157)	1.043 (.158)
Trend	.998 (.001)	.999 (.002)	.998 (.002)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.140* (.060)	1.097 (.058)	1.096 (.058)
2 months	1.072 (.056)		
Corner Greeters active		.623* (.120)	.594* (.126)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.559* (.334)	1.576 (.396)
Safe Passage active		1.587 (.398)	1.518 (.399)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.716 (.226)	.727 (.240)
Business improvements active		1.984** (.453)	1.981** (.451)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.639 (.177)	.641 (.178)
CPTED active		.611** (.115)	.621* (.118)
CPTED active × ABSPY		1.129 (.290)	1.127 (.289)
PBIS active		1.334 (.333)	1.402 (.364)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.590 (.188)	.583 (.190)
Constant	6.266*** (2.338)	6.761*** (2.553)	6.781*** (2.576)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	40.668 (22.709)	45.299 (25.607)	45.336 (25.652)
ln_s	8.709 (4.492)	9.256 (4.845)	9.222 (4.825)
Log likelihood	-1631.388	-1638.702	-1638.346
Wald chi2	52.215***	73.642***	74.440***
N	1140	1150	1150

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A6: Random effects negative binomial regression on part A property offenses

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	.839 (.076)		.807 (.102)
ABSPY	1.196 (.282)	1.262 (.297)	1.189 (.283)
Post × ABSPY	1.131 (.099)		1.291 (.196)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.441* (.181)	.419* (.178)	.421* (.179)
Light Rail	.529 (.228)	.508 (.224)	.513 (.227)
Lake Washington	.629 (.277)	.614 (.276)	.603 (.270)
Safeway	.356* (.148)	.328* (.142)	.334* (.145)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.015 (.106)	1.013 (.106)	1.012 (.105)
Mar	1.120 (.115)	1.112 (.115)	1.113 (.115)
Apr	.974 (.103)	.977 (.104)	.973 (.104)
May	1.161 (.116)	1.172 (.118)	1.171 (.118)
Jun	.955 (.098)	.977 (.103)	.973 (.102)
Jul	1.158 (.115)	1.180 (.120)	1.177 (.120)
Aug	1.006 (.104)	1.022 (.107)	1.019 (.107)
Sep	1.009 (.105)	1.013 (.106)	1.013 (.106)
Oct	1.189 (.119)	1.192 (.120)	1.191 (.120)
Nov	1.026 (.106)	1.028 (.107)	1.027 (.107)
Dec	.981 (.102)	.991 (.104)	.989 (.104)
Trend	.999 (.001)	.999 (.001)	1.000 (.001)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.196*** (.050)	1.195*** (.050)	1.190*** (.050)
2 months	1.126** (.046)	1.124** (.046)	1.121** (.046)
3 months	1.087* (.044)	1.085* (.044)	1.084* (.044)
4 months	1.017 (.041)	1.015 (.041)	1.010 (.041)
Corner Greeters active		.756* (.101)	.864 (.134)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.212 (.183)	1.013 (.187)
Safe Passage active		.997 (.208)	1.099 (.238)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.973 (.245)	.863 (.227)
Business improvements active		1.258 (.189)	1.265 (.192)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.834 (.157)	.820 (.155)
CPTED active		.876 (.123)	.870 (.122)
CPTED active × ABSPY		1.105 (.219)	1.103 (.218)
PBIS active		1.260 (.265)	1.167 (.251)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.781 (.199)	.844 (.218)
Constant	7.584*** (2.890)	7.648*** (2.997)	8.104*** (3.204)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	10.959 (6.792)	10.708 (6.642)	10.891 (6.795)
ln_s	4.356 (2.809)	4.246 (2.743)	4.275 (2.773)
Log likelihood	-2196.162	-2194.641	-2192.947
Wald chi2	90.969***	93.177***	97.257***
N	1120	1120	1120

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A7: Random effects negative binomial regression on part B offenses

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	1.307 (.179)		1.255 (.237)
ABSPY	1.362 (.297)	1.369 (.292)	1.396 (.335)
Post × ABSPY	1.051 (.142)		1.190 (.265)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.735 (.214)	.873 (.268)	.899 (.307)
Light Rail	.227*** (.075)	.253*** (.086)	.240*** (.089)
Lake Washington	.519* (.157)	.589 (.187)	.586 (.207)
Safeway	.807 (.233)	.820 (.251)	.756 (.254)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.046 (.167)	1.057 (.169)	1.054 (.167)
Mar	1.072 (.169)	1.076 (.170)	1.059 (.162)
Apr	1.218 (.187)	1.159 (.180)	1.199 (.180)
May	1.348* (.202)	1.305 (.197)	1.264 (.187)
Jun	1.077 (.164)	1.012 (.157)	1.036 (.161)
Jul	1.196 (.178)	1.133 (.172)	1.167 (.177)
Aug	1.017 (.156)	.962 (.150)	1.014 (.158)
Sep	.882 (.143)	.853 (.139)	.891 (.144)
Oct	.944 (.153)	.912 (.148)	.950 (.153)
Nov	.932 (.152)	.896 (.147)	.933 (.152)
Dec	1.095 (.172)	1.062 (.168)	1.073 (.169)
Trend	.994*** (.002)	.994** (.002)	.991*** (.002)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.220*** (.070)	1.201** (.069)	1.189** (.067)
2 months	1.119* (.064)	1.111 (.063)	1.112 (.062)
3 months	1.142* (.065)	1.130* (.064)	
4 months	1.166** (.067)	1.150* (.066)	
5 months	.975 (.055)	.959 (.054)	
Corner Greeters active		1.063 (.208)	.990 (.221)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.264 (.281)	1.116 (.295)
Safe Passage active		1.155 (.323)	1.159 (.335)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		1.017 (.351)	.970 (.346)
Business improvements active		1.371 (.310)	1.462 (.329)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.756 (.207)	.769 (.209)
CPTED active		.702 (.153)	.653* (.140)
CPTED active × ABSPY		1.228 (.369)	1.238 (.366)
PBIS active		1.620 (.438)	1.892* (.530)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.503* (.171)	.483* (.167)
Constant	3.224*** (1.024)	3.551*** (1.191)	4.267*** (1.459)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	38.818 (22.490)	39.294 (24.165)	28.893 (16.525)
ln_s	12.630 (7.199)	12.351 (7.516)	8.918 (4.962)
Log likelihood	-1505.867	-1500.826	-1553.020
Wald chi2	122.707***	131.900***	119.324***
N	1110	1110	1140

Random effects negative binomial regression
Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure A1: Percent change in calls for service in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in calls for service

Legend:
- Hot spots
- Comparison spots
- Rest of Rainier Beach
- Rest of South Precinct

Bar chart values:
- Hot spots: -2
- Comparison spots: -25
- Rest of Rainier Beach: -28
- Rest of South Precinct: -9

X-axis: Percent change (-30, -20, -10, 0)

Figure A2: Percent change in offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in all offenses

Legend:
- Hot spots
- Comparison spots
- Rest of Rainier Beach
- Rest of South Precinct

Bar chart values:
- Hot spots: -5
- Comparison spots: -16
- Rest of Rainier Beach: -14
- Rest of South Precinct: -5

X-axis: Percent change (-15, -10, -5, 0)

Figure A3: Percent change in youth offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in offenses involving youth

Legend: Hot spots, Comparison spots, Rest of Rainier Beach, Rest of South Precinct

Hot spots: -26
Comparison spots: -30
Rest of Rainier Beach: -24
Rest of South Precinct: -25

Percent change

Figure A4: Percent change in violent offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in violent offenses

Legend: Hot spots, Comparison spots, Rest of Rainier Beach, Rest of South Precinct

Hot spots: -14
Comparison spots: -18
Rest of Rainier Beach: -13
Rest of South Precinct: -7

Percent change

Figure A5: Percent change in NIBRS Group A Person offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in Part A person offenses

Legend:
- Hot spots
- Comparison spots
- Rest of Rainier Beach
- Rest of South Precinct

Hot spots: -4
Comparison spots: -6
Rest of Rainier Beach: 0
Rest of South Precinct: -3

Percent change

Figure A6: Percent change in NIBRS Group A Property offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in Part A property offenses

Legend:
- Hot spots
- Comparison spots
- Rest of Rainier Beach
- Rest of South Precinct

Hot spots: -6
Comparison spots: -23
Rest of Rainier Beach: -12
Rest of South Precinct: -3

Percent change

Figure A7: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in Part B offenses

- Hot spots
- Comparison spots
- Rest of Rainier Beach
- Rest of South Precinct

Figure A8: Percent change in calls for service at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in calls for service, Rose St

- Rose St
- Rose St Comparison

Figure A9: Percent change in all offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in all offenses, Rose St

Figure A10: Percent change in youth offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in youth offenses, Rose St

Figure A11: Percent change in violent offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in selected violent offenses, Rose St

Figure A12: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part A person offenses, Rose St

Figure A13: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part A property offenses, Rose St

Figure A14: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part B offenses, Rose St

Figure A15: Percent change in calls for service at Rainier & Henderosn and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in calls for service, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A16: Percent change in all offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

### Change in all offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A17: Percent change in youth offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in youth offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A18: Percent change in violent offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

### Change in selected violent offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A19: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part A person offenses, Rainier & Henderson


Figure A20: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

## Change in NIBRS Part A property offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A21: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part B offenses, Rainier & Henderson

Figure A22: Percent change in calls for service at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in calls for service, Light Rail

Figure A23: Percent change in all offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in all offenses, Light Rail

■ Light Rail　　■ Light Rail Comparison

-35

-25

-40　　-30　　-20　　-10　　0

Percent change

Figure A24: Percent change in youth offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in youth offenses, Light Rail

■ Light Rail　　■ Light Rail Comparison

-34

-27

-40　　-30　　-20　　-10　　0

Percent change

Figure A25: Percent change in violent offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in selected violent offenses, Light Rail

■ Light Rail ■ Light Rail Comparison

-61

-29

-60   -40   -20   0

Percent change

Figure A26: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part A person offenses, Light Rail

■ Light Rail ■ Light Rail Comparison

-36

5

-40   -30   -20   -10   0   10

Percent change

Figure A27: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part A property offenses, Light Rail


Figure A28: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part B offenses, Light Rail

Figure A29: Percent change in calls for service at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in calls for service, Lake Washington

Figure A30: Percent change in all offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in all offenses, Lake Washington

Figure A31: Percent change in youth offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in youth offenses, Lake Washington

Figure A32: Percent change in violent offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in selected violent offenses, Lake Washington

Figure A33: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part A person offenses, Lake Washington

■ Lake Washington   ■ Lake Washington Comparison

-5

-68

Percent change

Figure A34: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part A property offenses, Lake Washington

■ Lake Washington   ■ Lake Washington Comparison

-15

-29

Percent change

Figure A35: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part B offenses, Lake Washington

Figure A36: Percent change in calls for service at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in calls for service, Safeway

■ Safeway   ■ Safeway Comparison

Figure A37: Percent change in all offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in all offenses, Safeway

■ Safeway   ■ Safeway Comparison

Figure A38: Percent change in youth offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in youth offenses, Safeway

■ Safeway   ■ Safeway Comparison

Figure A39: Percent change in violent offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in selected violent offenses, Safeway

■ Safeway   ■ Safeway Comparison

Figure A40: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part A person offenses, Safeway

Figure A41: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part A property offenses, Safeway

Figure A42: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Part B offenses, Safeway

Figure A43: Calls for service in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2020

Calls for service, 2011-2020

—— Treatment hot spots   —— Comparison hot spots

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes

Figure A44: Predicted number of calls by treatment assignment and intervention status

Calls for service

Pre- or post-ABSPY start (May 2014)

—•— Comparison   —•— ABSPY

Figure A45: Offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2020

All offenses, 2011-2020

— Treatment hot spots   — Comparison hot spots

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes

Figure A46: Predicted number of offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

All offenses

Pre- or post-ABSPY start (May 2014)

— Comparison   — ABSPY

Figure A47: Youth offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2020

Offenses involving youth (suspect or victim), 2011-2020

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes

Figure A48: Predicted number of youth offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

Offenses involving youth (suspect/victim)

Figure A49: Violent offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2020

Selected violent offenses, 2011-2020

— Treatment hot spots   — Comparison hot spots

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes

Figure A50: Predicted number of violent offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

Violent offenses

Pre- or post-ABSPY start (May 2014)

🔵 Comparison   🟠 ABSPY

Figure A51: NIBRS Group A person offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2020

NIBRS Part A person offenses, 2011-2020

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes

Figure A52: Predicted number of NIBRS Group A person offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

NIBRS Part A Person offenses

Figure A53: NIBRS Group A property offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2020

NIBRS Part A property offenses, 2011-2020

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes

Figure A54: Predicted number of NIBRS Group A property offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

NIBRS Part A Property offenses

Figure A55: NIBRS Group B offenses in treatment and comparison sites, January 2011-August 2020

NIBRS Part B offenses, 2011-2020

1: CTF training, community center reopens
2: Corner Greeters and plaza activation begin
3: Corner Greeters and plaza activation end
4: Safe Passage begins
5: Corner Greeters resume, business engagement begins
6: Break in interventions (except Safe Passage)
7: Corner Greeters and business engagement resume
8: CPTED begins
9: PBIS begins
10: Break in business engagement
11: Business engagement resumes

Figure A56: Predicted number of NIBRS Group B offenses by treatment assignment and intervention status

NIBRS Part B offenses