

Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth

2021 Evaluation Update

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The Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP) in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at George Mason University seeks to make scientific research a key component in decisions about crime and justice policies. The CEBCP carries out this mission by advancing rigorous studies in criminal justice and criminology through research-practice collaborations, and proactively serving as an informational and translational link to practitioners and the policy community. Learn more about our work at <http://cebcp.org> and about the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at <http://cls.gmu.edu>.

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Summary of Findings

What is Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth?

Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth (ABSPY) is an innovative community-led, place-based violence prevention initiative. The goal of the program is to reduce youth victimization and crime in the Rainier Beach neighborhood. The program is named for the vision set out by the Rainier Beach community in its Neighborhood Plan Update, which is to make Rainier Beach a Beautiful Safe Place. ABSPY is happening in five small groups of street blocks in the neighborhood—“hot spots”—where about half of all youth crime incidents in Rainier Beach happened in 2012. The five hot spots are Rose Street, Rainier and Henderson, Rainier Beach Light Rail Station, Lake Washington, and Our Safe Way. This report updates our original 2016 evaluation report and annual updates from 2017 through 2020.

ABSPY Background

ABSPY is based on a number of research studies, including one from Seattle by David Weisburd and his colleagues, showing that about half of all crime in cities comes from a very small number—typically about 5 percent—of street blocks. Crime involving young people is even more likely to come from a small number of places. Research shows that police efforts to reduce crime at hot spots through crackdowns and arrests are effective at reducing crime, but arrest and prosecution can increase the chance of reoffending among high-risk youth. ABSPY focuses on **non-arrest** strategies to reduce crime, such as building community leadership and capacity to help solve problems and addressing environmental risk factors for crime to promote community safety. ABSPY was originally funded by a \$1 million grant from the Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program, an initiative of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, awarded in 2012, and has been funded by the City of Seattle since 2016. The Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program supports partnerships between cities, communities, and researchers to develop community-led, place-based, data-driven problem-solving efforts. ABSPY is advised by a Core Team including representatives from the City of Seattle, the Seattle Neighborhood Group, Seattle Police Department, the Boys and Girls Club of King County, Seattle Public Schools, and the Rainier Beach Action Coalition. However, what makes ABSPY unique is that community members in Rainier Beach itself took the lead in developing evidence-informed strategies to address the root causes of youth crime in the neighborhood.

Community-Led Problem Solving

From 2013 through 2016, in an effort overseen by the Core Team, community members from the five Rainier Beach hot spots took the lead in developing evidence-informed strategies to address the root causes of youth crime in the neighborhood. These interventions were tailored to the specific conditions in each hot spot, and continue to be regularly updated and adjusted based on new data and changing conditions in the hot spots. ABSPY’s signature interventions include:

- **Corner Greeter** events, led by the Rainier Beach Action Coalition, in which young people from the neighborhood set up stations offering refreshments, information, and fun activities in each hot spot to engage community members and “activate” places that were previously considered to be unsafe.

- **Safe Passage**, led by the Boys and Girls Club of King County, which provides guardianship, supervision, and encouragement to young people as they leave school. Since 2020, the Boys and Girls Club has also led community healing spaces in the hot spots.
- **Business engagement**, coordinated by Seattle Neighborhood Group and local community and economic development organizations. This intervention focuses on learning about the concerns facing local businesses, building relationships between businesses, and increasing business owners' ability to prevent and report crime.
- **Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)** interventions and resources, applied to both public and private property, to improve design, layout, and place management.
- **Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) and restorative practices** in both school and community settings, overseen by Seattle Public Schools and the ABSPY Core Team, to collaboratively set behavioral expectations for young people, reward good behavior, support youth in need of services, and engage in supportive conflict resolution.

Updated Evaluation Findings

The Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University is the research partner for ABSPY. We tracked calls for service and reported crime in the five hot spots from September 2011 to August 2021. We paired each Rainier Beach hot spot with a comparison hot spot—a similar location elsewhere in Seattle Police Department's South Precinct—and assessed crime rates in the Rainier Beach hot spots and neighborhood compared to trends in the South Precinct. We also conducted an online survey with community members who subscribe to the mailing lists of ABSPY partners, including RBAC, the Boys and Girls Club, and SNG. Although the survey respondents and sample size are not comparable to previous years, we asked similar questions about community members' perceptions of public safety and community resources.

Our updated findings for 2021 show that **crime in the ABSPY hot spots continues to trend downwards**, and some of the challenges we noted in 2020 may be improving.

- In most cases crime continues to trend downward in Rainier Beach. This is especially true for crime involving young people. While there was a small uptick in crime at Rainier and Henderson, all locations have seen consistent downward trends in crime.
- Calls for service remain significantly higher in the hot spots, but individual ABSPY interventions seem to affect crime outcomes differently according to our statistical models.
- Community members think ABSPY makes Rainier Beach safer. A larger proportion of survey respondents were familiar with ABSPY interventions, and a majority felt they improved safety in the hot spots.
- Most people think crime has gotten better in Rainier Beach in the past year, and community members generally feel safe in the hot spots, except at night.

- Social cohesion is high among survey respondents, but most still do not think that people are willing to intervene in neighborhood problems.
- Satisfaction with police is higher than last year but still fairly low, and survey respondents report low levels of police visibility in the neighborhood. However, around half of the survey respondents felt that the police are doing a good job and treat people fairly and with respect.

Recommendations for 2022


It is important to note that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic continues to affect both the implementation of ABSPY interventions and our ability to evaluate their impact. However, our analysis this year suggests the following focus areas for 2022:

- Develop an **action plan for ABSPY sustainability and development**, including exploring new sources of financial support and discussing the role of ABSPY in broader community safety initiatives.
- Continue exploring how to **re-engage the community and increase representation, particularly among youth**, in the continued development and evolution of ABSPY interventions and data collection and evaluation efforts.
- **Continue exploring the differential impacts of interventions at the hot spots** to understand small changes in trends over time and possible reporting effects.
- **Re-engage the Seattle Police Department** as an important partner in maintaining and improving community safety.

1 Background

This report updates the original *Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth* (ABSPY) Final Evaluation Report (Gill et al., 2016) and subsequent evaluation updates (Gill et al., 2018; Gill & Prince, 2020a, 2020b; Gill & Vitter, 2017) with new findings from our crime analysis and community survey in 2021. ABSPY is a **community-led, place-based, data-driven, non-arrest based collaboration** focused on preventing crime in five juvenile and youth crime hot spots in the Rainier Beach neighborhood of Seattle (see Figure 1). ABSPY builds on several neighborhood and City processes, including the 2011 Rainier Beach Neighborhood Plan Update (RBNPU) and the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative, and is grounded in research evidence showing that crime—especially crime involving juveniles and youth¹—is highly concentrated at small places (e.g. Weisburd, 2015; Weisburd et al., 2004; Weisburd et al., 2009). This evidence indicates that policing and crime prevention efforts focused at these hot spots are effective (Braga et al., 2014; Lum et al., 2011; Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018). However, proactive policing approaches that focus on law enforcement strategies such as crackdowns and “busts” to clear offenders from high-crime areas may not be suitable at hot spots of youth crime, since young people who are arrested and processed through the juvenile justice system—especially those involved in less serious crimes—are more likely to reoffend than those who are diverted. Research suggests that community-led, non-arrest strategies may be more appropriate at such places.

Figure 1: Rainier Beach hot spots identified for ABSPY intervention



¹ ABSPY defines “youth” as individuals aged 25 and under. While the juvenile justice system focuses on young people under the age of 18, ABSPY builds on increasing recognition by researchers and policy makers that the brain does not fully develop until around age 25, directly impacting decision-making and risky behavior (e.g. Steinberg, 2008).

The RBNPU explicitly called for a community-led hot spots approach to address crime and improve neighborhood safety in Rainier Beach, which led to the development of ABSPY. The planning process began in 2012 with the development of a successful \$1 million grant proposal to the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance's [Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program](#) (renamed "Innovations in Community Based Crime Reduction" in 2017). Implementation began in October 2013 with a problem-solving process undertaken by Community Task Force (CTF) teams representing each of the five hot spots, and the subsequent development and implementation of a suite of signature interventions (see below). Federal funding continued through September 2016. Beginning in January 2016, the City of Seattle also began to fund implementation and evaluation on an annual basis. ABSPY funding was overseen by the Human Services Department from 2016 to 2020, and transferred to the Department of Neighborhoods in 2021. ABSPY planning and implementation is overseen by a [cross-sector Core Team and supported by a range of community intervention partners](#). A detailed description of ABSPY's history, including key partners, hot spot identification process, problem-solving process, and intervention development, can be found in the [original evaluation report](#) (Gill et al., 2016).

2 2021 Intervention Update

Our [2017 evaluation update](#) shows the timeline of ABSPY interventions from October 2013, the beginning of the planning phase, to October 2017 (Gill & Vitter, 2017, p. 3). The interventions continued through the last few months of 2017 and were consistently implemented through 2018 and 2019. When the COVID-19 pandemic began in early 2020, some ABSPY interventions were temporarily paused, while others continued in a modified capacity (for example, virtual Peace Circles), and new initiatives started up to respond to the immediate effects of the pandemic and other challenges that arose during 2020. For example, Core Team members have coordinated community healing spaces to respond to local and national events and helped provide information to residents about access to COVID testing, food support, and so on. The ABSPY Core Team has continued to meet virtually during 2021 to coordinate the original interventions and new activities.

2.1 Intervention summary

2.1.1 *Coordination and planning*

In 2021 the Core Team responded to the continued effects of the pandemic, as well as the reopening of the schools and many regular community activities. Discussions within the Core Team have focused on what ABSPY is about and how the initiative should evolve.

- **Funding and sustainability.** ABSPY funding and formal administration within the City of Seattle transitioned from the Human Services Division to the Department of Neighborhoods (DON) beginning with 2021 contracts. Waing Waing and Jenn Brandon from DON have been active participants in the initiative by regularly attending Core Team meetings throughout the year. Financial stability will be a key focus for 2022 as the NIJ grant that funds the PBIS/restorative practices work ends this year.

Discussions have also occurred about whether and how to expand ABSPY to other locations in the

city. ABSPY organizations are already participating in citywide violence prevention initiatives, and there is local interest in replicating the ABSPY model as well as specific interventions, such as Safe Passage, in West Seattle and the Central District. This involves some challenging conversations about ownership and intellectual property, as well as understanding what ABSPY actually is - the specific interventions or the process of community building? In general, there is a feeling of unease among Core Team members about ABSPY being a 'plug and play' model — the interventions are developed by and belong to the community. However, there may be scope for ABSPY members to provide professional development to teams attempting to go through a similar process in their neighborhoods.

- **Team-building.** Core Team meetings have continued to occur monthly via Zoom, and a quarterly retreat is held, facilitated by Dr. Jabali Stewart and his organization Huayruru. Discussions this year have focused on what is next for ABSPY — how should the initiative grow and what does this look like over the next 4-5 years? Some of the key challenges highlighted include (1) the need for more staff to support the program manager, which could involve administration support, marketing and outreach, and/or more capacity to participate on citywide community safety initiatives; (2) more youth involvement and representation; and (3) better marketing and branding, including how to tell the story of ABSPY and celebrate the team's efforts.
- **Community advocacy and outreach.** Led by the Rainier Vista Boys and Girls Club partners, ABSPY members convened regular community healing spaces after several high-profile crimes in the neighborhood in the summer of 2020, including the murder of a local teenager on Mother's Day. These gatherings have been very successful and have continued throughout the year. They take place on the second and fourth Fridays of the month from 6-10pm and provide an opportunity for community members to come together, enjoy food from local caterers, and build relationship and trust. The goal is to develop mutual support and collective efficacy and to activate the space to avoid incidents: as with other ABSPY initiatives such as the Corner Greeters the healing spaces are scheduled to coincide with the times when incidents are most likely to happen. While the healing spaces began in the Safeway parking lot, they have expanded to the Rite Aid parking lot, Rainier Beach Square, Mapes Creek Circle, and so on.

ABSPY members have already provided rapid response to community violence in Rainier Beach beyond the original hot spots, including shots fired around the Hutchison Playground and CPTED support to the Northwest Kidney Center.

2.1.2 Safe Passage

Safe Passage is one of the flagship initiatives of ABSPY. Overseen by the Boys and Girls Club of King County, Safe Passage provides supervision, guardianship, and a friendly face on the streets in the afternoons (between 1 and 6pm) when children are leaving schools on the Rainier and Henderson campus and the risk of youth crime at this hot spot is highest. Safe Passage staff work for the Boys and Girls Club and are community members who have grown up in the neighborhood. They are easily recognizable by their bright blue jackets or t-shirts with the "Be Safe" slogan, which (along with "Be Safe Bro!") has become a popular greeting between the Safe Passage team and local young people. While Safe Passage staff are authorized to break up fights, they primarily focus on providing a positive presence and engaging young people as they walk home or head to the bus stop.

The Safe Passage team conducted regular monitoring of the safety zones, created signage and surveys, increased focus on case management and supporting vulnerable families, delivering food and school supplies, and supported activities at the Boys and Girls Club during the pandemic while schools were closed. By February 2021 the team had returned to its regular schedule walking the safety route. The team has also collaborated closely with the new leadership at Rainier Beach High School, helping them deal with security and disciplinary issues.

2.1.3 Corner Greeters

The Corner Greeters initiative, overseen by the Rainier Beach Action Coalition (RBAC), consists of positive community messaging, mobilization, and outreach; pop-up events and activities such as music, dancing, crafts, and other fun and culturally-relevant activities at the hot spots; and community data collection. The goal of the Corner Greeters is to “take back” hot spot spaces for the community and build collective efficacy and empowerment among residents. The key feature of the Corner Greeters is that the events are completely youth-led. Young people from the neighborhood collaborate with RBAC to plan different activities and staff the events. They are also trained to communicate and share ABSPY data and information, such as neighborhood crime data reports, with visitors to their events to connect community members to ABSPY, build collective efficacy, and empower them to take action in the neighborhood. RBAC is also responsible for the Mobile Discovery Center, a unique community information booth on wheels that sets up at Corner Greeter and other neighborhood events. The Corner Greeters also conduct their own surveys regularly at the Rainier Beach hot spots to track community perceptions of safety and collective efficacy at the hot spots, and support ABSPY at community events.

This year RBAC and the Corner Greeters engaged in community clean-up projects and were involved in a summer mural project at Be'er Sheva Park, which was led by the Link to Lake group and incorporated ideas from the community healing spaces. They also put up new Be³ signs around the neighborhood. RBAC bought more property around the Light Rail station, with a goal of making improvements to existing buildings and creating a farmstand and food innovation center.

2.1.4 Business and community engagement

Engagement with Seattle Police Department remains a challenge. ABSPY no longer has a regular representative from SPD and is no longer funding police-related activities. This means that the basketball tournaments and Cops and Cones events at Lake Washington apartments have been discontinued.

ABSPY has been more successful at engaging Safeway this year, resulting in a lighting and mural project around the store and the former Pho Van restaurant. The liquor store at the Safeway hot spot was criticized by respondents to the 2020 survey (which, we note, was likely not representative of the Rainier Beach community); however, the store owners have been important community partners in the healing spaces and are interested in building relationships. ABSPY recognizes the importance of collaborating with larger corporations like Safeway that have resources and capacity to invest and support in neighborhoods where they are located.

2.1.5 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

Several CPTED initiatives were started or recommenced this year. The Northwest Kidney Center became a new ABSPY partner. This business is located near the Light Rail and is an award-winning facility in terms of its landscaping. They reached out initially to SNG and RBAC for assistance with removing trash and reducing parties in their parking lot. CPTED trainings were also held at Rose Street in June.

2.1.6 Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) and restorative practices

The NIJ Workgroup of the Core Team continued to meet regularly in 2021 to implement community-wide PBIS and restorative practices under a grant from the National Institute of Justice. RBAC held a number of virtual “PBIS Deep Dives” to introduce community members and business owners to PBIS principles, and are working on an effort similar to the Tiered Fidelity Inventory used to assess PBIS implementation in schools that could be used as part of a ‘walkthrough’ with businesses and community institutions. This would blend PBIS and CPTED principles. The Boys and Girls Club continued to hold in-person and virtual peace circles, and have worked with the administration at Rainier Beach High School on conflict resolution and alternatives to suspension and expulsion.

3 2021 Evaluation Update: Summary of Methods

A detailed description of the data and methods used for this evaluation can be found in the [original evaluation report](#) and the [2017 update](#). This 2021 evaluation is based on monthly police data on calls for service and recorded offenses and incidents from January 2011 to August 2021, provided by SPD, and an online survey of Rainier Beach community members conducted online in December 2021. For our analysis of police data, we matched each Rainier Beach hot spot with a comparison location elsewhere in SPD’s South Precinct, which is similar in terms of crime rates and characteristics such as land use, presence of schools, access to public transit etc. These sites were selected in 2012 as part of the original federally-funded evaluation of ABSPY, and further details about the selection process and data are available in our original report. As we have noted in prior reports, we continue to include the originally selected comparison sites because analytic models need to match the research design, but significant gentrification and population change in Southeast Seattle have affected the comparability of these locations since they were first identified. We also now know that the events of 2020, including the COVID-19 pandemic, racial justice protests, and disruptions to police services, had a considerable impact on crime and calls to the police. This also presents challenges for comparing 2020-21 data to previous years.

To make this report easier to read, all of the tables and most graphs are included in the [Statistical Appendix](#) at the end of this report. You can look at any of the tables or graphs in more detail in the electronic version of this report by clicking on the blue number next to each reference to a table or figure (e.g. Table A1—click the blue “A1” link to see the table).

3.1 Police crime data definitions

We use the following information from official police data provided to us by SPD in our analyses. Each measure of crime data can tell us different information about how ABSPY is working. Note that we are not allowed to report the numbers of certain offense types, including homicide, rape, and domestic incidents. These offenses are included in our statistical analysis because specific numbers cannot be identified from these models, but they are not included when we report the numbers of certain offenses.

1. **Calls for police service.** “Calls for service” include both 911 calls from the public to the police, and the logs that police record (usually on their in-car computers) while they are out on patrol. Calls for service tell us what people in the neighborhood are concerned about, what they are willing to call the police about (which may indicate how much they trust the police), and what the police see or hear about while they are in the neighborhood. But calls for service don’t tell us the “true” picture of crime. Sometimes the person calling 911 doesn’t know exactly what they are seeing or hearing, but when the police arrive they can determine what type of crime has been committed and record this in their report (see below). Multiple people might call 911 about the same problem, like hearing shots being fired. And sometimes, even if a person was worried about an issue and called the police, it might turn out that no crime has been committed or the police can’t find whatever was going on. Calls for service also don’t tell us who was involved in a crime (e.g. the age, gender, or race of a suspect or victim). This information is verified by police at the scene and included in the report.
2. **Police reports (offenses).** Police write reports when they respond to a call or see something while on patrol and have reason to believe that a crime may have occurred (such as a victim or witness willing to make a report). Although not every call for service turns into a report, the reports give us a better idea of what happened and who was involved. However, police can decide whether or not to take a report, and sometimes victims don’t want the police to take a formal report, so not all crimes make it into the data.

Seattle Police Department, like most other police departments around the country, uses a computerized database to store details about offenses that are reported. Police departments report this information to the FBI via a reporting system called NIBRS (National Incident-Based Reporting System) so that national crime statistics can be compiled.

This overall category of police reports includes the youth, violent, and minor crime incidents described in points 3-5 below.

3. **Youth crime reports.** Because ABSPY is focused on creating a “beautiful safe place for youth,” we also analyze reports of offenses that involve young people (under 18 and age 18-25) as suspects and/or victims.
4. **Violent crime reports.** ABSPY is also focused on violence prevention, so we look at the effects of the interventions on violent offenses. We define “violent offenses” as murder and non-negligent manslaughter; aggravated assault; robbery; rape; and simple assault.²
5. **Group A person offenses.** Offenses reported to NIBRS are classified into Group A and Group B offenses. Group A offenses are the most serious or violent crimes, and are divided into two groups:

²We are not permitted to report homicide (murder/manslaughter) and rape offenses separately.

crimes against people and crimes against property (see point 6 below). Group A person offenses include the violent incident types described in point 4 above, and certain other offenses against the person such as intimidation and kidnapping. To create this category, we selected all offenses that were categorized in SPD's database as both Group A and Person Offenses. A full list of NIBRS offense definitions is available [here](#).

6. **Group A property offenses.** Similar to the Group A person offense category, Group A property offenses include the more serious property offenses. These include crimes like arson, burglary, larceny/theft (including motor vehicle theft), property damage, and so on. To create this category, we selected all offenses that were categorized as both Group A and Property Offenses in SPD's database.
7. **Group B offenses.** NIBRS Group B offenses are typically minor crimes, including things like disorderly conduct, drunkenness, non-violent family offenses, and liquor law violations. It is useful to look at these less serious crimes because they reflect quality of life issues that, while less serious, are still likely to be very important to community members' feelings of safety and confidence in the police.

3.2 Community survey

From 2014 to 2019 we conducted in-person community surveys in the five Rainier Beach and five comparison hot spots. Due to COVID-19 we have suspended in-person data collection, but developed a similar online survey instrument for the Rainier Beach community only. The comparison hot spots are outside Rainier Beach and not all in the same neighborhood, so we do not have any way to obtain online access to residents of those areas. In 2020 we distributed the survey to Rainier Beach residents via RBAC's mailing list (approximately 800 members) but only received 19 valid responses. In 2021 we again distributed the survey to RBAC's mailing list, but also shared the link with the Boys and Girls Club, SNG, and the Department of Neighborhoods. This resulted in a much larger response rate: 81 people fully completed the survey. We also collaborated with RBAC to place flyers in the five Rainier Beach hot spots, but it does not appear that these were used.

As we cautioned in the 2020 report, it is likely that people who responded to the online survey are different from those we usually encounter on the street, because they have chosen to actively engage with local community organizations like RBAC. This means that they may be more supportive of ABSPY activities and more aware of public safety issues in the community. As with the 2020 online survey, this year's respondents also differed demographically from the typical in-person respondent, although the larger sample size resulted in considerably more variability than last year. The 2020 sample was much more likely to be female, older, White, US-born, highly-educated, and employed compared to the in-person respondents in previous years. In 2021, about 60% of respondents identified as female compared to about half of our typical in-person sample, but they were much younger than last year, with two-thirds of respondents aged between 18 and 35 (over one-third of the respondents were in the 18-25 age group). This is much younger than our typical in-person sample, in which around half of respondents were under 35. This year's survey results may therefore better reflect the concerns of some of the young people ABPSY intends to support. However, respondents were still more likely to be White (around half, compared to less than one-quarter of in-person respondents) and born in the United States (89%, compared to around two-thirds of in-person respondents). The number of respondents who had children was more comparable to previous years: around half reported having children of any age. While this year's sample still

had a higher level of education than the typical in-person respondent, there was much more variation compared to last year. About one-third of the sample had a high school diploma or less, while around 25% had completed an associate's or bachelor's degree and 20% had received a masters or higher.

A plurality of 2021 survey respondents (40%) listed Rainier and Henderson as the location where they spent most time. Twenty-five percent spent most time at Lake Washington; 16% at Our Safe Way, and 14% at Rose Street. Only 6% reported spending most time at the Light Rail. In this year's survey we asked respondents simply to list all the activities they did at their chosen location, rather than selecting a "main" activity plus additional activities. Most respondents reported engaging in multiple activities at their hot spot, although most of them (65%) stated that they lived there.

The remainder of the survey included the same questions as in previous years. We asked about residents' perceptions of safety and their assessment of the likelihood of different types of crime and disorder occurring at the hot spot; their knowledge of ABSPY interventions; their perceptions of social cohesion, community involvement, and collective efficacy; and their perceptions of and experiences with the police. However, in collaboration with Core Team members, we made some changes to the language used in some of the survey questions. Core Team members and previous survey respondents felt that the wording of some questions (such as "groups of youth hanging out and causing problems") perpetuated negative and racist stereotypes about young people in the neighborhood, and suggested removing these items altogether or changing the language. We also changed and added other questions; for example, asking whether people felt ABSPY interventions made the community safer rather than asking if they were satisfied with the interventions, and asking whether people who had interacted with the police felt safe during these encounters.

3.3 Analytic strategy

We again used the updated analytic strategy for the crime data that we developed for the [2020 Evaluation Update](#). These statistical models now analyze the effects of ABSPY and its specific interventions on police reports and calls for service using random effects negative binomial regression models that also control for autocorrelation between monthly crime rates as well as seasonal and overall crime rates. The updated timeframe for the police data analysis is January 2011 to August 2021 (128 months).³ We also present descriptive graphs showing the number of reported offenses in each hot spot and across all five Rainier Beach hot spots from September 2011 to August 2021, and the percentage change in each crime outcome pre- and post-May 2014 (when the first interventions were rolled out) in each hot spot relative to its comparison site, the overall Rainier Beach neighborhood, and the South Precinct overall. These descriptive graphs complement the statistical analysis and are easier to read and interpret.

As in previous reports, we also calculated the crime inflation factor, which is the ratio of calls to offenses in the pre-intervention and during-intervention periods (Weisburd et al., 2020). The crime inflation factor assesses whether higher numbers of offenses can be attributed to increased calls to the police (reflecting improved collective efficacy and trust in police among residents) rather than ABSPY failing to work or even "backfiring." This is an important potential source of bias in analyzing the effects of interventions that aim to decrease crime but increase citizen engagement with crime prevention (which can result in more calls to the police). We calculated the inflation factor for both the treatment and comparison hot spots and adjusted the number of incidents in the treatment spots by the difference between the

³Refer to the [2017 Evaluation Update](#) for a table showing pre-intervention monthly average numbers for each crime outcome.

treatment and comparison group inflation factors.


Like last year, we did not conduct any statistical analysis with the 2021 survey data. While the response rate was much higher than last year, the low response rate in 2020, the change in methods (in-person vs. online) from 2019 to 2020 and 2021, and the changes to the phrasing and response options of some of the questions in 2021 means we cannot compare the results to previous years. We provide a narrative report on the survey results, and tables or graphs where appropriate.

4 Updated Evaluation Findings

4.1 In most cases crime continues to trend downward in Rainier Beach

Figure 2 shows that the number of reported crimes in the five combined Rainier Beach hot spots has continued to trend downwards. For offenses involving youth specifically, this decrease has been fairly consistent every year since 2015-16, around the time that all ABSPY interventions were fully under way. Although the pandemic and other events of 2020-21 have affected calls for police service and crime in cities around the country, there does not appear to be any negative effects on reported crimes involving adults or youth in Rainier Beach. It is possible that the pandemic affected people’s routine activities and kept some people at home during 2020 and 2021, reducing their opportunities for crime, which could explain the larger drop in adult offenses from 2019 to 2020-21. However, if this were the case, we might also expect to see negative impacts on youth crime. For example, young people who were not in school or receiving supervision and structured activities during the pandemic may have been involved in more incidents, but this does not seem to have been the case in Rainier Beach.

Figure 2: Reported offenses in all Rainier Beach hot spots, September 2011-August 2021




A descriptive analysis of the period pre- and post-May 2014, when ABSPY interventions first began, shows

that the numbers of calls for service and reported offenses have been lower in the hot spots since ABSPY began, although they have also been lower in the comparison spots, Rainier Beach as a whole, and the South Precinct (Figures A1-A2). Offenses involving youth were 32% lower in the hot spots compared to the pre-ABSPY period, which is larger than the decreases in the rest of Rainier Beach or the South Precinct as a whole (Figure A3). Violent offenses are 14% lower in the hot spots compared to 8% lower in the South Precinct (Figure A4), and the hot spots also saw the largest decrease in Group A person offenses (7% compared to a 5% decrease in the comparison spots, 1% decrease in the rest of Rainier Beach, and 3% decrease in the South Precinct: Figure A5). Group B offenses were also 11% lower than the pre-ABSPY period in the hot spots, reversing the trend in previous reports where they were higher (Figure A7).

Youth offenses at Rose Street remain very low, with only five reported between September 2020 and August 2021. This reverses the small uptick we saw last year, where eight youth-involved offenses were reported (Figure 3). Offenses involving adults were also much lower this year after spiking in 2019-2020. The substantial reduction in youth-involved offenses is also borne out when we look at the percent change in offenses pre- and post-May 2014, when ABSPY began. Youth offenses are 52% lower at Rose Street post-ABSPY, compared to 28% lower in Rose Street’s comparison spot (Figure A10). Group A person offenses and Group B offenses are also lower at Rose Street post-ABSPY relative to the comparison site (Figures A12 and A14). Calls for service, all offenses, violent offenses, and Group A property offenses are also lower at Rose Street, but have also decreased by an equal or greater percentage at the comparison site (Figures A8-A9; A11; A13-A14).


Figure 3: Reported offenses at Rose Street, September 2011-August 2021



Crime at Rainier and Henderson has been variable over the years. Both youth and adult crime was trending steadily downward from 2014, when ABSPY was implemented, through the summer of 2018, but there was a spike in both crime types in 2018-19, followed by a decrease in 2019-20, and another uptick in 2020-21 (although the uptick for crime involving youth was fairly small, increasing from 22 incidents last year to 27 this year (Figure 4). As we noted in our previous report, it is possible that the dip last year was due to COVID-19 related closures of schools, the community center, and so on. As some of these services have resumed in the past year, crime trends may be returning to ‘normal.’ However, when we look

at the percentage change in various crime types pre- and post-ABSPY, there are some promising trends. Calls for service are 21% lower at Rainier and Henderson post-ABSPY, but just 6% lower at the comparison site (Figure A15). Reported offenses are 6% lower, while in the comparison site they are slightly higher (Figure A16). We also see this trend for most other crime types: violent offenses are 21% lower at Rainier and Henderson compared to 2% lower in the comparison site (Figure A18); while Group A person offenses and Group B offenses have increased in the comparison site but decreased at Rainier and Henderson (Figures A19, A21). Youth offenses and Part A property are also lower, although they have decreased more in the comparison site (Figures A17, A20).

Figure 4: Offenses and incidents at Rainier & Henderson, September 2011-August 2021



Continuing last year’s trends, crime at the Light Rail continued to decrease in 2020-21. Crimes involving adults decreased from 7 to 3, while crimes involving youth decreased from 5 to 3, suggesting that last year’s slight uptick in youth crime may have been temporary (Figure 5). Furthermore, the percentage decrease in calls for service and all offense types is greater at the Light Rail than it is for the comparison site (Figures A22-A28). Notably, youth offenses are 38% lower, compared to 23% lower for the comparison site, and violent offenses are 64% lower compared to 32%. Calls for service at the comparison site are 13% higher, but have decreased by 37% post-ABSPY at the Light Rail.

Lake Washington also continues to show a steady decline in adult and youth crimes (Figure 6). The percentage change trends pre- and post-ABSPY mirror those of previous years: with the exception of violent offenses, calls for service and all other offense types are lower at Lake Washington, but have not decreased as much as the comparison site (Figures A29-A35). However, the trend for youth is positive - youth offenses are 35% lower at Lake Washington, while last year they were 29% lower (Figure A31). And while violent crimes are still higher than they were post-ABSPY, the percentage difference continues to decrease. In our 2019 report violent crimes were 19% higher post-ABSPY; last year they were 8% higher; and this year they are only 2% higher (Figure A32).

Finally, crime at Safeway continues to decrease substantially, and notably there were only 5 incidents involving youth this year (Figure 7). Indeed, Safeway is a success story when it comes to reducing youth

Figure 5: Offenses and incidents at Light Rail, September 2011-August 2021






Figure 6: Offenses and incidents at Lake Washington, September 2011-August 2021



crime - youth-involved offenses are 40% lower than they were pre-ABSPY, compared to 38% lower in the comparison site (Figure A38). This is the first year that the reduction at Safeway has exceeded the reduction in the comparison site. Calls for service and all other crime types except Part A property remain higher than the pre-ABSPY period, in some cases substantially. For example, calls for service are 70% higher at Safeway, violent offenses are 68% higher, Group A person offenses are 148% higher, and Group B offenses are 50% higher (Figures A36-A42). However, in most cases, these offense types increased at

the comparison site as well, albeit not as much.

Figure 7: Offenses and incidents at Safeway, September 2011-August 2021



4.2 Calls for service remain significantly higher in the hot spots, but individual ABSPY interventions affect crime outcomes differently

In the previous section we discussed the descriptive results of the evaluation. In this section we use the statistical models described earlier in the report to assess whether the changes in crime we see in the descriptive results are statistically significant; i.e. can we say ABSPY led to the differences, or did they just happen by chance? It’s important to understand the limitations of the statistical analysis before we look at the results. As we have noted before, our comparison sites are not randomly assigned it was extremely difficult to find comparison hot spots that were similar to Rainier Beach, especially because many other areas in the South Precinct are experiencing gentrification and economic development that can affect crime rates and people’s perceptions of safety. Our statistical results also do not take into account the possibility that a program like ABSPY, which is intended to increase community members’ involvement with crime prevention and encourage them to look out for each other and interact more with the police, could increase calls for service, which in turn may lead to higher rates of recorded offenses as the police respond to and take reports for more calls. Finally, the pandemic, protests, and policing challenges in 2020 and 2021 have undoubtedly affected crime rates, making long-term pre-post ABSPY comparisons difficult. These issues may also have affected our hot spots and comparison areas differently.

Figure A43 shows that calls for service in both the treatment and comparison spots spiked substantially between 2020 and 2021, although they had returned to somewhat normal levels by the summer of 2021. Interestingly, calls were much higher in the comparison hot spots than the treatment hot spots during this spike, although both areas followed the same pattern. Overall, calls have remained relatively steady in the treatment sites, controlling for other factors, pre- and post-ABSPY, but they have slightly decreased in the comparison sites (Figure A44). Calls for service in the Rainier Beach hot spots remained significantly

higher in the post-ABSPY period, as they have been in previous years, although the difference in the rate of calls continues to decrease (calls were 22% higher than the comparison sites this year, compared to 24% higher last year and 34% higher in 2019 (Table A1). None of the individual interventions had a significant impact on calls for service, looking at the interactions between the active intervention and treatment vs. comparison sites. However, all interventions are associated with reduced calls for service in Rainier Beach, although, business improvements were associated with a non-significant 3% higher rate of calls.

Similarly, the rate of offenses was 21% higher in Rainier Beach in the post-ABSPY period (Figures A45 and A46); youth offenses were 25% higher (Figures A47 and A48); and violent offenses were also 21% higher overall (Figures A49 and A50). However, none of these models was statistically significant (Tables A2-A4). However, there are some interesting findings for the effects of specific ABSPY interventions. During the months when the business improvements were active, Rainier Beach hot spots had a significant 26% lower rate of all offenses relative to the comparison sites. Business improvements were also associated with a significant 70% lower rate of both youth offenses and violent offenses. However, the months where Corner Greeters were active are associated with a significant 100% higher rate of youth offenses and 95% higher rate of violent offenses in the hot spots. Safe Passage, CPTED, and PBIS were associated with lower rates of crime, but not significantly so.

The post-ABSPY period is associated with no change in Group A person offenses, a 28% higher rate of Group A property offenses, and a 21% higher rate of Group B offenses. None of these differences is statistically significant (Tables A5-A7; Figures A51-A56). None of the individual interventions significantly impacted these crime types, although Corner Greeters were associated with non-significant higher rates of each, while CPTED improvements were associated with a non-significant higher rate of Group A property and Group B offenses. All other interventions were associated with non-significant lower rates of each crime type.

As described above, we also ran a model adjusted for the crime inflation factor to see whether the higher rates of crime associated with ABSPY could be a result of increased community engagement and reporting to the police. We calculated a crime inflation factor of 2.30 for the Rainier Beach hot spots (indicating that the ratio of calls to incidents was higher after ABSPY was implemented) and 2.09 in the comparison hot spots (indicating that the ratio was also higher, but by a smaller amount, during the same period). Because there are more months in the intervention active period (40 pre-intervention months and 88 post-intervention months), we would expect to see a higher ratio in the post-ABSPY period in both locations. The inflation factor in the Rainier Beach hot spots is slightly more than what would be expected, since the ratio of 88/40 is 2.2. The difference between the inflation factors in the treatment and comparison areas was not statistically significant ($t=-.303$; $p=.769$). We then divided the comparison group inflation factor by the treatment group inflation factor and multiplied the total number of post-ABSPY crime incidents in the treatment hot spots by this value to adjust for call inflation. We ran a univariate ANOVA (adjusting for treatment assignment, each “block” or treatment-comparison site pair, and the pre-ABSPY crime rate) with the unadjusted and adjusted incident counts.⁴ The unadjusted model showed that crime incidents were slightly higher in the treatment hot spots relative to the comparison spots, but not significantly so ($F=.04$; $p=.856$), while the adjusted model predicted a slightly lower and non-significant incident rate in Rainier Beach ($F=0.68$; $p=.469$). This analysis does not offer any conclusive findings about crime inflation, but it does suggest that accounting for inflation changes the results slightly and that ABSPY is not likely to be having a backfire effect. As we observed in last year’s report, the previous analysis showing differential effects between the individual ABSPY interventions further supports the argument that ABSPY

⁴We used logged values for the pre- and post-ABSPY crime incident rates in this analysis.


may be changing people’s behavior in different ways.

4.3 Community members think ABSPY makes Rainier Beach safer

A majority (81%) of survey respondents said they had noticed ABSPY, which is not surprising given that the survey was distributed via the email lists of several organizations that participate in ABSPY. However, there was more variation in their familiarity with the specific interventions that comprise ABSPY. The Be³ was the most well-known intervention, with 74% of respondents saying they had noticed it (this may be due to a mural dedicated to the Be³ principles that was painted in the neighborhood this year). 62% had noticed Safe Passage, 60% had noticed Corner Greeters, 58% had noticed business improvements, and 48% had noticed the community healing spaces, which were new this year.

As we explained above, this year we changed the survey question asking whether respondents who had noticed ABSPY were satisfied with the initiative. Instead, we asked whether they thought it made the community safer. Overall, a majority of respondents believed ABSPY and its interventions make the community at least a little, if not much safer (Figure 8). The only exception was the community healing spaces - 48% of respondents who had noticed the healing spaces felt they made the community a little or much safer. However, this may be because this is a newer intervention - fewer people had noticed this intervention compared to the others, and more people answered “don’t know” to this question. It is concerning that a few people thought some of the interventions, such as Safe Passage, the Corner Greeters, the business improvements, and the healing spaces, made the community less safe, although the numbers are small (although, 11% of respondents felt Safe Passage made the community less safe).


Figure 8: Survey respondents’ satisfaction with ABSPY and specific interventions



4.4 Most people think crime has gotten better in Rainier Beach in the past year

In last year's survey, which was very small and not necessarily representative of the community as a whole, only two of the 19 respondents thought crime had gotten somewhat or much better in the past year. This year, with a larger sample, the news is much better: once again, a majority of respondents (57%) felt crime had gotten somewhat or much better (Figure 9). Only 10 people (12%) thought it had gotten somewhat worse, and nobody felt it was much worse.

Figure 9: Survey respondents' assessment of change in crime in the hot spots in the past year



In line with these results, survey respondents generally felt safe in the hot spots in most contexts, especially during the day where 91% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they felt safe (Figure 10). The only context in which a majority of respondents did not feel safe was in the hot spots at night: 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed that they felt safe in this context. In terms of how often respondents reported seeing different indicators of disorder in the hot spots, a smaller proportion of respondents identified disorder compared to last year's sample (Figure 11). Drinking in public was the issue people reported seeing most frequently (35% of respondents reported seeing this a few times a week or every day). Respondents reported seeing vandalism and graffiti least frequently (only 17% said they saw this a few times a week or every day). However, quite a substantial proportion of respondents stated that they didn't know how frequently some issues, like people selling or using drugs or sex workers working on the street, occurred.

Respondents were also less likely than last year to believe a serious crime was likely to occur in the hot spots (Figure 12). Only theft from a vehicle was considered likely or very likely by a majority (54%) of respondents. Compared to last year's results, which were concerning because so many respondents believed serious crime was likely, these results are more promising and suggest that the smaller group of people who responded last year were not necessarily representative of the Rainier Beach community.

4.5 Social cohesion remains high and willingness to intervene is improving

Social cohesion refers to the extent to which residents of a community trust each other and feel they have the resources to take care of problems. We asked a number of questions on the survey that were designed to assess these issues. Overall, respondents this year believed social cohesion was very high (Figure 13). While only 57% of respondents (which is still a majority) agreed or strongly agreed that residents knew

Figure 10: Survey respondents' perceptions of safety in the hot spots






Figure 11: Survey respondents' perceptions of disorder frequency in the hot spots




each other by name and 58% agreed/strongly agreed that people would call the police if a crime was happening, over 85% agreed or strongly agreed that residents cared about the community and 80% said people were willing to help each other out. A majority of people also said there were good activities for youth; business and property owners cared about the community; there are good stores, services, and opportunities to get involved; and people look out for each other and can be trusted. In general, respondents this year were relatively well-connected to the community themselves, which makes sense given how we distributed the survey. Around two-thirds of respondents said they had attended a com-

Figure 12: Survey respondents' perceptions of likelihood of serious crime in the hot spots



munity meeting or social event, or volunteered in the community. Almost 60% said they had engaged in problem-solving with neighbors and about half said they had talked to a government official about a problem.


Figure 13: Survey respondents' perceptions of social cohesion in the hot spots



Perceptions of collective efficacy—the willingness of residents to intervene directly to address community problems, were less strong than perceived social cohesion. While a majority of respondents (56%) thought that residents would be willing to intervene if a fight happened, most thought it was unlikely or very unlikely that someone would do something if young people were skipping school and hanging out

on the street, showing disrespect to an adult, or if people were spraying graffiti or vandalizing property (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Survey respondents’ perceptions of collective efficacy in the hot spots



4.6 Perceptions of police are somewhat favorable, but less so than in previous years

Perceptions of the police were more favorable than respondents last year. More than 30% of respondents said they were very satisfied, compared to 22% in our last in-person survey (2019) and nobody last year. In all, just under 60% of respondents were somewhat or very unsatisfied with the police. At the same time, around 43% of respondents had experienced some contact with the police, but only one person reported being stopped and frisked and nobody had been arrested. Most people who had contact with the police had reported a crime and/or been a victim or witness, or had spoken with an officer at a community meeting or event.

In line with previous survey results, respondents reported fairly low levels of police activity, and tended to see more passive rather than proactive policing. Around 50% said they saw the police walking or cycling in the hot spots a few times a week or every day, and 44% saw police driving around this frequently. However, only around a quarter of respondents saw police at community meetings or interacting with the community (Figure 15).

Figure 16 shows survey respondents’ perceptions of police. In previous years we have used the first two measures—“the police do a good job preventing crime” and “the police do a good job enforcing drug laws”—to assess satisfaction with the police and the remaining three measures—the police treat people fairly, treat people with respect, and care about solving problems—to assess perceived legitimacy. Figure 16 shows that satisfaction and legitimacy are reasonable, but fewer than 50% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with each measure. This is an improvement on last year and likely more representative of community views, given the larger sample. However, it is not as favorable as perceptions of the police in our in-person surveys, which occurred prior to the pandemic and racial/social justice-related protests.

Figure 15: Survey respondents' perceptions of frequency of police activity in the hot spots





Figure 16: Survey respondents' perceptions of police in the hot spots



5 Conclusions and Recommendations

ABSPY is a community-led, place-based, data-driven approach to reducing crime and public safety in five hot spots of juvenile and youth crime in the Rainier Beach neighborhood of Seattle. This updated evaluation report for 2021 shows many favorable results, despite the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, local and national protests against police brutality and the impact of the January 6th insurrection and change in government, and continued instability in the Seattle Police Department, on crime

rates and people's feelings of safety. Crime is still trending downward in Rainier Beach since ABSPY was implemented, although there may be differential effects of the various interventions. Our survey findings are based on a much larger online sample than last year, and show that people believe ABSPY makes the community safer and have relatively favorable views of safety and social cohesion.

- **In most cases crime continues to trend downward in Rainier Beach.** Overall, the downward trend in the number of youth offenses at the Rainier Beach hot spots we have reported in recent years continues, and crime in Rainier Beach continues to be lower since ABSPY began than it was before on several measures. Rainier and Henderson, which is a historical high-crime location and represents a 'flagship' ABSPY intervention site, saw a small uptick in crime, possibly as a result of schools and community services reopening, but crime remains lower than it was at the beginning of the ABSPY initiative in 2014. Crime has continued to decline at Lake Washington and the Safeway hot spot, although it remains much higher at Safeway than the pre-ABSPY period. After small increases last year, crime at Rose Street and the Light Rail continued to trend downward this year and crimes involving youth are minimal.
- **Calls for service remain significantly higher in the hot spots, but individual ABSPY interventions affect crime outcomes differently.** When we examine statistical rather than descriptive differences in crime between the ABSPY hot spots and comparison sites outside Rainier Beach, we see similar trends from previous years. Calls for service remain significantly higher in Rainier Beach relative to the comparison sites, but the size of the difference continues to decrease and there are no significant differences between the hot spots and comparison sites. Among the specific interventions, business improvements are associated with significantly lower rates of all offenses, and youth and violent offenses. Youth and violent offenses were around 70% lower than the comparison sites during the months when business improvement interventions were active. Rainier Beach hot spots had a significantly higher rate of offenses, including youth and violent offenses, during the months when the Corner Greeter intervention was active.
- **Community members think ABSPY makes Rainier Beach safer.** As with last year's survey, our survey results this year cannot be directly compared to prior years because of the different sample and method of delivery. However, this year we received a much larger number of responses, suggesting that this year's survey is more representative than last year. Respondents this year were very familiar with ABSPY and its interventions. Given that the survey was sent via the mailing lists of ABSPY organizations it is not surprising that people were more familiar with the work. A majority of respondents believed that most of the ABSPY interventions made the community safer; slightly fewer than half said this about the healing spaces, but fewer respondents were familiar with this new intervention compared to the longer-standing ABSPY initiatives.
- **Most people think crime has gotten better in Rainier Beach in the past year.** A majority of survey respondents believed crime had gotten somewhat or much better in the past year. In general, they felt safe in the hot spots in most context, except while walking around at night. In terms of disorder, respondents reported seeing people drinking in public most often. They were less likely than respondents last year to believe that a serious crime was likely to occur in the hot spots—only theft from a vehicle was considered likely or very likely to occur by a majority of respondents.
- **Social cohesion remains high and willingness to intervene is improving.** Survey respondents reported high levels of social cohesion. In particular, over 80% of respondents said residents cared about the community and were willing to help each other out. As in previous surveys, perceptions

of collective efficacy were less strong. A majority of respondents thought that residents would be willing to intervene if a fight happened, but they believed this was less likely in the event of other types of social disorder issues. Given the nature of the sample, it was not surprising that a majority of respondents were well-connected to community initiatives and volunteering themselves.

- **Perceptions of police are somewhat favorable, but less so than in previous years.** Three years ago we saw statistically significant improvements in satisfaction with the police and perceptions of legitimacy associated with ABSPY, but—while the past two surveys have not been comparable—perceptions have been less favorable. However, respondents to this year’s survey reported slightly higher levels of satisfaction than last year’s respondents. Nonetheless, around 60% of respondents were somewhat or very unsatisfied with the police. Respondents also noted seeing fairly low levels of police activity, which tended toward passive patrol rather than proactive or community engagement efforts. Around half of respondents felt the police were doing a good job and treated people fairly and respectfully.

5.1 Recommendations for 2022

- **Develop an action plan for ABSPY sustainability and development.** The mission and role of ABSPY and whether/how its members should be involved in citywide initiatives have been key topics of conversation in 2021. In 2022 the Core Team should make concrete decisions about a path forward, deciding what ABSPY should be and how the initiative as a whole and the individual members/partners relate to broader crime prevention and public safety initiatives. Crucial to this decision-making process will be capacity-building within the Core Team itself (i.e., hiring additional staff to support project management and capacity building efforts) and exploring new sources of financial support.
- **Continue exploring how to re-engage the community and increase representation, particularly among youth.** This recommendation is continued from our past two reports. There remains a clear desire and need among the Core Team to increase the representation of community members, especially young people, in this work, including data collection and analysis, to make it truly community-led. While this has been challenging during the pandemic, the Core Team should recommit to developing concrete steps to make this happen this year.
- **Continue to explore the differential impact of interventions at the hot spots.** Our statistical analysis continues to show differential impacts for certain interventions in the hot spots. In a change from last year, business improvements were associated with significantly fewer youth and violent offenses, while reported offenses were higher during the months when Corner Greeter intervention was active. It is important to reiterate, as we did last year, that the analysis does not indicate that, for example, Corner Greeters events themselves are associated with crime—it is not specific enough to track crime rates at the exact times and days when Corner Greeter events were occurring. It simply suggests that, all else being equal, crime was higher in the hot spots during the post-ABSPY months that the Corner Greeter program overall has been operating. However, it is possible that events and activities in the community bring more people out onto the street, which in turn could increase the risk of crime through sheer numbers, or that there are higher levels of police scrutiny during times when events are going on. Certain interventions may also increase crime reporting. As research partners we commit to exploring ways to examine these differential effects in the coming year.

- **Re-engage the Seattle Police Department.** While police involvement in community initiatives has become more controversial in the wake of “defund the police” conversations, ABSPY has historically had a good, if challenging, relationship with SPD. Our biggest challenge has been consistency in representation, given substantial personnel changes within the department over the years. Nonetheless, there is Core Team support for re-engaging SPD, and a recognition that a public safety initiative ultimately benefits from having the police as partners. Furthermore, ABSPY is data-driven and relies on SPD data for tracking success and fine-tuning implementation. Toward the end of 2021 the Core Team drafted a letter to Chief Adrian Diaz, describing the initiative and requesting a partnership and consistent representation. We think that redeveloping this relationship will be important as the initiative moves forward.

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Statistical Appendix

Table A1: Random effects negative binomial regression on calls for service

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	.918 (.047)		.839* (.065)
ABSPY	1.402** (.176)	1.504** (.191)	1.438** (.184)
Post × ABSPY	1.083 (.054)		1.219* (.112)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	1.187 (.226)	1.121 (.221)	1.134 (.225)
Light Rail	.942 (.185)	.863 (.174)	.855 (.172)
Lake Washington	1.097 (.225)	1.015 (.215)	1.005 (.213)
Safeway	.741 (.126)	.680* (.119)	.680* (.119)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.022 (.061)	1.023 (.061)	1.024 (.061)
Mar	1.165** (.067)	1.166** (.067)	1.167** (.067)
Apr	1.075 (.061)	1.074 (.061)	1.072 (.061)
May	1.218*** (.067)	1.216*** (.067)	1.217*** (.067)
Jun	.904 (.053)	.910 (.054)	.911 (.054)
Jul	1.050 (.059)	1.050 (.060)	1.050 (.060)
Aug	.945 (.055)	.944 (.055)	.944 (.055)
Sep	.906 (.055)	.907 (.055)	.908 (.055)
Oct	.954 (.056)	.954 (.057)	.955 (.057)
Nov	.946 (.056)	.942 (.056)	.944 (.056)
Dec	.856* (.052)	.856* (.052)	.856* (.052)
Trend	1.000 (.001)	.999 (.001)	1.000 (.001)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.497*** (.046)	1.483*** (.046)	1.476*** (.046)
2 months	1.200*** (.038)	1.188*** (.038)	1.185*** (.038)
3 months	1.037 (.031)	1.026 (.032)	1.023 (.031)
Corner Greeters active		.946 (.073)	1.063 (.099)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.079 (.093)	.935 (.101)
Safe Passage active		.960 (.116)	1.038 (.130)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.975 (.141)	.891 (.134)
Business improvements active		1.055 (.094)	1.059 (.095)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		1.039 (.112)	1.032 (.112)
CPTED active		.894 (.073)	.889 (.073)
CPTED active × ABSPY		.979 (.108)	.976 (.107)
PBIS active		1.158 (.138)	1.090 (.132)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.794 (.115)	.841 (.123)
Constant	1.460* (.253)	1.633** (.295)	1.747** (.320)
Dispersion parameters			
In_r	8.268 (4.189)	8.065 (4.050)	8.016 (4.016)
In_s	13.253 (6.945)	12.721 (6.604)	12.540 (6.494)
Log likelihood	-3938.531	-3932.877	-3930.001
Wald chi2	655.507***	674.253***	683.054***
N	1250	1250	1250

Random effects negative binomial regression
 Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A2: Random effects negative binomial regression on all offenses

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	1.006 (.068)		.969 (.094)
ABSPY	1.193 (.209)	1.192 (.210)	1.153 (.205)
Post × ABSPY	1.065 (.072)		1.214 (.143)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.639 (.167)	.669 (.182)	.643 (.177)
Light Rail	.693 (.236)	.706 (.247)	.679 (.236)
Lake Washington	.691 (.196)	.753 (.224)	.732 (.217)
Safeway	.583* (.153)	.546* (.150)	.548* (.152)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.035 (.083)	1.034 (.083)	1.032 (.083)
Mar	1.133 (.090)	1.114 (.088)	1.115 (.088)
Apr	1.094 (.087)	1.077 (.086)	1.082 (.086)
May	1.241** (.094)	1.243** (.094)	1.244** (.094)
Jun	1.062 (.083)	1.070 (.085)	1.074 (.085)
Jul	1.209* (.091)	1.213* (.093)	1.218* (.094)
Aug	1.048 (.082)	1.050 (.083)	1.055 (.083)
Sep	1.034 (.082)	1.028 (.082)	1.030 (.082)
Oct	1.115 (.087)	1.107 (.087)	1.107 (.087)
Nov	1.024 (.082)	1.017 (.082)	1.017 (.081)
Dec	1.024 (.082)	1.022 (.082)	1.024 (.082)
Trend	.998** (.001)	.998** (.001)	.997** (.001)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.173*** (.040)	1.157*** (.039)	1.154*** (.039)
2 months	1.228*** (.042)	1.217*** (.041)	1.213*** (.041)
3 months	1.090** (.036)	1.080* (.036)	1.078* (.036)
4 months	1.032 (.034)	1.022 (.034)	1.019 (.034)
Corner Greeters active		.786* (.081)	.814 (.097)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.259* (.148)	1.108 (.157)
Safe Passage active		1.118 (.172)	1.149 (.184)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.980 (.186)	.899 (.177)
Business improvements active		1.432** (.170)	1.454** (.173)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.751 (.110)	.742* (.109)
CPTED active		.831 (.087)	.840 (.088)
CPTED active × ABSPY		1.084 (.160)	1.074 (.158)
PBIS active		1.366* (.208)	1.371* (.215)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.698 (.131)	.734 (.140)
Constant	4.477*** (1.139)	5.020*** (1.348)	5.369*** (1.461)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	14.313 (9.120)	13.549 (8.599)	13.889 (8.841)
ln_s	9.262 (6.093)	8.535 (5.604)	8.664 (5.699)
Log likelihood	-2941.834	-2934.121	-2931.894
Wald chi2	213.495***	227.190***	233.245***
N	1240	1240	1240

Random effects negative binomial regression
 Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A3: Random effects negative binomial regression on offenses involving youth

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	1.150 (.139)		1.110 (.197)
ABSPY	1.216 (.229)	1.395* (.189)	1.340* (.194)
Post × ABSPY	1.042 (.124)		1.251 (.261)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.537* (.136)	.652* (.135)	.625* (.135)
Light Rail	.277*** (.078)	.278*** (.061)	.266*** (.060)
Lake Washington	.638 (.167)	.735 (.141)	.723 (.142)
Safeway	.652 (.164)	.824 (.182)	.802 (.184)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.177 (.175)	1.182 (.176)	1.183 (.175)
Mar	1.205 (.177)	1.184 (.175)	1.182 (.174)
Apr	1.210 (.178)	1.196 (.176)	1.218 (.179)
May	1.610*** (.217)	1.625*** (.221)	1.635*** (.222)
Jun	1.263 (.178)	1.285 (.185)	1.307 (.188)
Jul	1.256 (.178)	1.297 (.187)	1.313 (.189)
Aug	1.156 (.166)	1.190 (.173)	1.210 (.176)
Sep	1.074 (.158)	1.078 (.160)	1.084 (.160)
Oct	1.306 (.187)	1.300 (.187)	1.308 (.188)
Nov	1.007 (.152)	1.008 (.153)	1.011 (.153)
Dec	1.018 (.153)	1.026 (.156)	1.034 (.156)
Trend	.993*** (.001)	.993*** (.002)	.991*** (.002)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.129* (.055)	1.110* (.054)	1.101* (.054)
2 months	1.166** (.056)	1.148** (.056)	1.144** (.056)
3 months	1.131** (.053)	1.117* (.053)	1.113* (.053)
4 months	1.036 (.049)	1.026 (.049)	1.026 (.049)
Corner Greeters active		.474*** (.102)	.467** (.110)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		2.349*** (.550)	2.003** (.539)
Safe Passage active		1.560 (.404)	1.508 (.420)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.833 (.262)	.773 (.257)
Business improvements active		2.860*** (.688)	2.923*** (.699)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.307*** (.089)	.303*** (.088)
CPTED active		1.110 (.212)	1.147 (.219)
CPTED active × ABSPY		.702 (.188)	.697 (.187)
PBIS active		1.781* (.508)	1.908* (.566)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.536 (.181)	.565 (.196)
Constant	2.361** (.653)	2.117** (.554)	2.268** (.606)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	19.308 (12.607)	64.359 (67.599)	60.495 (62.075)
ln_s	15.134 (10.236)	53.037 (57.725)	49.120 (52.233)
Log likelihood	-2012.071	-1995.643	-1992.799
Wald chi2	197.848***	265.459***	268.678***
N	1240	1240	1240

Random effects negative binomial regression
 Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A4: Random effects negative binomial regression on violent offenses

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	.848 (.105)		1.200 (.211)
ABSPY	1.378 (.308)	1.430 (.292)	1.417 (.271)
Post × ABSPY	1.004 (.121)		1.212 (.250)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.769 (.238)	.818 (.247)	.501** (.133)
Light Rail	.418** (.139)	.423** (.136)	.226*** (.068)
Lake Washington	.463* (.147)	.441** (.137)	.787 (.235)
Safeway	.666 (.207)	.579 (.176)	.576* (.154)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.011 (.157)	1.006 (.155)	1.171 (.167)
Mar	1.321 (.189)	1.300 (.184)	1.140 (.162)
Apr	1.144 (.169)	1.139 (.167)	1.198 (.169)
May	1.376* (.195)	1.380* (.195)	1.617*** (.219)
Jun	1.270 (.183)	1.324 (.192)	1.298 (.186)
Jul	1.336* (.190)	1.388* (.199)	1.324 (.191)
Aug	1.311 (.187)	1.354* (.194)	1.218 (.178)
Sep	1.323 (.193)	1.338* (.194)	1.086 (.160)
Oct	1.177 (.175)	1.182 (.175)	1.302 (.187)
Nov	1.151 (.173)	1.158 (.173)	1.015 (.153)
Dec	1.188 (.178)	1.202 (.179)	1.031 (.155)
Trend	1.000 (.001)	1.002 (.001)	.988*** (.002)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.191*** (.062)	1.144** (.059)	1.091 (.056)
2 months	1.105 (.057)	1.080 (.056)	
Corner Greeters active		.547** (.112)	.481** (.111)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.622* (.373)	1.946* (.512)
Safe Passage active		1.384 (.377)	1.561 (.428)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.765 (.250)	.840 (.278)
Business improvements active		2.019** (.470)	3.223*** (.755)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.525* (.150)	.302*** (.085)
CPTED active		.560** (.102)	1.110 (.215)
CPTED active × ABSPY		1.092 (.278)	.735 (.202)
PBIS active		1.261 (.344)	1.908* (.545)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.502* (.166)	.582 (.196)
Constant	4.357*** (1.463)	4.707*** (1.636)	3.743*** (.961)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	41.438 (23.167)	55.728 (33.350)	16.054 (10.622)
ln_s	10.783 (5.747)	13.106 (7.576)	12.400 (8.576)
Log likelihood	-1793.638	-1777.771	-2060.561
Wald chi2	51.442***	86.914***	203.245***
N	1260	1260	1270

Random effects negative binomial regression
 Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A5: Random effects negative binomial regression on Group A person offenses

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	1.090 (.130)		1.096 (.181)
ABSPY	1.468 (.364)	1.433 (.333)	1.439 (.341)
Post × ABSPY	.962 (.114)		.993 (.203)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.800 (.275)	.937 (.317)	.924 (.315)
Light Rail	.242*** (.088)	.254*** (.090)	.251*** (.089)
Lake Washington	.535 (.188)	.621 (.215)	.618 (.215)
Safeway	.602 (.207)	.539 (.183)	.539 (.183)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	.996 (.146)	.990 (.143)	.991 (.143)
Mar	1.170 (.161)	1.132 (.154)	1.135 (.155)
Apr	1.146 (.158)	1.108 (.152)	1.116 (.153)
May	1.342* (.179)	1.335* (.177)	1.339* (.178)
Jun	1.273 (.172)	1.296 (.176)	1.305 (.178)
Jul	1.298 (.174)	1.320* (.178)	1.330* (.180)
Aug	1.236 (.167)	1.245 (.169)	1.255 (.171)
Sep	1.274 (.175)	1.262 (.173)	1.265 (.174)
Oct	1.169 (.163)	1.156 (.161)	1.159 (.162)
Nov	1.046 (.150)	1.039 (.148)	1.042 (.149)
Dec	1.059 (.152)	1.057 (.151)	1.062 (.152)
Trend	.998 (.001)	1.000 (.001)	.999 (.002)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.161** (.058)	1.119* (.056)	1.118* (.056)
2 months	1.084 (.055)	1.061 (.053)	1.060 (.054)
Corner Greeters active		.598** (.115)	.573** (.121)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.522* (.326)	1.528 (.384)
Safe Passage active		1.675* (.421)	1.606 (.425)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.685 (.217)	.692 (.230)
Business improvements active		2.099*** (.472)	2.093*** (.469)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.657 (.179)	.660 (.179)
CPTED active		.637* (.113)	.645* (.114)
CPTED active × ABSPY		.999 (.243)	.997 (.242)
PBIS active		1.242 (.308)	1.295 (.333)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.633 (.199)	.628 (.202)
Constant	5.526*** (1.959)	6.099*** (2.229)	6.096*** (2.239)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	37.860 (20.607)	47.516 (27.098)	47.549 (27.143)
ln_s	8.706 (4.446)	9.992 (5.368)	9.956 (5.349)
Log likelihood	-1804.096	-1790.509	-1790.203
Wald chi2	56.831***	87.858***	88.590***
N	1260	1260	1260

Random effects negative binomial regression
 Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A6: Random effects negative binomial regression on Group A property offenses

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	.881 (.075)		.851 (.105)
ABSPY	1.149 (.271)	1.212 (.283)	1.146 (.271)
Post × ABSPY	1.126 (.096)		1.282 (.194)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.402* (.166)	.403* (.170)	.402* (.170)
Light Rail	.525 (.231)	.523 (.232)	.523 (.232)
Lake Washington	.626 (.282)	.648 (.294)	.637 (.287)
Safeway	.338** (.140)	.330** (.141)	.335* (.144)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.030 (.103)	1.029 (.103)	1.028 (.102)
Mar	1.103 (.110)	1.094 (.109)	1.096 (.109)
Apr	.968 (.099)	.967 (.099)	.966 (.099)
May	1.157 (.111)	1.165 (.113)	1.164 (.112)
Jun	.958 (.095)	.971 (.098)	.969 (.097)
Jul	1.173 (.112)	1.184 (.115)	1.183 (.115)
Aug	1.004 (.099)	1.013 (.102)	1.012 (.102)
Sep	1.035 (.103)	1.032 (.103)	1.031 (.103)
Oct	1.197 (.115)	1.194 (.115)	1.192 (.115)
Nov	1.026 (.102)	1.022 (.102)	1.021 (.102)
Dec	.984 (.098)	.989 (.099)	.988 (.099)
Trend	.998 (.001)	.998 (.001)	.998 (.001)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.202*** (.048)	1.202*** (.048)	1.199*** (.048)
2 months	1.131** (.045)	1.131** (.045)	1.128** (.044)
3 months	1.092* (.043)	1.092* (.043)	1.091* (.042)
4 months	1.029 (.040)	1.029 (.039)	1.025 (.039)
Corner Greeters active		.756* (.100)	.844 (.130)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.253 (.188)	1.055 (.194)
Safe Passage active		1.048 (.217)	1.134 (.244)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		.950 (.239)	.846 (.221)
Business improvements active		1.336 (.198)	1.351* (.202)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.784 (.145)	.770 (.143)
CPTED active		.912 (.121)	.913 (.121)
CPTED active × ABSPY		1.054 (.200)	1.052 (.200)
PBIS active		1.267 (.263)	1.201 (.254)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.849 (.212)	.915 (.231)
Constant	8.215*** (3.192)	8.037*** (3.165)	8.493*** (3.371)
Dispersion parameters			
In_r	10.540 (6.400)	10.736 (6.646)	10.940 (6.816)
In_s	4.015 (2.527)	4.094 (2.635)	4.142 (2.680)
Log likelihood	-2393.968	-2391.921	-2390.539
Wald chi2	119.145***	121.806***	125.419***
N	1240	1240	1240

Random effects negative binomial regression
 Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table A7: Random effects negative binomial regression on Group B offenses

	ABSPY only	Individual interventions only	Full model
Fixed effects	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)	IRR (SE)
Post	1.454** (.195)		1.299 (.246)
ABSPY	1.334 (.285)	1.334 (.269)	1.301 (.280)
Post × ABSPY	1.029 (.138)		1.205 (.271)
Matched pair (ref:Rainier & Henderson)			
Rose St	.758 (.214)	.894 (.259)	.862 (.259)
Light Rail	.251*** (.081)	.283*** (.091)	.258*** (.086)
Lake Washington	.521* (.153)	.616 (.183)	.593 (.182)
Safeway	.847 (.237)	.876 (.252)	.861 (.256)
Month (ref:Jan)			
Feb	1.018 (.160)	1.035 (.163)	1.024 (.160)
Mar	1.082 (.167)	1.090 (.169)	1.075 (.165)
Apr	1.193 (.180)	1.127 (.172)	1.146 (.174)
May	1.318 (.194)	1.267 (.188)	1.267 (.187)
Jun	1.049 (.156)	.965 (.147)	.982 (.149)
Jul	1.192 (.173)	1.104 (.164)	1.123 (.166)
Aug	.990 (.149)	.915 (.141)	.934 (.143)
Sep	.834 (.133)	.794 (.128)	.799 (.128)
Oct	.923 (.146)	.878 (.140)	.884 (.140)
Nov	.962 (.152)	.912 (.145)	.922 (.146)
Dec	1.090 (.168)	1.049 (.163)	1.057 (.162)
Trend	.992*** (.002)	.991*** (.002)	.988*** (.002)
Autocorrelation controls			
1 month	1.242*** (.070)	1.233*** (.070)	1.205*** (.068)
2 months	1.131* (.064)	1.129* (.064)	1.106 (.062)
3 months	1.168** (.066)	1.164** (.065)	1.143* (.064)
4 months	1.196** (.067)	1.184** (.067)	1.168** (.066)
5 months	.977 (.054)	.965 (.054)	.952 (.053)
Corner Greeters active		1.124 (.220)	1.002 (.223)
Corner Greeters active × ABSPY		1.300 (.290)	1.166 (.308)
Safe Passage active		1.217 (.340)	1.144 (.330)
Safe Passage active × ABSPY		1.000 (.345)	.949 (.337)
Business improvements active		1.490 (.334)	1.562* (.346)
Business improvements active × ABSPY		.710 (.193)	.713 (.191)
CPTED active		.753 (.157)	.774 (.160)
CPTED active × ABSPY		1.157 (.338)	1.137 (.330)
PBIS active		1.605 (.433)	1.893* (.533)
PBIS active × ABSPY		.525 (.177)	.519 (.178)
Constant	3.220*** (.995)	3.517*** (1.128)	4.124*** (1.374)
Dispersion parameters			
ln_r	41.042 (23.851)	45.486 (28.824)	43.559 (26.673)
ln_s	13.217 (7.576)	14.406 (9.102)	13.056 (7.916)
Log likelihood	-1599.402	-1594.955	-1590.502
Wald chi2	184.748***	195.988***	203.724***
N	1230	1230	1230

Random effects negative binomial regression
 Exponentiated coefficients (incidence rate ratio, IRR)
 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure A1: Percent change in calls for service in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014




Figure A2: Percent change in offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014




Figure A3: Percent change in youth offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in offenses involving youth




Figure A4: Percent change in violent offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014

Neighborhood-level change in violent offenses




Figure A5: Percent change in NIBRS Group A Person offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014




Figure A6: Percent change in NIBRS Group A Property offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014




Figure A7: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses in hot spots, Rainier Beach, and South Precinct, pre/post May 2014




Figure A8: Percent change in calls for service at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A9: Percent change in all offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A10: Percent change in youth offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A11: Percent change in violent offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A12: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A13: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A14: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Rose Street and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A15: Percent change in calls for service at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in calls for service, Rainier & Henderson




Figure A16: Percent change in all offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in all offenses, Rainier & Henderson




Figure A17: Percent change in youth offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A18: Percent change in violent offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A19: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group A person offenses, Rainier & Henderson




Figure A20: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group A property offenses, Rainier & Henderson




Figure A21: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Rainier & Henderson and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A22: Percent change in calls for service at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A23: Percent change in all offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A24: Percent change in youth offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A25: Percent change in violent offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A26: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A27: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group A property offenses, Light Rail




Figure A28: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Light Rail and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group B offenses, Light Rail




Figure A29: Percent change in calls for service at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A30: Percent change in all offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A31: Percent change in youth offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A32: Percent change in violent offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A33: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A34: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A35: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Lake Washington and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group B offenses, Lake Washington




Figure A36: Percent change in calls for service at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A37: Percent change in all offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A38: Percent change in youth offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A39: Percent change in violent offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A40: Percent change in NIBRS Group A person offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A41: Percent change in NIBRS Group A property offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014




Figure A42: Percent change in NIBRS Group B offenses at Safeway and its comparison site, pre/post May 2014

Change in NIBRS Group B offenses, Safeway

